State of Play
Everton's estimated squad cost ratio is 67.1% against the Premier League's 85% limit for clubs outside Europe, leaving roughly £49.4m/yr of cost headroom. The summer 2026 window stands at £89.3m banked from sales against £65.2m committed on signings. Every figure here is this tracker's own estimate, built from published accounts and media reporting, as reported 3 Sept 2026.
The Clock — What's Counting Down
6 SEP
22 AUG · PALACE (H)
OCT 2026
31 DEC · FINAL CYCLE
The Six Regulations — Pass / Fail / Room Left
Quick Answers — Everton's Finances in Plain English
Are Everton in trouble with FFP in 2026?
Not currently. The two points deductions of 2023/24 (6 + 2) closed the historic breaches; the Friedkin takeover converted £450m of Moshiri loans to equity; and the June 2025 sale of the women's team and Goodison Park Stadium Ltd to the parent company booked £49.2m of profit that — on independent estimates — turned a ~£30m final-cycle PSR breach into a ~£19m pass. Thin, engineered, but a pass, pending the FY26 accounts.
What rule applies to Everton now that PSR is gone?
From 2026/27 the Premier League's Squad Cost Ratio caps player and manager wages + transfer amortisation + agent fees at 85% of football revenue plus net player-trading profit (clubs in Europe get 70%). Everton, not in Europe, get the 85% tier — passed by a 14–6 club vote in November 2025, with Sustainability & Systemic Resilience (SSR) solvency tests alongside.
What is Everton's squad cost ratio?
Roughly 79% of projected 2026/27 football revenue on this tracker's estimates, with the completed Nørgaard signing counted — inside the 85% line with about £16m/yr of cost headroom. The caveat: on last season's £196.7m revenue the same cost base was around 86%, so the compliance case rests on the Hill Dickinson Stadium's near-doubled matchday income and the new TV cycle actually landing.
Can Everton spend this summer?
Yes — genuinely, for the first time since the Moshiri spending era ended. Analysts have called the SCR switch an "unshackling": accumulated historic losses no longer bind, only this season's cost-to-revenue ratio does. Hackney (£16.5m), George (~£18m), Röhl (~£18m) and now Christian Nørgaard (~£7m from Arsenal, announced 5 August on a two-year deal) are in; ~£16m/yr of headroom is roughly £80m of fees on five-year deals — though spending to the line would leave nothing for January.
What's happening with Jack Grealish?
Everton declined the £50m purchase option after his season-ending foot injury — an option priced for the player of the first half of 2025/26, not one coming back from surgery. Talks continue towards a cut-price PERMANENT deal — a fee around £10.4m and wages near £200k/wk remain the reported numbers as of 9 August, with the player said to favour a return and gossip columns now reporting Everton EXPECT to get it done. Nothing is agreed with City, and the stress fracture means any deal lands late in the window. The Rumour Mill tab models both structures.
Why did Everton sell their women's team to their own owner?
PSR. Selling Everton FC Women Ltd and Goodison Park Stadium Ltd to Roundhouse Capital (Dan Friedkin's holding company) on 27 June 2025 — three days before the accounting deadline — booked £49.2m of profit against a book value of roughly £1.25m for the women's team. Chelsea and Aston Villa ran the same play. The PL accepted it under PSR at fair value; the new SCR rules close the loophole, which is one reason the timing mattered.
Incomings & Outgoings
Summer 2026 window (opened 15 June, closes 1 September — delayed by the World Cup). A deal enters this table at a medical and not before: ADVANCED means terms agreed and the medical taken or booked, DONE means a club has announced it. Anything short of that is interest, however well sourced, and interest lives on the Rumours tab. Fees per media reports; deals at medical/agreed stage are marked Advanced and deals still being negotiated are marked In talks — neither is a completed signing. Everton's window so far is the mirror image of recent years: money going OUT on fees, and the departures list made of expiring contracts, not forced sales.
Summer 2026 — Out
| Player | To | Fee £m | Wage £k/wk | Cost freed £m/yr | Profit £m | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Summer 2026 — In
| Player | From | Fee £m | Wage £k/wk | SCR cost £m/yr | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2025/26 Season — In (Summer 25 + Jan 26)
| Player | From | Fee £m | Window |
|---|
2025/26 Season — Out
| Player | To | Fee £m | Window |
|---|
Spending Headroom
"Room" for Everton in 2026/27 means one thing above all: distance below the Premier League's 85% squad cost ratio. The old PSR three-year loss maths ended on 30 June 2026 (final assessment January 2027), and there is no UEFA layer because there is no European football. The model below is adjustable — the defaults are my estimates, so put your own numbers in.
The window so far — fee balance
The Deduction Era — Every PL Points Sanction, Compared
Everton didn't just live through the PSR sanction era — they WERE it. Every Premier League points deduction under PSR, side by side.
| Club | Deduction | Period covered | Breach size | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Everton (I) · Nov 2023 | −10 → −6 on appeal | 3 yrs to 2021/22 | £124.5m loss vs £105m cap (£19.5m over) | First-ever PSR deduction; appeal board cut it to 6 (Feb 2024) citing errors in the original panel's approach. Finished 15th |
| Everton (II) · Apr 2024 | −2 | 3 yrs to 2022/23 | £16.6m over the cap | Only club charged twice; panel credited overlap with the first case & early guilty plea. Stayed up on 48 points |
| Nottingham Forest · Mar 2024 | −4 | 3 yrs to 2022/23 | £34.5m over their £61m promoted-club cap | Credited for cooperation; survived on goal difference — above Luton |
| Leicester City · 2024–25 | Escaped, then not | 3 yrs to 2022/23 | Charged; appeal board initially found no jurisdiction after relegation | The great jurisdictional loophole — later closed by rule amendment. The case PSR's replacement was partly designed to avoid repeating |
Annual constraint — squad cost ratio model
Squad cost = player & manager wages + transfer amortisation + agent fees. Denominator = football revenue + net player-trading profit. Defaults are this tracker's FY27 projections (revenue up on the stadium's first full corporate season + the new TV cycle). Edit any figure:
What-if: add a signing
Rumour Mill
The window shut at 11pm on 1 September 2026, and this tab is now mostly history. Nothing below can become an incoming transfer until January: a registration cannot be lodged outside the window, so every inbound link here is closed rather than pending, however well sourced it was. Three things the deadline does not close, which is why the cards are kept live rather than swept away. Free agents — a player already out of contract can be signed and registered outside the window. Outgoing moves abroad — several leagues closed later than England, so a player could still leave after English clubs had stopped buying: the Saudi Pro League runs to 6 September, the Süper Lig closed on 4 September and MLS on 2 September. Seven cards on this site point at one of those and are still live; every other card is now marked JANUARY and priced as a January deal rather than one that can happen today. Academy moves — an under-18 joining on training compensation is not moving a professional registration and is not bound by this deadline. Cards are left in place because a rumour that died at the deadline is a record of what was reported and what it was worth, and deleting them would quietly improve this site’s hit rate. The tick-box model still works: a JANUARY card prices what the deal would cost when the window reopens, which is the question actually worth asking about a link that survived the summer.
Everything on this tab is short of a medical. That is the line: a deal that has reached one sits in the Ins & Outs table, and everything below it — an offer, an agreement in principle, personal terms with no fee agreed, a bid lodged — is here, counting towards nothing until it moves. Tick any combination of live rumours (fees and wages are my estimates of reported figures) and the panel at the bottom recalculates the effect on the rules that actually bind Everton: the 85% PL squad cost ratio, the annual cost swing, the window's net balance, and the profit any sale would book into the denominator. Uses the same base assumptions as the Headroom tab, so tweaks there flow through here.
Incoming rumours
Outgoing rumours
Squad · Book Value & Amortisation
Senior squad after this summer's confirmed exits. Book value is computed live: straight-line amortisation of the reported fee from signing date to current contract end (extensions re-spread the remaining value — this is the standard treatment). Fees, contract dates and wages are media-reported/database estimates, not official — Everton disclose almost nothing. Tap a column to sort.
| Player | Pos | Fee £m | Signed | Contract End | Yrs Left | Amort £m/yr | Book Value £m | Mkt Val £m | Profit If Sold £m | Est Wage £k/wk |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Amortisation Runway — What's Already Committed
Transfer-fee amortisation locked into future seasons from today's contracts (straight-line on remaining book value), plus the amber scenario bar for a Grealish permanent (the ~£10.4m fee now reported, spread over an assumed three-year deal — the contract length has not been reported). This is spending that's already eaten before Everton buy anyone else.
Premier League homegrown quota — 2026/27
Two ceilings, not one. A club may register 25 senior players, and no more than 17 of them may be non-homegrown. The familiar “eight homegrown” line is what falls out of those two numbers — but only if you fill all 25. A club with six qualifiers is not breaking any rule; it simply cannot name a squad bigger than 23. Under-21s sit outside the list altogether and play regardless: for 2026/27, born on or after 1 January 2005. Players out on loan are not registered.
Homegrown is a registration test, not a passport test. Three entire seasons, or 36 months, at any club affiliated to the FA or the FAW before the end of the season in which the player turns 21. That is why Iliman Ndiaye qualifies — French-born, but Boreham Wood and then Sheffield United from 18 — while Nathan Patterson does not: Rangers is a Scottish FA club, and Everton came too late to serve three seasons.
PL 25-Man Squad List — 2026/27
Everton aren't in Europe, so there's no UEFA List A — the list that matters is the Premier League's 25-man squad list: max 25 players over 21, of whom no more than 17 can be non-homegrown (HG = registered with an English/Welsh club for three seasons before the 21st birthday). Under-21s (born on/after 1 Jan 2005 for this season) play without registration. Everton's problem has historically been the opposite of most rivals': plenty of HG quota, not enough squad.
List Transition · 2025/26 → 2026/27
Each position: who's gone off last season's list, who stays, and who fills the hole — with deal status. The exits are all expiring contracts; the arrivals are all bought. Only confirmed deals are classed in/out — loose links stay in the Rumour Mill.
Goalkeepers
Defenders
Midfielders — the succession
Forwards
Sanction Tracker — The PSR Years
The Loss Glidepath — 3-Year Rolling PSR Result vs the £105m Cap
The first-ever PSR points deduction — 10 points
An independent commission found a £124.5m loss for the three years to 2021/22, £19.5m over the cap, and imposed the biggest sporting sanction in Premier League history. Everton's mitigation — stadium financing costs, the loss of "Player Y"'s (Sigurðsson's) value, Usmanov-linked sponsorship evaporating after the invasion of Ukraine — was largely rejected. The club called it "wholly disproportionate and unjust" and appealed.
Appeal: 10 becomes 6
The appeal board found legal errors in the original panel's approach to sanctioning and cut the deduction to 6 points — still the joint-largest ever applied at the time. Everton climbed from the bottom three overnight.
The second charge — 2 more points
A separate commission for the period ending 2022/23 (a £16.6m breach) docked another 2 points, crediting the overlap with the first case and an early admission. Everton became the only club sanctioned twice under PSR — and still finished 15th, four points clear.
The Friedkin takeover — the balance sheet rescue
The Friedkin Group completed its purchase from Farhad Moshiri via Roundhouse Capital Holdings, ending the 777 Partners saga and years of financing on a knife-edge. What followed was the largest recapitalisation in the club's history: £450.75m of interest-free Moshiri shareholder loans converted into equity, shareholders' funds rising from £168.5m to £393.3m, and the going-concern doubts that haunted successive audit reports finally lifted.
The women's team & Goodison sale — PSR managed, three days before the deadline
Everton FC Women Ltd and Goodison Park Stadium Ltd were sold to parent company Roundhouse for a combined profit of £49.2m, booked in the FY25 accounts. Book value of the women's team: ~£1.25m. The Premier League permits intra-group sales at fair value under PSR — Chelsea and Aston Villa ran the same play — and analysts estimate the transaction converted a ~£30m final-cycle breach into a ~£19m pass. Legal under the old rules; impossible under the new ones. That's why it happened when it did.
Clean sheet — and the rule that caught Everton retires
No new charges. The final PSR cycle closed 30 June 2026; accounts are due 31 December, the last-ever PSR assessment lands in January 2027, and from this season the squad cost ratio takes over — a rule that measures this year's costs, not the Moshiri era's accumulated losses. No UEFA exposure (no European football), no embargo, no open proceedings. For the first time since 2021, the Sanctions tab of an Everton finance tracker is a history page.
Last Accounts — FY2024/25 (y/e 30 June 2025)
The final season at Goodison Park, 13th place under Moyes, and the first full accounts of the Friedkin era. Headline: a club-record £196.7m turnover and the loss slashed to £8.6m. Reality: the loss only shrank that far because of a £49.2m one-off sale of the women's team and Goodison Park Stadium Ltd to the club's own parent company.
Revenue mix
How −£57.8m became −£8.6m
| Underlying pre-tax result (est.) | −£57.8m |
| Profit on sale of Everton FC Women Ltd + Goodison Park Stadium Ltd → intra-group, 27 Jun 2025 | +£49.2m |
| Reported pre-tax loss | −£8.6m |
Rules & Compliance Status
Every regime that applies to Everton, the limit in pounds, and where the club stands. "FFP" itself no longer exists as a single rule — it's the old umbrella name. For Everton in 2026/27 the live rulebook is the Premier League's SCR + SSR; PSR is in its final assessment; UEFA's rules only bite if Everton qualify for Europe.
Compliance calendar
PSR — Profitability & Sustainability
SCR — Squad Cost Ratio (PL)
SSR — Sustainability & Systemic Resilience
UEFA Financial Sustainability — dormant
Swap-Deal / Player-Exchange Rule
25-Man List & Homegrown Quota
FFP → what it means now
Amortisation & "pure profit"
The Whole League — Bean Counted
All 20 clubs for 2026/27: which SCR tier they're in, their latest published accounts (FY2024/25, y/e mid-2025), and their compliance baggage. Nine clubs in Europe carry the 70% green / 100% red caps; the other eleven get 85% / 115%. Notes updated 27 Jul — officially announced deals and appointments only; pursuits and links stay in the Rumour Mill. Figures marked ~ are estimates from league-wide analyses rather than confirmed line items — FY25 league totals: £6.8bn revenue, £4.4bn wages, £2.0bn amortisation, £948m aggregate pre-tax losses.
| Club | Europe 26/27 | Green cap | Rev £m | Wages £m | W/R | Compliance notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Arsenal | CL · CHAMPIONS | 70% | ~617 | ~328 | ~53% | Comfortable on both ratios; CL runners-up 25/26. Amortisation £170m+ the main cost line. |
Manchester City | CL | 70% | ~715 | 408 | ~57% | New era: Maresca replaces Guardiola. Broke the British record for Forest’s Anderson (£116m, fixed fee) — absorbed inside 70% by a £715m revenue base. |
Manchester United | CL | 70% | ~666 | ~313 | ~47% | Carrick made permanent manager; ~£85m midfield rebuild (Santos £50m, Tielemans £35m from Villa). £196m amortisation, but a £666m denominator makes 70% easy. |
Aston Villa | CL · EL HOLDERS | 70% | 378 | 273 | 72% | Mid-UEFA-settlement, fined twice, trend endorsed — selling the £117m British-record Rogers to comply, and reportedly circling Everton's Garner with the proceeds. |
Liverpool | CL | 70% | ~614 | ~386 | ~63% | Iraola officially appointed (4 Jun, 2-yr deal) after Slot was sacked a year on from the title. FY25 wages inflated by title bonuses after £241m on Isak (£125m) & Wirtz. Squad cost £545m, big denominator. |
Bournemouth | EUROPA | 70% | ~175 | ~140 | ~80% | Flagged spending near capacity in FY25 — and first-ever Europe now drags them from 85% to the 70% cap just as Iraola officially left for Liverpool. The squeeze case, squeezed further. |
Sunderland | EUROPA | 70% | ~180* | ~95* | ~53% | *FY25 = first PL season back. Europe two seasons after League One — the 70% cap lands on a still-growing revenue base. |
Crystal Palace | EUROPA · CONF WINNERS | 70% | ~190 | ~135 | ~71% | Conference League winners — then Glasner officially departed for Forest. Second straight European season keeps them on the 70% cap, right on the line like Villa. |
Brighton | CONFERENCE | 70% | ~222 | ~165 | ~74% | FY25 costs rose sharply on amortisation; historically balanced by elite player trading profits. |
Chelsea | — | 85% | ~541 | ~360 | ~67% | Xabi Alonso era. UEFA settlement (£26.7m paid, up to £51m conditional), fined again Jul 2026 — then broke their record for Rogers (£117m) days after loaning Garnacho to Villa, walking the swap-rule tightrope. League-high £212m amortisation; missing Europe eases the cap to 85%. |
Newcastle | — | 85% | ~350 | ~220 | ~63% | Fined Jul 2026 for BOTH SCR and FER breaches; FY25 leaned on selling Isak to Liverpool for £125m. Settlement obligations continue despite missing Europe. |
Tottenham | — | 85% | ~526 | ~222 | ~42% | Lowest wage ratio among the big-revenue clubs — the league's most comfortable bean-counting position. |
Nottingham Forest | — | 85% | ~190 | ~155 | ~82% | Fined £2.2m in Jul 2026 — then banked £116m selling Anderson to City, transforming the FER/PSR picture overnight. Glasner confirmed as head coach 6 Jul (reported club-record ~£13m/yr salary) — their FIFTH boss in 12 months. |
EVERTON | — | 85% | 197 | 152 | 77% | The subject of this tracker: two PSR deductions survived, recapitalised by Friedkin, and betting the Hill Dickinson revenue curve grows faster than the squad cost line. See every other tab. |
Fulham | — | 85% | ~180 | ~145 | ~81% | Small-revenue cohort where 85% barely funds a competitive XI — the other side of the SCR squeeze. |
Brentford | — | 85% | ~195 | ~125 | ~64% | The sustainability model club — comfortable margin on every metric. |
Leeds | — | 85% | ~150* | ~110* | ~73% | *FY25 = promotion season. Second PL season consolidating. |
Coventry | PROMOTED · CHAMPIONS | 85% | ~45* | ~35* | ~78% | *Championship-era accounts. PL broadcast money transforms the denominator overnight — big headroom if they spend sensibly. |
Ipswich | PROMOTED | 85% | ~145* | ~115* | ~79% | *FY25 reflects their last PL season. Straight back up at the first attempt. |
Hull | PROMOTED · PLAY-OFFS | 85% | ~30* | ~28* | ~93% | *Championship accounts. The biggest financial step-up in the division — SSR liquidity tests bite hardest here. In: Butland, ex-Villa Targett, Zambrano & Morita. |
Who's Selling to Survive — Net Transfer Balance
Sorted by net balance — the top of this table is where the selling pressure lives, the bottom is where the money goes.
Can Anyone Still Catch the Big Six?
The question underneath every number in this tracker. The honest answer: the old door is bricked up — but there's a turnstile, and Everton have just paid for a ticket to the queue.
Why it feels closed — because it mostly is
The squad cost ratio is a percentage of revenue — so it doesn't cap spending, it caps spending relative to income. City's 70% of ~£715m buys a ~£500m squad; Everton's 85% of ~£230m buys ~£195m. The gap is locked in by design. And the new rules kill the only ladder anyone ever actually climbed: Abramovich's Chelsea, early City, and — the cautionary tale on this very page — Moshiri's Everton all spent ahead of revenue. Everton tried the old route with ~£500m of signings from 2016–2020, got the points deductions instead of the trophies, and became the case study the new rulebook was written around. The clubs at the top climbed the ladder, then wrote rules that pulled it up.
The cracks in the door
1 · Grow the denominator. Every £1 of new revenue is 85p of new squad allowance at Everton's tier — which is why Hill Dickinson (52,888 seats, matchday income roughly doubling, a naming-rights deal already monetised) is worth more than any transfer the club could make. A stadium is the one revenue lever a non-Big-Six club fully controls. 2 · The trading engine. Net transfer profit counts IN the denominator — selling well literally raises your cap. Everton's academy line (Branthwaite's ~£1m book value, Armstrong, the Chermiti sell-on already paying twice) is the machine starting up. 3 · Efficiency is legal. Tarkowski free, Ndiaye at £15.7m, second-lowest five-year net spend while surviving two deductions — the lean years accidentally taught the exact discipline the new rules reward. 4 · The rich can now fail permanently. Under squad-cost rules, a £650m mistake consumes finite headroom even for giants. Bad buying is finally fatal at every level — and nobody knows the cost of bad buying better than Everton.
Changelog
Every update to the Bean Counter's data, newest first. Maintained manually with each rebuild.
Twenty-six sold players were sitting in “Retained” columns across fifteen clubs SITE-WIDE CORRECTION
Villa’s board was not the exception. It was the one somebody happened to be looking at. After Emiliano Martínez was found under “Retained” four days after his sale to Chelsea, the same pattern was checked across the other nineteen pages. Every club page carries these position boards — three columns each, who left, who stayed, who arrived — and at roughly forty-five chips a page that is about nine hundred hand-written claims, none of which any gate on this site could read, because they name players in free HTML rather than through a data array.
Twenty-six of them said a player had stayed when the club’s own deal table said he had been sold. The list is not marginal. Rodri sat under Manchester City’s “Retained · 6” tagged “REAL MADRID TALKS”; he had gone to Barcelona for £51m. Tijjani Reijnders (£52m, Al Qadsiah) and Nico González (£50m, Newcastle) were beside him. Carlos Baleba was retained at Brighton after a £65m move to Manchester United. Liam Delap was retained at Chelsea after £45m to Forest. Everton had five in one page — Ndiaye, McNeil, Beto, Iroegbunam and Patterson. Arsenal had Gabriel Jesus, Ipswich three, Hull two, Palace two, and so on across fifteen clubs.
Each one is now in the column it belongs in, with the destination and fee taken from the deal table rather than retyped. Column counts were recomputed from the chips actually present, so the headings match their own contents for the first time in a while. “Out · 0 — Nobody” placeholders were removed where a real departure now fills the column.
Worth recording how nearly this went wrong, because it is the second time today. The first script moved the chips and reported twenty-two successes. It had in fact deleted all twenty-two players: the insertion point never matched, the removal did, and the counts were recomputed afterwards so every column looked internally consistent. Nothing in the output said anything was missing. It was caught by reading one board back rather than by trusting the tally, and reverted. The rewrite asserts the set of names in a board before and after the edit and refuses to write when they differ — which then immediately caught a second, smaller error, and later a third: the pattern used to find a column was swallowing the last chip’s closing tag, so the final name in every column was invisible, which is why four clubs looked clean on the first pass and were not.
And a gate, the twenty-fifth. tools/check-flowboards.js asserts two things about every chip on every board: a name in a retained column must not be a completed permanent sale in that page’s OUT26, and a name in a retained column must exist in that page’s data at all. It says nothing about incoming or outgoing columns, where naming a target from another club is correct, and it exempts chips whose own tag places them outside the squad table — a third-choice keeper in contract talks, a U21 needing no registration. Its first run reported seventy-one problems, of which twenty-four were its own fault: typographic apostrophes it could not match to straight ones, and editorial labels like “Third keeper slot” that are not players. Tested against the pre-fix pages, where it finds exactly twenty-six.
The reason this sat unseen is worth stating plainly. The deal arrays are gated. The ratio inputs are gated. The squad table is gated. The answer block, the league tables and the share cards are all derived. These boards were the one substantial thing on every club page that was neither derived nor checked — prose in the shape of a table, in a heavily-read tab — and they had been drifting for as long as they have existed. It took a reader with the live page open to find the first one.
Deadline day, three weeks late: Ndiaye, Iroegbunam, Beto and Patterson out, Grealish and Maitland-Niles in OFFICIAL
This page had none of it. Everton did the largest single piece of business of their window on 1 September and this tracker was still showing Ndiaye as a live Al-Hilal rumour, Iroegbunam as a January target and Beto as a Nottingham Forest one. Six completed deals were missing. They are all in now, and the ratio moves 80.0% → 67.1% — the largest single-page correction this site has made.
Out: £89.3m of sales where the page showed £0m. Iliman Ndiaye to Manchester City for £60m guaranteed plus £5m of add-ons, booking ~£51m of profit against a £9.0m book value. Tim Iroegbunam to Hull at £13m guaranteed plus £9m. Beto to Fiorentina for a €18m package (~£15.4m). Nathan Patterson to Torino for €1m — against £3.4m of book value still to write off, so that one books a loss of ~£2.5m and is recorded as a loss rather than rounded to zero.
In: the loan, not the permanent. Jack Grealish returns on a season loan, which this page had two competing cards for — a £10.4m permanent and a cheaper loan. The cheaper one happened, and on these numbers that is the better outcome: no fee, no amortisation, and only the ~£130k/wk share Everton pick up. Ainsley Maitland-Niles arrives from Lyon at ~£4.2m.
The sell-on is booked, not mentioned. Villa kept 10% of the uplift when they sold Iroegbunam here in 2024. On the £13m guaranteed the uplift is £4m, so £0.4m goes to Villa and comes off the profit booked here — and lands as a receivable on their page, in the SELLON_IN field built on 2 September for exactly this. The clause is on the uplift rather than the fee, so it is stored as a sum: a percentage of the fee would have been £1.3m and wrong by more than three times.
And the £40m striker who did not sign. Balogun arrived for a medical, hit a problem, was re-cleared by specialists, and declined to sign with about five minutes of the window left. It is on the board as a dead card because a non-event that size is data: the Ndiaye money was the money for a striker, and Everton go into the season without one. It also ended Monaco’s Lamine Camara sale to Chelsea, which is one player’s decision closing three clubs’ windows.
All four inputs moved and every one of them is now derived rather than typed: wages £122m → £116m on the bridge, amortisation £72m → £60m from the squad table, player-trading £25m → £47m on the trading bridge. The squad table loses four players and gains two, and the registration prose was recounted from it rather than edited.
The Saudi deadline was five weeks out, and it is four days CORRECTION
This morning’s work put the Saudi Pro League window at 12 October and built a countdown, a gate and seven card tags on it. A reader said that sounded wrong — they had read it was days away. They were right.
The sources disagree. Wikipedia and Goal put the registration period at 22 July to 6 September; one tracker says 11 September; Sports Mole and AgentFlow say 12 October. The tell is arithmetic: 22 July to 12 October is 11.7 weeks, essentially FIFA’s twelve-week maximum for a registration period. That reads like somebody published the longest period permissible rather than the date actually announced. 6 September is 6.6 weeks, an ordinary window.
It is now carried at 6 September — the earliest credible date, chosen deliberately. The conservative error here is the early one: saying a shut window is open invents deals, which is the exact failure the window gate was written this morning to prevent. The countdown now reads four days rather than forty.
What is still unresolved: no source reachable from here separates Saudi domestic registration from international, so no such split is modelled. If one exists it is the international deadline that governs a sale out of England, and 12 October may well be a domestic-only extension rather than simply wrong. The date is flagged as contested on the deadline page rather than asserted.
Worth naming the pattern: the 12 October figure came from a single search result, and the source family it came from has now been wrong four times in this project — Hincapié’s fee, Trafford’s club, Fofana’s club, and this. A date that anchors a gate deserved a second source before it was written into twenty-one pages.
The window is shut, and the site now says so — except where it isn’t CORRECTION
The Premier League window closed at 11pm on 1 September, so from the 2nd no rumour card here can describe a signing as something still pending: a registration cannot be lodged outside the window, however well sourced the link was. 139 cards are now marked JANUARY and priced as January deals rather than deals that can be done today.
But “the window” is not one thing, and flattening it would be the opposite error. A club that cannot buy can still sell: the Saudi Pro League runs to 6 September and the Süper Lig to the 4th; MLS closed on the 2nd. Bundesliga clubs finished earliest, on 31 August; Serie A, LaLiga and the Premier League all shut on the 1st. Six cards survive because they point at a league that outlasted England’s, and each has had its destination narrowed to the club that can actually still act. The seventh has already gone. Leon Bailey, whose card read “Al Diriyah” after Sevilla and Hull ran out of time, signed for Olympiacos on 2 September for £3.4m — which is the point of this section in one transfer. The English window shutting does not stop an English club selling, and it did not stop this one. It also proves a window this table does not list: Greece was still open on 2 September, and no closing date for it could be sourced, so none is stored rather than guessed.
The first countdown clock had been reading DONE against a label saying “days to window close”. It now counts to the Saudi deadline on 6 September — the one transfer deadline that still constrains these clubs, because they can still sell into it.
tools/check-window-state.js holds it: a card with no jan flag is asserting the deal can happen now, so its destination must sit in a window open today. It is date-driven rather than a one-off sweep — on 5 September the Türkiye cards stop being live and the gate says so without anyone remembering. It found six on Fulham that the first pass missed, because those rows are written with double quotes where the rest of the site uses single.
The countdown gate had a matching blind spot: it skipped any page without a club nav and only knew one label shape, so deadline/ was invisible to it — and was still counting to 1am on 1 October, the exact GMT-versus-BST bug that gate was written for, fixed on twenty pages and left on the twenty-first. It now reads both shapes, both const and var, and every page that carries a clock.
The Muñoz card was still live after he had signed for Forest DATA
Everton were credited with interest in Daniel Muñoz through August. He joined Nottingham Forest on 30 August for £20m, and the card here stayed live and kept moving the scenario modeller.
It is now marked dead. It stays on the board as a record of a pursuit Everton did not win, which is what the dead flag is for — the alternative, deleting it, would quietly erase the fact that the club chased him at all. No other figure on this page changes.
Hull are back for Iroegbunam — £15m plus £7m, and a sell-on worth naming RUMOUR
Tanswell has Hull closing in on an agreement at £15m guaranteed plus £7m of add-ons, three weeks after they walked away when he tore a hamstring in the Stuttgart friendly. Only the guaranteed £15m counts here.
It stays in the Rumour Mill. Closing in on an agreement is not an agreement, and it is a long way short of a medical.
What it would do: he cost £9m in July 2024 and is written down to about £4.1m, so £15m books roughly £10.9m of profit, or £10.3m after the sell-on. Cost freed is about £5.9m/yr. A domestic sale, so no FIFA solidarity.
The sell-on is the part worth pinning down. Aston Villa take 10%, reported at about £500,000 — and that figure identifies the clause. 10% of the accounting profit would be £1.09m; 10% of the uplift over the £9m Everton paid is £600k. So it is a resale-uplift clause, not a share of book profit. Same three words, a different number, and the difference only shows up when someone publishes the answer.
Three pages had the window shutting four hours early CORRECTION
Hull, Coventry and Newcastle counted down to 7pm on 1 September. The window shuts at 11pm, which is what the other seventeen pages said and what their clocks ran to. On the eve of deadline day, three club pages were telling readers they had four hours less than they did.
Both halves were wrong together, which is why nothing looked odd on those pages: the label said 7PM and the clock counted to 19:00, so they agreed with each other and disagreed with the rest of the site. The first fix here only corrected the labels, and the new gate immediately failed for the right reason, catching a symptom fixed without its cause.
Also tidied: a squad-list deadline written as “after the window closes (~2 September)”, where the date belongs to the list and the parenthetical made it read as hedging on the window itself. And the Premier League checkpoint countdown was set to midnight UTC on 1 October, which is one o’clock in the morning here, because it was stored as though Britain were on GMT in October rather than BST.
tools/check-countdowns.js now renders each stored target through Europe/London and compares it to the label written beside it. Timezone is the whole difficulty: 22:00 UTC is 11pm in September and would not be in December, so the two can only be compared after conversion. Broken on purpose in both directions before being trusted, once with a wrong label against a right clock and once the other way about.
This was found because a reader corrected something said in conversation, not by anything that runs. Sixteen gates check this site and none of them read a clock.
The bolding was doing too much work — 2,316 signposts dropped EDITORIAL
A reader said the site reads as though a machine wrote it. That is worth measuring rather than arguing with, so it was measured.
The design came out fine. Claret and blue are the club’s own rather than the cream-and-terracotta that generated pages default to, the display face is Barlow Condensed rather than Inter, corners are three or four pixels rather than fully rounded, and there are five emoji on a 530KB page. Nothing there needed changing.
The prose was the problem, and one habit dominated: a bolded editorial sentence opening almost every paragraph. There were 2,612 of them, roughly one bold span every 62 words across half a million words of text. Bold is for things a reader scans for — a fee, a name, a date, a verdict. Used on the thesis of every paragraph it stops marking anything at all, and it is one of the most recognisable tells there is.
2,316 of those have gone. Figures, names, labels and short verdicts keep theirs. No wording changed anywhere, only tags, so nothing about the analysis moved and the whole pass reverts with one command. Density goes from one bold every 62 words to one every 85.
Two things this does not fix, stated plainly because the difference matters. The em-dash rate is 17.3 per thousand words against one to three in edited prose, and that needs a slower pass: a blanket substitution produces comma splices. And underneath both is a rhetorical habit no script reaches — signpost, then aphorism, then antithesis, three times a paragraph. That is the thing the reader actually noticed, and it has to be rewritten by hand.
One note on method: the first attempt stripped the bold from the two sentences that state the medical rule, which tools/check-deal-stage.js holds byte-identical across all twenty pages. The gate failed and the sentences are excluded now. It was written to guard a transfer convention and it caught a typography change, which is the argument for gating wording as well as arithmetic.
Agent fees to 10%, the wage gross-up to 1.55x — both were too low, and the FA publishes the proof MODEL CHANGE
Two constants underneath every figure on this site have moved, at a reader’s prompting. The agent fee charged on a signing goes from 5% of the transfer fee to 10%, and the wage gross-up from 1.45x to 1.55x. Both were estimates that had never been checked against a published source. Both now have one.
The agent rate was checkable all along. The FA publishes what every club pays intermediaries. Between 4 February 2025 and 2 February 2026, Premier League clubs paid £460.3m — against the £3,137m of incoming fees this site records for that window, an implied rate of 14.7%, nearly three times the 5% being charged. Chelsea alone paid £65.1m, Aston Villa £38.4m. 10% is the figure taken, deliberately below the implied ceiling: the FA total also covers sales, loans and contract renewals, and only the buy-side portion is capitalised into a transfer’s cost. It is a floor with evidence under it rather than a rule of thumb.
The gross-up was missing a whole category of pay. It covered employer NI, bonuses and image rights — but not signing-on fees, and UEFA is explicit that they count. Annex G.3 of the Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations: all forms of consideration to and/or benefit of players, such as sign-on fees, must be treated as employee benefit expenses and not costs of a player’s registration. So they belong in the numerator, they sit with the wage rather than the amortisation, and they spread across the contract as a prepayment for services. Employer NI alone is 15%, so of the old 45% only about 30 points were doing the work of bonuses, image rights and signing-on fees together. 55% gives that last item somewhere to live.
What actually moved. League-wide, the annual cost this window adds rises from £1,257m to £1,330m. Twelve clubs’ wage inputs were re-derived by the bridge and reset to it; no club crossed a limit, and headline ratios moved by at most 0.9 of a point — mostly downwards, which is worth understanding rather than glossing: the gross-up applies to the net wage movement, and most clubs sold more wage than they bought, so a bigger multiplier makes a negative movement more negative. Every projection built on an old baseline was recomputed too, not just the baselines.
One piece of tidying that mattered more than it looks. The gross-up existed as a named constant and then as five hard-coded copies of 1.45 in the same file, on all twenty pages. They all now read the constant. A number duplicated a hundred times across a site is not a convention, it is a hundred chances to change ninety-nine of them.
Nothing below a medical belongs in the Ins & Outs tables RULE CHANGE
Jack Grealish leaves the Ins table. Two Rumour Mill cards already modelled him properly — the permanent and the second loan, priced separately, which is the whole question — while the Ins row flattened both into one line at a fee that is not agreed with Manchester City. His loan-ended row in the Outs table is untouched: that one happened.
The status ladder ran done → advanced → in talks → offer, and all four rungs were rendered as rows in the deal tables. The bottom two contributed nothing to any figure — every total on this site filters to done and advanced — which made them arithmetically harmless and editorially loud. A reader scanning the Ins table saw rows the club had never agreed to, in the same table, in the same shape, as business that is done. Being excluded from the totals is not visible; being in the table is.
The threshold is now a medical. A deal enters at advanced — terms agreed and the medical taken or booked, awaiting only an announcement — and moves to done when a club announces it. A loan row is an agreed loan. Everything short of that is interest, however well sourced, and interest lives in the Rumour Mill, where it can still be ticked and modelled against the ratio. Nothing has been deleted. A row that counted towards nothing still counts towards nothing; it is just no longer sitting where settled business sits.
Four figures did move, and they moved because they had been wrong. The headline ratios, the swing and the window balance all filter to done and advanced and were untouched. But the amortisation column added to the deal tables sums every row in the table with no filter at all, and writes its total into a footer labelled “TOTALS IN (confirmed/advanced)” — a total that named a filter it did not apply. The same total feeds the “Added by this window’s deals” and “Net change” lines under the run-off chart. So unagreed deals were being amortised into figures that said they excluded them:
- Crystal Palace — added by this window’s deals +£12.4m/yr → +£6.6m/yr, nearly halved, because Le Guen (£12m) and Njie (£16m) were being amortised though neither fee exists; freed −£18.3m/yr → −£12.3m/yr; net −£5.9m → −£5.7m/yr.
- Sunderland — added +£11.2m/yr → +£6.7m/yr and net change +£9.2m → +£4.8m/yr, on an asking price for Poku that no one had agreed to pay.
- Brentford — added +£16.9m/yr → +£16.1m/yr, net +£16.5m → +£15.6m/yr.
- Liverpool — totals out, wage ~£735k/wk → ~£725k/wk and cost freed £61m → £60.2m/yr, for a loan with no agreed destination.
The amortisation code has deliberately not been changed. Its filter is now the whole table, because the whole table is now business at a medical or beyond — and the fix belongs at the input, in one gate, rather than as a twenty-first copy of the same rule pasted into twenty pages of inline script. That is also the answer to why this survived: nothing compared a table’s footer against the label printed on it, and the rows doing the damage were invisible in every figure a reader would have checked.
Twelve rows moved across eight clubs, and the wording moved on all twenty. The ledes described the threshold nine different ways — “medical/verbal”, “option/verbal”, “talks/verbal”, “medical or negotiating” — and three of those promised a table that now excludes what they promised. One sentence states the rule on the Ins & Outs tab and its counterpart on the Rumours tab, identical on every page, and tools/check-deal-stage.js holds both to the letter as well as failing any deal row below the threshold. The gate was broken on purpose twice before being trusted: once by dropping a row’s stage entirely, which is the obvious way round a stage check, and once by adding a season array no hard-coded list would have known about.
The Ins & Outs tab scrolled sideways on a phone, and so did every other tab CORRECTION
One table on this site sat outside a scroll container. The amortisation runoff — Season, Already here, This window, Combined — is 560px wide and had nothing but a margin on its wrapper, while every other table on the page sits inside .twrap with overflow-x:auto. At phone width it stretched the whole document about 200px past the viewport, and because it was the document scrolling rather than a box inside it, every tab slid sideways, not just the one containing the table. All twenty club pages, identically.
It is not new and it was not the Read more button. The version of this page from before that change overflows by exactly the same 597 pixels against a 390-pixel viewport, which is worth stating plainly rather than letting the newest change take the blame for the oldest bug.
Why it went unseen is the more useful part. The browser check that runs against every page loaded it at desktop width and never clicked a tab, so it could not have seen either half of this: not the narrow viewport, and not the tab the table lives on. It now runs at 390px and walks all twelve tabs on all twenty pages, failing on any page whose document scrolls horizontally. That costs real time on each run, which is the honest price of catching a class of fault that only exists on the device most readers use.
The deal notes now fold away behind a button LAYOUT
The note under a player’s name is where the reasoning for a deal lives, and on the busiest rows it runs to several hundred words. Read end to end that is the point of the table; scrolled past on a phone it buries the row underneath and everything after it. Long notes now clamp to two lines with a Read more button, and short ones are left exactly as they were — a note that fits gets no furniture around it. The full text stays in the page whether or not it is open, so it is still searchable, copyable and printable.
It did not work the first time, and the reason is worth writing down. The clamp was styled on a single class, and the table already carried a td .glide-cap rule setting the notes to display as blocks — a more specific selector, so it won. The result was a button that toggled its own label and changed nothing else: the line-clamp property applied, the display property it depends on did not, and the note stayed full height. Checked in a browser at phone width rather than by reading the stylesheet, which is the only way that particular failure shows up.
A sell-on reduces the profit, not just the cash — and the gate that should have said so was reading a different page CORRECTION
Asked whether everything a transfer actually contains was applied to the deals on this site, and one thing was not. A sell-on owed to a former club is a cost of the disposal: it comes off the profit booked, not only off the cash banked. This site deducted it from the window balance and the List A test and then left it out of profit entirely — and profit is what feeds the squad-cost denominator through the three-year average. It now comes off booked profit, so the only quantified clause on the site, Villa’s £15m to Middlesbrough on the £117m Rogers fee, is handled by the model rather than by hand.
The gate was passing green on a £15m disagreement, and the reason is worth recording. The trading bridge’s check pulls the profit function out of the page and runs it — but that function reaches outside its own block for the sell-on data, which the extract did not include. Undefined dependency, guard returns zero, and the checker quietly computed a different profit from the one the page computes. A checker that does not mirror the page is not checking the page. It now pulls its dependencies across too, and it failed immediately when it did.
No figure moves today. The £15m had already been taken off this club’s denominator by hand when the sell-on was first noticed; the anchor gives that third back so the arithmetic lands in the same place, and from here it flows automatically. The three other clauses on the site — Baleba, Reijnders and Chérif — are recorded as unquantified and still contribute nothing, which is honest rather than convenient: the exposure is real and the percentage has never been reported.
The most comfortable homegrown position in the league NEW
The Premier League’s own squad rule arrives on this page. Until today it carried UEFA’s List A and nothing about the domestic quota — a different rule with different arithmetic: 25 senior places, no more than 17 non-homegrown, under-21s outside the list altogether, and players out on loan not registered at all.
Where this squad stands: 20 of the 25 places used, 12 homegrown and 8 non-homegrown, with 5 under-21s playing free of the list. They can name a full 25, which on this tracker is the minority position.
Homegrown is a registration test, not a passport test, which is why every player now carries a stated basis rather than a bare flag: three entire seasons, or 36 months, at any club affiliated to the FA or the FAW before the end of the season in which he turns 21. Nationality is not the question and repeatedly gives the wrong answer.
Why it was missing until now. The section was built for one club eleven months ago and the commit that shipped it said the other nineteen would follow. They did not, because an absent feature breaks no gate and nothing was watching for absence. Every count here derives from the squad table, and the same headcount gate that holds every other page holds this one.
The sale-profit input now derives itself, like the wage input above it METHOD
in-psp is the three-year average player-trading profit in the squad-cost denominator, and it was hand-set on all twenty pages. The failure mode is the one the wage bridge was built to stop, one input along: a sale completes, its profit is booked in the table, and the figure meant to carry a third of it stays where somebody last typed it. It only ever moved when whoever booked the deal remembered — which is the definition of a number that will eventually be wrong.
The page now shows its working beside the input: the earlier years’ contribution, plus this window’s booked profit divided by three, because UEFA smooths player-trading profit over three years so one window enters at roughly a third. Booked means done and not a loan — an advanced deal has not completed and its profit is not in the accounts, which is also the convention this page was already kept on. The profit is net of the FIFA solidarity taken out of a foreign sale.
One thing about the anchor is worth stating rather than glossing. The earlier years’ figure is carried forward from the number this page already used, not sourced from published accounts, so the bridge agrees with today’s input by construction. It earns its keep from here on, by moving when a deal lands. Tested by planting a completed sale into the tables and leaving the input alone: the gate said the denominator was £20m short, which is exactly the silence it exists to break.
A sale can lose money once FIFA has taken its 5%, and the formatter could not write it down CORRECTION
Modelling solidarity produced the site’s first negative profit on a completed sale. Villa banked ~£8.08m of Lucas Digne’s £8.5m fee against a book value of £8.5m, so that deal is a small loss rather than a break-even — which is the correct answer, and one the gross-fee basis could never produce.
The money formatter could not render it. It put the pound sign first and the minus wherever the number happened to start, so the cell read “£-0.4m” against a site that writes −£0.4m everywhere else. Nineteen pages had that version. Bournemouth had the correct one, negative-aware, written when its own trading profit went below zero — so the fix was to adopt the version already in the codebase rather than invent a twentieth. All twenty now share one formatter.
Checked in a browser rather than by inspection, because the failure this could introduce is a doubled sign where a caller already prepends its own minus: no malformed negative on any of the twenty, and no JavaScript error.
FIFA takes 5% of every fee sold abroad, and this site had been booking 100% of it CORRECTION
Asked what else is inside a completed deal that these numbers miss, and the answer was the solidarity contribution. 5% of any international transfer fee is deducted from the fee and shared among the clubs that trained the player between 12 and 23. The mechanics decide who pays: the buying club hands over the headline number and distributes the 5% out of it, so a purchase costs exactly the fee already capitalised here — nothing was wrong on that side. The selling club banks 95%. Every profit booked on a sale abroad was therefore 5% too high, across all twenty pages, from launch. Around £28m league-wide.
On this page it is nothing: every sale with a fee this window went to an English club, and the mechanism only triggers when a transfer crosses between associations.
The glossary had been claiming this was modelled the whole time. It said the 4% Premier League levy and FIFA’s 5% solidarity contribution both capitalise into registration cost — true of the levy, true of solidarity for a buyer, and quietly untrue of the thing that actually matters, which is what a seller keeps. Documentation that describes a calculation the code does not perform is worse than no documentation, because it stops anyone looking.
It is derived, not typed. The deduction comes from where the player went, which puts all the weight on classifying a destination — and getting that wrong is silent: an English club missing from the list costs its seller 5% of a fee it actually keeps, and no total looks odd. So tools/check-solidarity.js refuses to classify by default. Every fee-carrying destination must be a club one of the two lists already knows; a name in neither fails until a human decides which it is. The gate also holds the twenty inline copies of the classifier to being identical, for the same reason the wage gross-up is a single constant.
One assumption is recorded rather than hidden: Cardiff, Newport, Swansea and Wrexham are Welsh clubs inside the English pyramid, and are treated here as domestic because their registrations run through the English system.
Also documented, deliberately not changed: add-ons are modelled all-in on a purchase and guaranteed-only on a sale. That asymmetry makes the buy column a best case and the sell column a conservative one, and it now says so on the page instead of being visible only to whoever recomputes the fees.
Wages in the deal tables were understated by 45%, and the sentence describing the fix was wrong on nine other pages CORRECTION
The site grosses wages by 1.45 to cover employer NI, bonuses and image rights — everywhere except the two columns readers actually look at. The cost of an arrival and the relief from a departure in the Incomings and Outgoings tables were built from raw weekly wages, so every one of them understated the real charge. Both columns are now grossed through a single GROSS constant, so they cannot come apart again. The headline ratio does not move: it is computed from the wage, amortisation and agent inputs, which were already on the grossed basis. What moves is the Net SCR Swing card and the two columns feeding it.
Which is where the second problem was. The swing is derived from the deal arrays and was therefore right the moment the gross-up landed — but the same figure is also typed into the overview callout, and typed figures do not move. Nothing on this page stated either figure wrongly — the gross-up moved its table columns and nothing else. Palace’s was the clearest case: it read “still negative” where the page computed a positive swing, so the sentence was not stale but inverted.
Nothing showed this in a browser. A small script copies the derived card into the overview span at load, so the screen self-healed while the file stayed wrong — the same failure as the share card that displayed correctly and shipped a stale number to anyone who read the source. tools/check-overview-figures.js now runs the page’s own formulas against the page’s own arrays and fails on any stated swing or profit that disagrees, in the callout or in prose. The changelog is excluded, because a dated entry is a record.
Two more holes closed while the gate was being written. The baseline gate knew five ways of phrasing a ratio and not the one in the most-read sentence on every page, which is how City carried “~65% ratio vs the 70% wall” against a computed 57.1%; it now reads that shape too. And tools/check-parity.js checks that CI runs every gate the local suite runs — twice a gate had been wired into one and not the other, and both times it was caught by eye rather than by anything.
Ten answer blocks disagreed with their own pages — and the rule that lets that happen is now written down CORRECTION
The answer block is the first paragraph on every club page and the one a search engine quotes. It states four things that are all derivable — the ratio, the headroom or overshoot, what the club has banked from sales, what it has committed on signings — and only the ratio had a gate. Ten of the twenty disagreed with their own data. Brighton said £91.9m banked against £156.9m of completed sales; Manchester United £89m committed against £154m; Sunderland £0m against £32.6m; Forest was wrong on all three. Every answer block is now written from the deal tables and the ratio inputs rather than typed, and a gate holds them there.
One of the ten was two days old and mine. Manchester City’s said “£338m banked from sales”, which came from reading a total that includes advanced deals into a sentence that says banked. It is £288m. Advanced business is committed, not banked, and the gate now applies that distinction rather than trusting whoever writes the sentence to remember it.
Chelsea, Fulham and Ipswich stated no headroom at all, because they are over their line and the sentence had been written for clubs that are under it. They now say by how much: −£23.3m, −£19.2m and −£17.7m per year.
And the underlying rule is now recorded in the repo rather than relied on. A club page is twelve sections plus the head, the same quantity is stated in several of them, and every significant error here has had one shape: a figure corrected where somebody noticed it and left standing everywhere else. tools/echoes.js reports which sections state a given figure before it is edited, and the gates that exist because of this rule are listed alongside it. Anything derivable gets derived; anything typed gets a gate.
No gate had ever read a headcount CORRECTION
Ten gates run on every build and not one of them counted players. They read percentages, deal statuses, transfer rows, bar widths and card images — so a sentence saying “nineteen senior players, six places unused” could sit beside a card correctly showing 22 and 3, indefinitely, with everything green.
There is now a gate that recounts from the squad table, using the page’s own registration rule rather than a second copy of it: a player is on the list unless he is loaned out or under 21 on the season’s cut-off, and the cut-off is read from the page rather than assumed. It checks the registered total, the homegrown and non-homegrown split, the free places and the under-21 count, in both digits and words.
It missed one of its own test cases on the first run. “Six more players are under 21” begins a sentence, so the word is capitalised, and a lowercase-only pattern walked straight past it — found only by planting each stale figure back and checking the build failed. Four claim types, four confirmed failures, then green. A check you have not watched fail is a guess about what it catches.
The hero stat cards were three-across on a phone, and four of them left an orphan LAYOUT
Reported on Villa: three columns on a 430px screen squeezed the longest card into a ribbon, and because that page carries four cards rather than three, the fourth dropped alone onto a second row beside two empty cells. Below 760px the grid is now two columns, which gives Villa a clean 2×2.
The other nineteen pages carry three cards, so two columns would have left an orphan there instead. A lone last card now spans the full row rather than sitting beside a hole — so three reads as two-then-one and four reads as two-and-two, without a special case for either.
Desktop had the same orphan and nobody had mentioned it. Four cards in a fixed three-column grid is unbalanced at every width, not just on a phone. The grid fits its own content now, so Villa gets four across on a wide screen and the three-card pages are unchanged. Measured at 390, 430 and 1400px rather than eyeballed.
And the card that caused it got shorter. Villa’s List A churn description had just been lengthened to fix an arrival count, which is what made it tower over its neighbour. The names moved out — they are on the Ins & Outs tab — and every figure in it stayed.
A stale ratio phrased one way slipped a gate built for another CORRECTION
The prose-baseline gate catches “roughly N% of football revenue”. It did not catch “sit at roughly N%”, which is how the glossary phrases the same claim — so a stale ratio could sit in a definition indefinitely while the identical statement in the FAQ was checked on every build. Found on Villa, where the glossary was two revisions behind the page.
Extending the rule found the same fault on three more pages nobody had asked about. Arsenal’s glossary said 64% against 66.1% computed; Fulham’s said 90% against 94.0%; Ipswich’s said the ratio “sits at roughly 85% — on the line” when it is 94.6%, about ten points over. Ipswich’s sentence also quoted a “~£106m gross window” that the deal table puts at ~£147m. That one was wrong twice and read as reassurance both times.
A gate that matches one phrasing of a claim is a gate against that phrasing, not against the claim. Both forms are checked now, and the extension was tested by planting the old figure back and confirming the build fails.
Both loan bars read as full when only one quota was used CORRECTION
Reported by a reader looking at Villa on a phone, and right. The card showed two full amber bars, so both ceilings looked hit — when the line under the second one said 6 of 6 international slots still free. Only the domestic quota was used. The bar was hard-coded to 100% and had nothing to do with the sentence beneath it.
Every one of these bars was a literal width typed in beside the text it was meant to summarise. That is the same fault as the headline reading “1 + 6 Left” above a body saying none left, which already had a gate; the bar had simply never been looked at. They are derived now — “N of M remaining” means M−N used, and the width and the colour come from that, so the picture and the sentence cannot disagree. Amber only when nothing is left, which is the point at which a quota starts deciding what a club can do.
Writing the check found four more pages the report had not mentioned. Fulham, Ipswich, Tottenham and Coventry each had a quota line with no bar above it at all, so the international ceiling was invisible on those cards. And Chelsea’s international bar sat at 33% beside a sentence that stated no count whatsoever — nothing could have derived it and nobody could have checked it. That line now says 5 of 6 senior slots remaining and shows its working: Badiashile at Napoli is the one senior non-club-trained loan abroad, with Antwi and Murray-Campbell treated as academy and therefore exempt. Disagree with that classification if you like — the point is that it is now possible to.
The gate checks the source, not just the screen. Villa’s rendered card was fixed by the derivation the moment it was added, while the hard-coded 100% was still sitting in the file — correct in the browser, wrong in the thing a checker reads and the thing that renders before any script runs. Both are right now, and the gate compares the typed width against the stated numbers so a hand edit cannot quietly reintroduce it.
Deep audit of the rules and the inputs: the wage figure had drifted from its own derivation on five clubs CORRECTION
The rule constants are unanimous across all twenty pages and all correct — the £105m PSR cap, the €60m earnings limit, the five-year amortisation cap and its 1 July 2023 start, the 4% Premier League levy, the 1 January 2005 under-21 cut-off, 17 non-homegrown of 25, two concurrent domestic loans and six international. Thirty-nine separate statements of the five-year cap; not one disagreed with another. That is the half of this audit with nothing to report, and it is worth reporting that it has nothing to report.
Every club’s cap now agrees with its European status. In Europe the UEFA line is 70%, outside it the Premier League’s is 85% — fifteen points of headroom turning on a single yes/no, asserted in three places at once and checked in none. All twenty agree: nine in Europe at 70%, eleven outside at 85%. A gate now enforces it, because a club’s European status is exactly what changes between seasons.
The real finding is the wage input. This site’s stated convention is that the wage figure IS the wage bridge’s own derivation on every accounts-basis club — that is what makes the league table comparable, and what makes the input track the window instead of sitting at a pre-window figure nobody updates. It had decayed on five clubs, because deals get booked by hand and the input gets nudged by hand with them, and a nudge drifts from the derivation the moment the arithmetic differs by a rounding. Tottenham were £22m adrift. All five are now set to the derivation and a gate holds them there. Promoted clubs are correctly exempt and the bridge explains why in its own text: a wage bill roughly doubles on going up, so last season’s accounts are the wrong anchor in both directions at once.
One club changes compliance status as a result. Bournemouth go from 69.8% to 71.2% — from just inside the 70% cap to about £3.4m/yr over it, in their first European season, on the tighter cap that European qualification brings. Tottenham move 64.6% to 68.3%, Forest 81.9% to 82.7%, Manchester City 57.7% to 57.1%, Villa 64.0% to 63.8%.
And two more pages were flooring their headroom at zero. Ipswich read “£0m of room” while sitting £17.8m/yr over the 85% line; Bournemouth would have done the same on crossing it. The same defect was fixed on Palace four days ago and not looked for elsewhere — which is the lesson, not the bug. Both now state the overshoot.
What the audit could not do. Every football site and reference database is blocked from this environment, so the transfer tables were reconciled internally — squad rows against deal rows, amortisation floors against inputs, both sides of every intra-league move — and checked externally only as far as search summaries allow. Internally they reconcile on all twenty clubs. That is a real guarantee about consistency and not a guarantee about completeness, and the £50m signing found missing yesterday is what the difference looks like.
The share card is now checked like everything else — and two gates had never run in CI at all CORRECTION
Rebuilding the cards fixed today’s figures and fixed nothing about tomorrow’s. A generator someone has to remember to run is exactly what produced a card reading 60.2% four days out of date, so the question is not whether the cards are right now but whether they can go wrong again quietly. A gate now recomputes the card’s figures from the page and compares them against the token the builder stamped into the meta tag. Move any input — a wage, a fee, a sale — and the build fails until the card is rebuilt. It was tested by nudging Villa’s wage input and confirming the failure, and by stripping the token to confirm that fails too.
The builder and the gate read the figures through one shared module. Two copies of the same calculation drifting apart is the failure this site has hit more than any other, and it would be absurd to reintroduce it in the check designed to prevent it.
And checking the CI list against the local one turned up a real gap. Two gates — the one that catches stale ratio figures in prose, and the loan-quota headline check — existed, worked, and had never run in CI. They only ran when someone ran the full suite by hand, which means a direct push could have deployed stale numbers with a green tick. Both now run on every push, and the two lists are asserted to match. The prose-baseline gate is the one that has caught the most this week, and it was the one running least often.
The share cards were showing a ratio four days and six deals out of date CORRECTION
The squad cost ratio is printed into the card image itself, which is fine until the ratio moves. Villa’s card said 60.2% against a page saying 64.0% — the figure from before the Goretzka wage correction, and before Jackson, Martínez, Suzuki, Ruggeri and the rest. Anyone sharing the link was posting a number this site had stopped believing on 27 August. Chelsea’s said 83% against 88.7%; Manchester City’s said ~65% against 57.7%.
There was no generator. The cards were made once, by hand, on 26 August and left, so nothing could have kept them current. There is one now: tools/build-og-cards.js reads every figure from the page it belongs to and rebuilds all twenty, and it runs like any other build step.
Cache-busting is the part that actually matters for sharing. X and Facebook cache a card image against its URL for days, so replacing the file in place does nothing for a link anyone has already posted. Each card’s meta tag now carries a version token derived from the figures on it, so the URL changes exactly when the picture changes and not otherwise.
The number is now coloured the way the page colours it — green three points clear of the limit, amber up to it, red past it. A card showing Ipswich at 94.6% against an 85% line in the same neutral cream as one showing Manchester United at 56.9% throws away the only thing a reader takes from a shared image.
And a gate now checks the alt text against the computed ratio, because that was stale too and in a way nobody would ever notice: six pages carried figures in the card’s alt attribute that no longer matched, including one that had never matched any published base. It was tested by planting the old 60.2% and confirming the build fails.
Full pre-deadline audit of all 20 clubs — one £50m transfer was missing entirely SWEEP
Nico González, Manchester City to Newcastle, ~£50m, completed and announced. Medical taken, presented to supporters before the West Brom cup tie, No.6 shirt issued — and absent from both pages. It is the largest single omission this site has had to correct, and it moved two ratios materially: City 60.4% → 57.7% with headroom out to £100.2m, Newcastle 70.8% → 74.7% with headroom down to £46.8m against their 85% line. The fee is reported as reaching £50m after add-ons, so the guaranteed portion is lower and unpublished; £50m is carried on both sides because a counterpart has to agree, and it is flagged. The same number cannot be conservative for both clubs at once — it flatters City’s profit while overstating Newcastle’s charge — and that is stated rather than smoothed over.
Everything else checked out, which is the more useful result. Forty-odd names drawn from external reporting were tested against the pages one by one and every single one was already there. Where the reporting and this site disagreed, this site was right: one summary placed Detourbet, Monga and Rulli at Nottingham Forest when all three are Manchester City signings, and another had Bouaddi at Forest when City announced him.
Two numeric errors found by audit rather than by reading. Manchester City’s Kalvin Phillips loan credited £11.3m of relief when a loan frees the wage and none of the amortisation — the registration stays, and so does the charge. Corrected to £7.8m. Nottingham Forest’s Gustavo Sá loan freed nothing at all when Olympiacos pay his wages; corrected to £1.8m. Two more outgoing loans, at Leeds and Liverpool, carried no loan flag, so the amortisation book and the List A gate were treating them as permanent sales.
Eight new checks, and they were run against real data before being trusted. A completed permanent signing must have a squad row; a sold player must not still be in one; a destination reading “loan” must carry a loan flag; no duplicate squad rows; no fee without contract dates; no end date before the signing date; no signing dated in the future; no expired contract still in the squad. All eight are clean across all twenty clubs, and two were deliberately broken to confirm they fail. Three earlier checks this week passed on their first run because they were wrong, not because the data was right, so nothing goes in now without being made to fail first.
What this sweep cannot claim. Every football site, news aggregator and reference database is blocked from this environment, so external checking is search summaries only — and those summaries mixed up clubs twice in this pass alone. The internal consistency of these pages is now verified exhaustively and mechanically. Their completeness against the real world is verified as far as search allows, which is not the same thing, and the González miss is what that gap looks like.
The stale-rumour gate could only see half the market — two more boards were selling players who had left CORRECTION
Yesterday’s gate checked live rumours against completed incomings at other clubs. That catches a player who moved between Premier League clubs and nothing else. Two whole classes of exit were invisible to it, and both had live cards sitting on boards.
A player sold abroad appears in no incoming table anywhere. Spurs sold Cristian Romero to Atlético Madrid and announced it on 15 August; Arsenal’s board went on offering him to the scenario modeller for a fortnight. The gate now reads completed outgoing rows as well, taking the destination from the row itself — which is derivable, and should have been there first time.
And a move between two non-Premier-League clubs is recorded on no page at all. Bayern sold João Palhinha to Benfica on 26 August — €14m plus up to €5m, contract to 2030 — and Newcastle’s card still read “door ajar again”. Nothing structural could ever have caught that, so there is now a small list at tools/gone.json for exactly this case, and the gate fails against it. Two names so far: Palhinha, and Leão to Galatasaray.
One false positive, worth recording because it nearly shipped. The first version read Jadon Sancho’s outgoing row — destination “Free agent” — as him having joined a club called Free agent, and would have killed two perfectly live cards. A released player has left a club and joined nobody: he is more signable, not less. Release destinations are now excluded, while a row naming an onward club after an arrow still counts. All three arms were then tested by un-flagging a closed card and checking the gate fired, because a check nobody has seen fail is not yet a check.
Cards closed: Romero (Arsenal), Palhinha (Newcastle), Cho (Hull, where Hull themselves ended the talks on 10 August). Each keeps its note as the record and leaves the modeller.
Dead rumours were still tickable — three players could be “signed” on boards they had already left CORRECTION
The scenario modeller priced any card you ticked, including cards whose own tag said the player was gone. Newcastle’s board offered Nicolas Jackson after he had joined Villa; the tag read “DEAD — JOINED ASTON VILLA” and ticking it still moved the ratio. Liverpool’s offered Ezri Konsa, an Arsenal player since 20 August. Chelsea’s offered Ousmane Diomande, who is at Forest. This site has named that exact contradiction in its own changelog — “a completed deal and a live rumour for the same player” — and then kept shipping it, because nothing was looking for it.
Now something looks. A gate fails any live incoming rumour naming a player who has completed a move to another club, which is derivable from the transfer tables rather than from a tag somebody remembered to type. Only incoming cards are checked: an outgoing rumour naming a player another club has signed is the same move seen from the selling side, and that is correct. It found all three on its first run.
Dead cards now stay on the board and leave the model. They keep their note as the record of what a club looked at, greyed, with the tick removed and the impact line replaced by “no longer available”. Deleting them would lose the history; leaving them live was worse.
Deadline-week sweep: four announced deals the tables had missed, and a gate that was crying wolf SWEEP
Four deals were sitting at “advanced” after their clubs had announced them. Bouaddi to Manchester City — announced on the club’s own site on 26 August, and carried here as unannounced for four days, with the prose quoting “~£95m/€110m… agreed in principle” when the real deal is £81.3m fixed plus £4.3m of add-ons on a contract to 2031. Badiashile to Napoli, announced 22 August. Disasi to Crystal Palace, announced 26 August by both clubs. And Emi Martínez to Chelsea, announced by Villa on 30 August. All four are now booked, with the ratios on five pages moving as a result.
The Disasi loan is the one with a consequence nobody was watching. Palace were sitting a whisker inside the 70% cap that their European qualification imposes. Taking a £120k/wk centre-back on loan added ~£9.0m/yr of grossed wages and put them over it — a loan, with no fee, no amortisation and no transfer to report, moving a compliance position that a £30m signing would have been scrutinised for. This page has argued all summer that loans are treated as free when they are not; this is the arithmetic saying it.
And the prose-baseline gate was flagging a correct sentence. It reads any “roughly N% of football revenue” as a claim about the club’s own ratio — but “capped at roughly 70% of football revenue” describes the LIMIT, and Palace’s page says exactly that, twice. A gate that fails on correct text is worse than one that stays quiet, because the next person learns to skim past it. It now ignores the phrase when cap or limit wording precedes it, and it still fails on a genuinely stale figure — checked by planting one before shipping.
The league window table was wrong on 19 of its 20 rows — and an edit ate two deal rows without a single gate noticing CORRECTION
The “Who’s Selling to Survive” table is a derivation and had stopped being one. Its own caption defines it exactly — disclosed fees on officially completed 2026 deals, loans and frees excluded — so every figure in it can be recomputed from the transfer tables it summarises. Nineteen of the twenty rows disagreed with those tables. Six clubs were shown as having spent nothing at all, including Newcastle at £0 against £174.9m of completed incomings and Manchester City at £0 of sales against £238m. The rows were hand-maintained, the pages moved on, and nothing compared the two. All twenty are now derived from the pages, with the hand-written notes kept, and a gate recomputes them so the table cannot drift from the deals again.
The second fault is worse, because it was self-inflicted and invisible. Promoting Jackson spliced his row out of one array and into another by matching the next }, — and deal rows share source lines, so the edit swallowed whatever followed on the same line. Goretzka’s incoming row vanished from Villa and Kellyman’s outgoing row from Chelsea. All eight gates passed. A missing row breaks no parse, satisfies every invariant, and simply makes the totals smaller — and nothing on the page knew what they should have been.
Two things now catch it. A squad player signed inside the window must also appear in the incoming table, which is a real structural invariant: the squad row survives when the deal row dies, so it is the witness. That check found a third case immediately, one nobody had touched today — Forest’s Gustavo Sá has had a squad row since July, with a book value and an amortisation charge, and his incoming row was never written. A changelog entry from that sweep claims he was added “both halves of him”. One half was missing. And for outgoing rows, which leave no trace on the page once the player has gone, there is now tools/diff-rows.js: it reports every deal row added or removed against a git ref, to be read before committing rather than after.
Two method changes: the five-year cap, and the wage input becomes the derivation METHOD
The ratio moves from 77.6% to 80.0% (wages 116→122).
The five-year cap, finally applied. This site's glossary has always described the rule that fees must be amortised over a maximum of five years however long the contract — and the code did not do it, spreading every fee across the whole contract instead. An eight-year deal was therefore charged at five-eighths of its true annual cost. The cap now applies to contracts signed from 1 July 2023, when it took effect; earlier deals are left alone, which correctly grandfathers the January 2023 contracts that prompted the rule and avoids capping long spans that are really a record of extensions rather than of one contract.
And the wage input is now the derivation. The wage bridge has been showing a derived figure beside a hand-set input since it was built, and on most pages the two disagreed. The hand-set number was anchored to a pre-window figure and never tracked the window, which is why the inputs sat high at clubs that sold heavily and low at clubs that bought. The input is now the derivation on all fourteen accounts-basis clubs, so it updates itself as deals land and the same method produces every club's number. That is what makes the league table comparable, which was the point of building the bridge.
What has not changed is how good the number is. It still rests on two assumptions — 80% of staff cost being players and coaches, and a 1.45x gross-up — and the bridge still shows both. Agreement between input and derivation means they are consistent, not that they are right.
A free transfer was costing the window totals nothing at all — £35.7m/yr across six pages CORRECTION
The cost-per-arrival calculation returned zero for any signing without a fee unless the row also carried a loan flag. So a free signing’s wages vanished from “cost added by this window” entirely. Goretzka was showing as costing Villa £0.0m. On the very page whose card argues that “the free one is the expensive one — a fee buys an asset that amortises and can be sold, a wage buys nothing and recurs”. The card was right and the arithmetic underneath it dropped the wage.
£35.7m/yr was missing across six pages: Villa £13.6m (Goretzka, Özcan, Guessand), Palace £8.1m (McNeil, Guessand), Liverpool £7.8m (Araújo), Everton £4.9m (Johnson), Coventry £1.1m, Fulham £0.2m. Villa’s window swing moves from +£12.4m/yr to +£26.0m/yr.
There were seven different versions of that one line across twenty pages, each special-casing frees and loans slightly differently, and the differences were exactly what caused this. They are now one formula — the one Hull already used: amortisation and the agent fee when there is a fee, and the wage on every arrival, fee or not.
And it exposes something this card cannot fix by itself. The List A gate carried a hand-typed margin of “Villa pass by ~£3.5m/yr” on the cost-based test. The page’s own sums now put the window at adding ~£26m/yr. That figure predates Jackson and Watkins, and the window totals count wages ungrossed while the ratio grosses them, so the two were never on one basis. The cost-based margin is now marked UNVERIFIED rather than passing — the fee-based balance above it is sound, that one is not, and saying so beats printing a number that cannot be reproduced.
A headline that contradicted its own paragraph — and nine more stale ratios behind it CORRECTION
Villa’s loan-quota card said “1 + 6 Left” in green, directly above a paragraph reading “0 of 2 concurrent remaining” and “ROOM: none left domestically”. Wan-Bissaka’s loan on 18 August took the second slot. The body was updated; the big number at the top was not. So the figure a reader sees first said a slot was free while the text underneath called the same thing a binding constraint. The bar sat at 50% with nothing left, and the card was still green. Crystal Palace had the same shape — “2 + 6” above “1 of 2”, left over from before the Guessand loan.
The failure runs one way every time: the prose gets edited and the summary above it does not. tools/check-quotas.js now fails when a loan-quota headline disagrees with its own body, including when the room note says “none left” and the headline disagrees. Verified by sabotage — put the wrong number back and it fails on exactly that.
Then the baseline gate was widened and found nine more. It was matching “ratio is X%” and “X% → Y%” but not the Quick Answers phrasing, “roughly 63% of football revenue” — which is the plain-English answer a reader or a search engine is most likely to lift. Brentford were claiming 75% while computing 84.9%. Manchester City 65% against 57.3%. Newcastle 74% against 70.8%. Ten pages rebased from their own inputs.
Two gates, two days, and both found more than the bug that prompted them. That is the argument for writing the check rather than the fix: the fix closes one hole, the check tells you how many others there were.
The baseline gate had a hole in it and was passing on what it could not see CORRECTION
The gate shipped this morning excluded the changelog by truncating each page at <section id="log">. The data arrays holding every rumour card sit in a script block after that point. So it was scanning 167KB of a 422KB page, never saw a single card’s projection, and reported green.
It now removes only that section and keeps the rest. On the first honest run it immediately found eleven stale figures across three pages — every Villa projection still quoting a baseline two changes old, and two on Chelsea. All recomputed.
A gate with a hole in it is worse than no gate, because no gate makes you check and a green one stops you looking. This one was written, tested against the case that prompted it, and shipped — and the case that prompted it happened to sit in the part of the file it could still see.
One rule came out of it. A live rumour card may state a projection, because the gate now keeps it honest against the current base. A completed deal may not: “60.2% → 63.4%” was true the day it was written and decays the moment anything else moves, and the effect is already in the headline. Those now state what the deal costs instead.
A new gate: does the prose still quote the ratio the page computes? CORRECTION
Twelve of the twenty pages were asserting a squad cost ratio their own inputs no longer produced. Manchester City claimed 63.0% while computing 57.3%. Manchester United said 53.9% against 56.9%, Sunderland 60.9% against 63.2%, Coventry 69.7% against 71.0%. Every one has been rebased from the page’s own figures.
Most of it sat in the answer paragraph and its structured-data twin — the text search engines and AI crawlers read before anything else, which makes it the worst place on the page to be stale. The headroom figures beside them were rebased too.
Nothing was catching this. The status gate reads deal status; the invariants gate reads the arrays; neither reads a percentage in a sentence. It surfaced only because a single free transfer moved one club’s baseline and the knock-on was visible. tools/check-baselines.js now recomputes every page’s ratio from its inputs and fails on prose asserting a different one, and it runs with the rest on every change.
Two things it deliberately does not flag. A sentence reading “68.6% → 62.0%” where 62.0% is the current ratio is a completed move being described, not a stale claim, so a done deal can still say what it did. And the changelog is excluded entirely: a dated entry recording August’s number is the record, and rewriting it to match today would be the opposite of what this tab is for.
The amortisation graph now splits the squad you had from the squad you bought FEATURE
One bar was hiding the more interesting number. The run-off now stacks two series — the squad that was already here in blue, and everyone signed this window in amber — with both totals and a combined figure above it, and a per-season split beside each bar.
It changes what the chart says about a club. A settled squad shows a thin amber band on a thick blue one; a rebuild inverts it. Coventry carry £14.0m already here against £28.9m signed this window, so two-thirds of their amortisation arrived in ten weeks, and their inherited book runs out entirely by 2028/29 while the new one still has three years to run. Liverpool are the other extreme at £143.6m against £18.4m. Same chart, opposite stories, and neither was visible when it was one bar.
Who counts as “this window” is taken from the signing date, not from the flag the squad rows carry. The two disagree: the date catches six players the flag had missed — Garnacho and Cissé here at Villa, Bentley at Coventry, Charles at Fulham, Sá and Diomande at Forest — and never disagrees the other way. A derived test cannot be forgotten the way a hand-set one can, which is the same reasoning that put the sell-ons and the outgoing amortisation on derivations.
Two rows of figures now sit above the chart and they will not always agree, so the panel says which is which rather than leaving a reader to spot it. The first row and the graph are the SQUAD, split by arrival date. The second row is the DEALS, including advanced ones whose players are not in the squad table yet. Where they differ the panel names the gap and what it is — agreed business that has not completed.
Every deal now shows what it costs per year — and the agent fee was being charged five times over FEATURE + FIX
A fee only means something against the charge it creates. £47.5m is a headline; £9.9m a year for five years is the thing that reaches the squad cost ratio. Until now this page printed the fee on every row and the amortisation on none of them. Both tables now carry an AMORT £m/yr column, and a panel underneath gives the number those rows add up into: the squad’s total annual amortisation, what this window has added and freed, and how the charge runs off over the next five seasons as existing deals finish.
None of it is newly typed data, which is the point. Incoming charges come from the player’s own squad row where one exists — real contract dates, five-year cap applied where it bites — and from fee over five years where a deal is advanced and the player is not in the squad yet, flagged est when that happens. Outgoing charges are derived rather than stored: a row’s cost-freed figure is the ungrossed wage plus the amortisation, so subtracting the wage leaves the charge that stops. They cannot drift from the totals above them because they are computed from them.
Loans show a zero, and that is the correct answer rather than a missing one. A loan moves the wage and leaves the registration here, so the amortisation stays too — the point this site has made about loans since the wage bridge, now visible as a column entry instead of a paragraph.
And a bug the new column sat straight on top of. The cost-per-year calculation behind these tables charged the agent fee in full every single year instead of capitalising it and spreading it over five — the same error corrected in the scenario modeller last week and missed here. On a £47.5m signing it overstated the annual cost by £1.9m. Every SCR-cost figure in the Ins and Outs tables, and the window’s cost-added total, move down accordingly.
One thing the new column makes visible and this page is not hiding: the SCR cost figures in these tables count wages at face value, while the rumour cards, the scenario panel and the wage bridge gross them up 1.45x for employer NI, bonuses and image rights. The same signing can therefore read £17.1m in the table and £20.2m on its card. The grossed figure is this site’s convention and the table is the odd one out. It is stated in the panel rather than quietly reconciled, because restating it moves every published window total on all twenty pages and deserves its own pass.
The “last updated” notice is gone — it had stopped telling the truth REMOVED
There were two of them. A line under the header reading “DEALS & FEES AS REPORTED [date] · BOOK VALUES & CALCS RECOMPUTE DAILY”, and a script that read that date and, once it was four days old, pushed an amber banner above the header warning that the page had last been checked N days ago.
The second one was firing on all twenty pages. The date it keyed off was hand-typed and ranged from 9 to 19 August across the site — while the deals underneath had in fact been swept on the 24th and 25th. So the site was leading with a warning about itself, generated from the one number on the page that nobody was maintaining. A staleness notice that is itself stale is worse than none: it tells readers to distrust figures that are current.
Both are removed, with their CSS. Nothing else changes — every ratio, book value and window total is unaffected, and the dated entries in this changelog remain the honest record of when each page was actually worked on.
You can now change the numbers — and the card line beside them was still wrong FEATURE + FIX
Every fee on the rumour board is somebody’s estimate. Brugge “value him around €45m”. Al-Hilal’s bid reached this site in the wrong currency and had to be chased down. Marmoush’s fee is arithmetic off a reported two-player budget rather than a figure anyone published. Readers were being asked to take those guesses as given.
So the amounts are editable now. Every card carries a fee box, and incoming cards a wage box too. Type your own number and the card’s cost line and the scenario panel both follow it immediately. Reset puts the reported figure back — overrides are held separately and the underlying data is never overwritten, so there is always something true to return to. Outgoing cards expose the fee but not the wage, because an outgoing player’s relief is derived from his squad row rather than typed, and the fee is the part that actually moves the profit on the sale.
And a fix that should have landed with the modeller rebuild. The card’s own “ADDS £Xm/yr” line was still running the OLD formula — ungrossed wages, and the agent fee charged in full every year. The calculation underneath was corrected; the display beside it was not, so every card showed one number while the panel below computed another. On this site’s own worked example the card said £10.1m and the panel used £10.7m — the exact discrepancy that rebuild was written to explain, sitting in the markup the whole time. Both now call the same helper, and that is checked on all twenty pages: tick a card, and its figure and the panel’s agree.
The 22 August sweep, and a modeller that was wrong three ways DATA + METHOD
The Johnston deal is dead and it was never a deal. He has a hamstring injury putting him out past the deadline, and O'Neill has said the move has “disappeared”. There was no medical and no announcement, so the £14m has come out of the ins table entirely rather than being carried forward as a live commitment.
The scenario modeller was wrong in three ways at once, on every page on this site. An incoming signing's wage was charged with no gross-up, while the wage bridge, the ratio inputs and every note here gross wages by 1.45x for employer NI and image rights — so every modelled signing was 45% cheaper on the wage line than the same player would be in the ratio directly above it. The agent fee was charged in full every year instead of being capitalised with the fee and amortised, so a £60m signing carried £3m/yr of agent cost rather than £0.6m. And sale profit never reached the denominator: nineteen pages let a sale relieve the numerator and stop, when the profit also lands in the denominator through the three-year average, and the twentieth added the whole window's profit when one window belongs at roughly a third.
Why none of it showed up. The first two faults pull in opposite directions and roughly cancel at a typical fee-to-wage ratio — for a £25m signing on £70k/wk the old code gave £10.09m/yr against a true £10.73m, close enough to look right. They do not cancel at the edges: a free transfer on big wages was understated by 45%, a big fee on modest wages overstated by about 9%. Two errors that hide each other are worse than one that does not.
Outgoing relief is now derived, not typed. The hand-set relief on all eighty outgoing rumour cards carried the same ungrossed wage — checked against the squad, the stated figures reproduced the ungrossed derivation almost exactly. Relief and profit now come from the squad row, on the same gross-up and the same five-year cap as everything else, with the typed figure kept as a fallback for the handful of names with no squad row. Profit is allowed to be negative, because some of these sales are losses and the page should say so.
Amortisation input raised to the squad floor: £67m → £72m INPUT CORRECTION
Why it moved. The amortisation input is the club-wide charge, which must be at least the current squad's, since it also covers players who have left mid-season and academy registrations the squad table does not carry. On this page it had fallen below that floor, which cannot be right — the summer's signings went into the squad table and the input stayed where it was. It is now raised to the floor.
Read it as a floor, not a figure. The true club-wide charge is higher by whatever departed players and fringe registrations add. This is a conservative correction, and it moves the ratio the wrong way for the club, which is the direction an honest correction usually goes.
Johnson in, McNeil out — an intra-league swap this page did not have at all SWEEP
What happened. Announced by both clubs on 11 August: Brennan Johnson joins from Crystal Palace on a four-year deal to 2030, Dwight McNeil goes the other way on four years. Neither leg was recorded here. It is Everton’s fifth signing of the summer, which is how the omission was caught — the club’s own copy said fifth and this page had four.
Why a swap is awkward to book. No cash consideration was disclosed either way, so both legs carry a £0 fee and the amortisation added by Johnson is unknown rather than nil — read the amortisation line as a floor. It also trips UEFA’s 45-day exchange rule: opposite-direction transfers between the same two clubs inside 45 days get valued at the lower of fee and book value, so neither club books a profit above book value whatever the paperwork says.
What moved. Wages up ~£1.2m net (Johnson’s ~£95k/wk in against McNeil’s ~£80k/wk out) and amortisation down ~£3.3m as McNeil’s 2022 fee leaves the books. Ratio 76.5% to ~78.8% once the loan correction below is also counted.
Bahoya added to the Rumour Mill — and NOT to the transfer table RUMOUR ONLY
What is reported. Everton are credited with interest in Jean-Mattéo Bahoya, Eintracht Frankfurt’s 21-year-old left winger, with other Premier League clubs and Saudi interest alongside. Transfermarkt values him near €25m; this page models £22m.
What is not. One low-quality site has published a “complete” headline. No club statement and no reliable outlet supports it, so the card sits at interest — the same standard applied to Ruggeri, Suzuki and every other deal here: a club announcement moves a row into the table, and nothing else does.
Hull walk away from Iroegbunam after his injury · Muñoz becomes a concrete target RUMOUR MOVES ONLY
Tim Iroegbunam. Hull’s formal £15m+ bid was live on the 13th; by the 14th he had pulled up after 17 minutes against Stuttgart with a hamstring injury expected to keep him out a lengthy spell, and Hull moved on. The sale money evaporates until he is fit again.
Daniel Muñoz. New card: a concrete right-back target with Palace reported ready to sell at ~£25m — but Forest, Barcelona, Chelsea and Inter are all in the queue.
Nørgaard is official — Advanced becomes Done; Johnston reporting splits; Grealish expectation hardens; Al-Hilal agree terms with Ndiaye's camp
Christian Nørgaard promoted from ADVANCED to DONE. Everton officially announced the signing on 5 August — a reported ~£7m from Arsenal on a confirmed two-year deal to 2028, Moyes' fourth signing of the summer. Because the tracker had already counted the deal at advanced stage on exactly those terms (the assumed two-year contract turned out to be right), no headline figure moves: committed fees stay at ~£61m, the window net balance at about −£61m, the new-signing cost load at ~£28m/yr, and the derived amortisation (and with it the ~79% squad cost ratio) is unchanged. What changes is certainty — the NOT YET ANNOUNCED flag comes off the Squad tab, his book value now rests on a real contract date, and the ~£70k/wk wage remains this tracker's estimate. Involves Arsenal — their page needs the same row marked Done on the outgoing side.
Alistair Johnston stays at TALKS — deliberately — because the reporting now points both ways. Some outlets report Celtic have ACCEPTED an improved Everton bid around £14m (rising to ~£15m with add-ons) with the player having told Celtic he wants the move; others report the deal has stalled with work still to do. What is consistent: Celtic want to keep him through their Champions League play-off against LASK (legs 19 & 25 August), so any completion lands late in the window. With the acceptance disputed and no medical, no fee is entered in the table and the row is not promoted.
Grealish: emphasis up again, ladder position unchanged. Talks over the ~£10.4m/£200k-a-week permanent continued through the week, the player is reported to be prioritising Everton over a reintegration under Maresca at City, and weekend gossip columns say Everton now expect to sign him permanently — but expectation is not an agreement, there has been no medical, and he is still rehabbing the stress fracture, so the row stays at In talks. Involves Manchester City.
Rumour board: Ndiaye — Al-Hilal are reported to have agreed personal terms with the player's camp and to be preparing an opening offer around £51m, which Everton (holding at ~£75m) are expected to reject; City and United are reported unwilling to pay the asking price, Arsenal have enquired, Villa and Spurs watch. Iroegbunam — clarified per the latest reporting: Hull, Ipswich and Coventry have made approaches (Hull's framed around ~£20m, loan or permanent) but no formal offer has yet been tabled. Beto–Forest, Garner–Villa (still no bid) and the Wheatley placeholder are unchanged. Not added for want of verification: single-source reports of the Johnston deal "hitting a brick wall" tied to an unnamed player's surgery, and a floated Eintracht Frankfurt pursuit of Nathan Patterson — both left off the board until they can be corroborated.
Still no completed sales: the sales line stays at £0, the net player-sale profit input stays a 3-year smoothed estimate (per the UEFA Art. 93 averaging convention this tracker applies), and every fee on this page remains media-reported, with wages, book values and market values estimated.
Nørgaard through a medical, Johnston bid lodged, Grealish talks accelerate — and the rumour board re-pointed
New on the board at ADVANCED stage: Christian Nørgaard (Arsenal → Everton, reported ~£7m). Agreement in principle was reported on 1 August by The Athletic's David Ornstein; the 32-year-old Denmark midfielder held his Everton medical on Tuesday 4 August, with reporting saying the clubs are still finalising details and an announcement is expected this week. He is therefore marked Advanced, not Done — Everton have not confirmed the signing. Because the deal counts in the confirmed/advanced totals, gross committed fees move from ~£54m to ~£61m, the window net balance deepens to about −£61m, and the new-signing squad-cost load rises from ~£22m/yr to about ~£28m/yr. He has also been added to the Squad tab carrying a NOT YET ANNOUNCED flag, which lifts the derived amortisation input and therefore the headline squad cost ratio by roughly a point and a half. His contract length has not been reported anywhere: a two-year deal to 2028 and a ~£70k/wk wage are this tracker's assumptions and are labelled as such. Involves Arsenal — their page will need the same row on the outgoing side.
New at TALKS stage: Alistair Johnston (Celtic, right-back). Everton have lodged an offer reported around £12m plus add-ons against a Celtic valuation nearer £14–15m (one report stretches the ceiling to £25m), and the Canada international has told Celtic he wants the move — but Celtic named him to start their league opener, Fulham are in the same race, and no fee is agreed. No fee is shown in the table because none has been agreed. Ridle Baku has been floated as the alternative if it stalls.
Grealish moved up in emphasis but NOT up the ladder. Multiple outlets on 2–5 August report Everton accelerating talks over a permanent return, with a fee around £10.4m and wages near £200k/wk, and the player said to favour Hill Dickinson. Nothing is agreed with Manchester City and he is still rehabbing a stress fracture, so the row stays at In talks — the Rumour Mill's permanent scenario has been repriced from a modelled £15m/£150k-wk to the reported £10.4m/£200k-wk, and the amortisation runway's amber scenario bar with it. Involves Manchester City.
Rumour board re-pointed to where the interest actually is. Ndiaye: Everton have hardened the asking price to around £75m (was ~£69m) and Football Insider reports City and Manchester United unwilling to pay it, with Al-Hilal now the likeliest buyer and Villa, Arsenal and Spurs watching — the modelled profit rises to ~£65m and his squad market value with it. Beto: Leeds' interest has been overtaken by Nottingham Forest, with Everton only willing to sell once a No.9 arrives. Iroegbunam: the Dortmund/Stuttgart links are gone, replaced by approaches from Hull, Ipswich and Coventry (Hull reported around £20m) with Everton now willing to listen — he is the likeliest first fee-paying sale of the window. Garner: kept on the board but downgraded in tone — Everton publicly denied receiving any approach from Villa on 24 July. Added: Ethan Wheatley (Manchester United), where Romano reports a formal approach being prepared; no fee has been reported anywhere, so the £10m in the model is an explicit placeholder, not a figure. Involves Forest, Leeds, Hull, Ipswich, Coventry, Villa and Manchester United on the rumour side only.
Still no completed sales: the sales line stays at £0 and every fee on this page remains media-reported, with wages, book values and contract lengths estimated.
Methodology: squad-cost amortisation now derives from the squad contracts
The headroom model's amortisation input used to be a hand-maintained estimate, while the Squad tab computed the same thing bottom-up from every player's fee and contract dates. The two had drifted apart — by up to £29m across the league, which is several points of squad cost ratio on pages whose whole purpose is showing how close a club sits to a compliance line. The hero model now takes its amortisation straight from the squad contracts, so the headline ratio and the squad table can no longer disagree, and the figure updates itself whenever the squad data changes. The field is still editable: type over it and the what-if model responds as before. Wages remain a stated estimate — clubs publish total staff costs, not the players-plus-head-coach slice the rule needs, so that split is still this tracker's assumption and is labelled as one.
Summer 2026 window rebuilt from a full source list
Outgoings rebuilt rather than incrementally patched, and two missing free-transfer exits added: Tyler Onyango (contract expired 30 June — the third of the Gueye/Coleman/Onyango free-transfer trio) and Reece Welch (released on expiry). Both carry £0 book value; their estimated wage relief (~£1.0m/yr combined) now flows through the Cost Freed and Net SCR Swing figures. Neither was on last season's 25-man list, so the squad-list board is unchanged; both have been removed from the Squad tab's "still at the club" footnote.
Fees corrected against the announcements: Tyrique George £20m → ~£18m up front (the original £25m Chelsea option was renegotiated down, worth up to ~£24m with add-ons tied to European qualification and appearances, with a 15% Chelsea sell-on), and Merlin Röhl ~£15m est → ~£18m reported (some outlets ~£22m/€25m). Announcement dates added — Hackney 2 July, George 6 July, Röhl early July — and the squad-table signing dates aligned, which reprices their book values and amortisation. Hackney's add-on ceiling restated as ~£24m. Gross committed fees are now ~£54m; the new-signing squad-cost load is ~£22m/yr, replacing an inherited ~£13m figure that never reconciled to the table.
Grealish stays "In talks" — deliberately. A cross-club check flagged this page as out of step with Man City's, but as of today there is no agreement between the clubs: a second loan is still reported as the likeliest outcome, terms around £10.4m have been floated, and City want a fee. The completed Everton–City Grealish deal in the record books is the August 2025 season loan, which is a previous window and already sits in the 2025/26 table. Status left as talks and the note dated. Likewise, the Broja (→ Chelsea), Harrison (→ Leeds) and Young (→ Ipswich) exits flagged as missing from counterpart pages are all summer 2025 items — two loan expiries and a contract expiry — and are correctly filed in the 2025/26 table here, not this window.
No permanent sales have been completed this window: Ndiaye remains at the club with the club's stance unchanged as of 31 July, so the sales line stays at £0 and the PSR/SCR model inputs are untouched. All fees remain media-reported; wages, book values and the two new wage-relief figures are estimates.
Page launched
The Bean Counter goes live at bean-counter.co.uk/everton. Baseline data loaded: FY24/25 accounts (record £196.7m revenue, −£8.6m pre-tax, the £49.2m intra-group sale), the final PSR cycle estimate (~£19m buffer, per the esk's analysis), the 85% PL squad cost ratio model (~76% projected on FY27 revenue estimates at launch), the summer 2026 window to date (Hackney £16.5m, George £20m+, Röhl made permanent; Gueye, Coleman & Begović out on expiries), the full points-deduction history, the repurposed 25-man PL squad list board, and the Rumour Mill (both Grealish structures, Ndiaye–City, Garner–Villa, Beto–Leeds, Iroegbunam–Bundesliga). All fees media-reported; wages and book values estimated.
Glossary
Every rule in this tracker, in plain English — each with a real Everton example. For the group chat member who just asked "what's SCR?"
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