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The Bean Counter
Ipswich Town · Financial Compliance · 2026/27

There is no crisis at Ipswich Town until the white wine runs out in the boardroom.

— John Cobbold · Ipswich Town chairman, 1957–76
Ipswich Town official crest

The Bean Counter · Ipswich Town

2026/27 PRE-SEASON
Tractor Boys
Football has become a game of bean counting — so here's the abacus. The new 85% Squad Cost Ratio · SSR · the closed P&S cycle · transfer balance · book values · promotion economics

State of Play

Ipswich Town's estimated squad cost ratio is 94.7% against the Premier League's 85% limit for clubs outside Europe, putting them roughly £18.2m/yr OVER the line. The summer 2026 window stands at £14.6m banked from sales against £166.0m committed on signings. Every figure here is this tracker's own estimate, built from published accounts and media reporting.

PL Squad Cost Ratio · Estimated · 2026/27
/ 85%
85% green line · red line 115% (off scale)
PSR is dead — from 2026/27 the Premier League tests squad cost vs 85% of football revenue + net player-trading profit. As a non-European club, Ipswich get the 85/115 tier, not the 70/100 one.
Window Net Spend
reported fees, confirmed + advanced deals
Squad Churn
·
25/26 promotion squad → 26/27 PL squad: 10 buys all officially announced (+ Enciso expected) + loan returners (Cajuste, Szmodics, Ogbene, Al-Hamadi & co)
P&S Cycle Closed
~£40m EST OF £61m
2023/24–25/26 adjusted losses vs the blended cap — no charge reported. Clean sheet.

The Clock — What's Counting Down

DAYS TO SAUDI WINDOW CLOSE
6 SEP
DAYS TO PL SQUAD LIST
~2 SEP · 25-MAN LIST
DAYS TO PL SCR CHECKPOINT
OCT 2026
DAYS TO FIRST SSR TEST
31 OCT · PROMOTED CLUBS

The Six Regulations — Pass / Fail / Room Left

EFL P&S (23/24–25/26)
Cycle Closed · Est Pass
EST USAGE: ~£40m of the £61m blended allowance (£13m Champ + £35m PL + £13m Champ) — promotion-bonus add-backs and the Delap/Hutchinson profits did the work.
ROOM: cycle ended 30 Jun 2026 · no charge reported · Ipswich have never been charged under P&S/PSR.
PL SCR
Not Yet Tested
PROJECTED: vs the 85% green line (red at 115%) · season basis, y/e 30 Jun 2027.
ROOM: of squad cost/yr · first checkpoint Oct 2026, assessment 1 Mar 2027 · levies only bite from 2027/28 — a transition year.
SSR
First Test 31 Oct
TESTS: liquidity after an £85m stress test + positive-equity ratios. Promoted clubs are tested 31 October — the revenue leap makes this the rule that bites promoted clubs hardest.
ROOM: owners have funded via equity (repeated share issues since 2021); accounts prepared on a going-concern basis. No indication of an issue — but the test is new to everyone.
PL PSR
Retired
The £105m three-year loss rule was voted out (14–6, Nov 2025) before Ipswich's return — the club re-enters the PL never having faced a PL PSR assessment for 2026/27.
Legacy: existing PSR cases at other clubs run to conclusion; Ipswich carry none.
25-Man List · Homegrown
Comfortable
RULE: max 17 non-homegrown of 25; U21s (born on/after 1 Jan 2005) are exempt and unlimited.
ROOM: our audit counts ~12 non-homegrown seniors (Emersonn, Diop, Scherpen, van Oevelen, Kipré, Matusiwa, Cajuste, Florentino, Lukić, Fatawu, Ogbene, Maeda) — roughly 5 non-HG slots spare. The Championship core (Davis, O'Shea, Greaves, both Clarkes, Philogene, Szmodics…) is HG-rich.
Loan Quotas (In · Senior)
2 + 6 Left
DOMESTIC (English clubs): 2 of 2 concurrent remaining — Akpom and Kipré converted to permanent deals, so no loan slots are burned · season cap 4 · max 1 per club · max 1 GK between PL clubs.
INTERNATIONAL (FIFA): 6 of 6 senior remaining. Maeda, Florentino and Lukić all arrived on permanents, so the loan slots stay untouched — a late-window loan remains fully available, and the Abraham loan agreed with Aston Villa would be the first to use one: one of the two domestic slots, with the season cap of four barely touched. (Al-Hamadi's collapsed Raków move was an OUT loan and never counted here.)

Quick Answers — Ipswich's Finances in Plain English

Are Ipswich Town in trouble with FFP in 2026?

No charge exists or is pending. The 2023/24–2025/26 P&S cycle closed on 30 June 2026 with adjusted losses this tracker estimates around £40m against a £61m blended limit, and no charge has ever been brought against the club. The one number now worth watching: after a ~£147m gross window, the projected squad cost ratio for 2026/27 sits at roughly 95% — not on the line but about eleven points OVER it, in a transition year. Both figures had gone stale: the window was quoted at ~£106m before the last of the summer's signings landed, and the ratio at the 85% limit itself rather than where the arithmetic actually puts it.

What rules apply now Ipswich are back in the Premier League?

PSR is gone. From 2026/27 the PL tests the Squad Cost Ratio — wages + amortisation + agent fees vs 85% of football revenue plus net player-trading profit (green 85%, red 115%, with a 30% multi-year allowance) — plus the SSR liquidity and solvency tests. As a newly promoted club, Ipswich's first SSR test is 31 October.

How much have Ipswich spent this summer?

About £106m gross on reported fees, all officially announced: club-record Emersonn (£24m), Fatawu (£20m + £3m add-ons), Florentino Luís (£16m + £3m, Burnley), Lukić (~£9m, Fulham), Scherpen (£8.5m + £2.6m add-ons), Diop (£8.5m), Maeda (£8m rising to £10m), van Oevelen (~£3.4m, Volendam), and £9.1m converting the Akpom and Kipré loans. Sales are ~£7m (Murić, Baggott), so completed net spend is ~£100m — with Enciso (ask ~£30m) reported as expected to sign on top.

Why could Ipswich spend £100m+ without breaching anything?

Amortisation. £106m of fees on 3–5-year deals adds ~£28m/yr of squad cost, while promotion lifts revenue from ~£70m (parachute year) to an estimated ~£165m. The denominator grew faster than the numerator — that is the trick of promoted-club economics under SCR. The caveat: with the wages on top, our model now has the ratio at the 85% line itself, so the trick is fully used up.

What happened to the money from relegation in 2025?

Ipswich banked ~£49m of parachute money in 2025/26, sold Delap (£30m) and Hutchinson (£37.5m), kept the fourth-highest wage bill in the Championship, and reinvested a division-high ~£51m on Egeli, Matusiwa & co. The gamble paid off at the first attempt — 2nd place and an immediate return.

Have Ipswich ever been sanctioned financially?

Not under any profitability rule — no P&S/PSR charge, no embargo, no deduction. The 2003 administration predates FFP entirely; the only recent sanction is a £24,000 FA fine (Oct 2025) for a touchline melee — conduct, not accounting.

The whole thing in two sentences: Ipswich come back up with a clean compliance record, a closed P&S cycle and the promoted club's structural advantage — a revenue base that more than doubles while £106m of fees adds ~£28m/yr of cost. But under new boss Gary O'Neil the club has now spent that advantage to the edge: our model puts the ratio on the 85% line itself, so the things to watch are the 31 October SSR liquidity test, the multi-year allowance, and whether sales (Szmodics, Philogene?) rebuild the buffer before March 2027; the detail lives in the other tabs.

Incomings & Outgoings

Summer 2026 window (opened 15 June, closes 1 September — delayed by the World Cup). A deal enters this table at a medical and not before: ADVANCED means terms agreed and the medical taken or booked, DONE means a club has announced it. Anything short of that is interest, however well sourced, and interest lives on the Rumours tab. Fees per media reports. All ten permanent arrivals are now officially announced — this pass caught two announcements the tracker had missed (Scherpen 28 Jul, Maeda 26 Jul) and one signing it had missed entirely (van Oevelen, July). One deal sits at the Advanced rung: Julio Enciso, reported by EADT/Sky as expected to sign, counted at Strasbourg's ~£30m ask because no agreed fee has been reported. Wages are estimates.

Summer 2026 — Out

PlayerToFee £mWage £k/wkCost freed £m/yrProfit £mStatus

Summer 2026 — In

PlayerFromFee £mWage £k/wkSCR cost £m/yrStatus
Fees Out (sales)
Confirmed + advanced permanent deals
Fees Committed (buys)
Confirmed + advanced permanent deals
Net Window Balance
Reported fees only — no gate applies; the SCR effect below is what matters
Annual Cost Freed (outs)
Wages + stopped amortisation leaving the SCR numerator
Annual Cost Added (ins)
Fee÷5 amortisation + wages + ~10% agent fee
Net SCR Swing
Change to the annual squad-cost numerator from this window
How the columns map to the rules: SCR cost / Cost freed hits the numerator of the PL's 85% squad cost ratio (tested on the 2026/27 season) · Profit feeds the SCR denominator (net player-trading profit counts as income) · fees themselves also flow into the SSR liquidity picture. Wages are estimates.
Buys lead the window by design — the opposite of a distressed club. Promotion roughly doubles the revenue denominator overnight, and Gary O'Neil's rebuild (a No.9, two wingers, a centre-half, two keepers and now two defensive midfielders) adds ~£28m/yr of amortisation against ~£95m/yr of new revenue. But with the wages on top the model now sits ON the 85% line: the bean-counting risk is no longer hypothetical relegation maths alone — it's that a tenth signing has spent the whole first-year allowance, which is exactly why the out-rumours (Szmodics, Philogene, Clarke) suddenly matter as much as the ins.

2025/26 Season — In (Summer 25 + Jan 26)

PlayerFromFee £mWindow

2025/26 Season — Out

PlayerToFee £mWindow
Last season's ~£51m gross spend was the biggest in the Championship — funded by ~£49m of parachute money and the £67.5m Delap/Hutchinson sales. Selling two players signed a year earlier for £40m combined at a ~£27m book profit is exactly how a relegated club buys its way back without touching the P&S limit.

Spending Headroom

"Room" means two things for Ipswich in 2026/27: the PL Squad Cost Ratio (green 85%, red 115%, season basis) and the SSR liquidity tests. There is no UEFA layer and no registration gate — the club's constraint is a ratio, not a licence. The model below is adjustable — the defaults are my estimates, so put your own numbers in.

The window so far — transfer balance

Sales banked
Murić (Sassuolo), Baggott (Millwall)
Committed on signings
Emersonn, Fatawu, Florentino, Lukić, Diop, Scherpen, Maeda, van Oevelen, Akpom, Kipré + Enciso (expected, at the ask)
Net window balance
Reported fees; add-ons excluded. A big negative number is normal — and affordable — in a promotion summer
Committed but deferred: the reported add-ons — ~£3m on Fatawu, ~£3m on Florentino, ~£2.6m on Scherpen, ~£2m on Maeda, plus undisclosed clauses on Emersonn and Volendam's 10% sell-on retained on van Oevelen — are this window's hidden liability: they cost nothing today but capitalise into book value and amortisation if triggered. Same for the promotion-style bonus structures in the new contracts: stay up and the FY27 wage bill jumps again. Bean counters call this "buy now, count later."

The Promoted Three — Same Leap, Different Ledgers

Ipswich, Coventry and Hull all make the same £100m+ revenue jump — from wildly different starting points.

ClubLast revenueEst wagesParachutes?Squad baseThe bean-counter's read
Ipswich Town~£70m*~£50m*Yes — ~£49m in 25/26 (now replaced by PL money)Kept the core of the 24/25 PL squad + £51m of Championship reinvestmentThe strongest position: PL-experienced squad, owner equity funding, clean P&S record. Risk = second wage-jump in three years.
Coventry City~£45m*~£35m*No — champions, up from a standing startChampionship-built; heaviest recruitment need of the threeBiggest relative revenue transformation; SSR liquidity is the test to watch. Big headroom if they spend sensibly.
Hull City~£30m*~£28m*No — play-off winnersSmallest base in the divisionThe steepest step-up in the league — 85% of a small denominator is still a hard ceiling until PL money lands in FY27 accounts.
*Estimates from Championship-era accounts and league analyses (FY25 for Ipswich reflects a mix of parachute-year projections; their last filed accounts are the £155.4m PL season). The pattern: promoted clubs rarely fail the SCR in year one — the denominator leaps first. They fail SSR-style liquidity tests, or fail sporting-side and meet the rules on the way back down.

Annual constraint — squad cost ratio model

Squad cost = player & head-coach wages + transfer amortisation + agent fees. Denominator = football revenue + net player-trading profit. Edit any figure:

PL SCR · green 85% · red 115%
green 85%
Same numbers vs the 70% Europe line (illustrative)
green 70%

What-if: add a signing

Added annual squad cost
amortisation (incl. 4% PL levy) + wages + est. agent fee
PL SCR after signing
vs 85% green line
Window balance after fee
FYI only — no registration gate applies to Ipswich
Rule of thumb: every £1m/yr of ratio headroom buys either ~£5m of transfer fee (5-yr amortisation) or ~£19k/week of wages. On the default assumptions the practical shape of the remaining window is roughly . The deeper point: the 30% multi-year allowance means one bad year isn't fatal — but it ratchets, so spending through 85% now mortgages next season's room.
Caveats: revenue assumes ~£110–120m of PL central distributions (position-dependent), ~£18m matchday on a sold-out Portman Road, and commercial growth on the record FY25 base — relegation would tear ~£90m out of the denominator while the new contracts keep charging. The wages figure is the SCR-relevant slice (players + head coach), not the total staff bill, and Ipswich's contracts are reported to be heavily promotion/relegation-variable, which is exactly the right structure under a ratio rule. Amortisation is derived straight-line from the squad contracts (~£182m of estimated book value carried). The PL's precise adjustments (which income lines qualify, how the multi-year allowance is drawn down, treatment of bonuses) mean the true ratio will differ — treat this as a planning tool, not a compliance calculation.

Rumour Mill

The window shut at 11pm on 1 September 2026, and this tab is now mostly history. Nothing below can become an incoming transfer until January: a registration cannot be lodged outside the window, so every inbound link here is closed rather than pending, however well sourced it was. Three things the deadline does not close, which is why the cards are kept live rather than swept away. Free agents — a player already out of contract can be signed and registered outside the window. Outgoing moves abroad — several leagues closed later than England, so a player could still leave after English clubs had stopped buying: the Saudi Pro League runs to 6 September, the Süper Lig closed on 4 September and MLS on 2 September. Seven cards on this site point at one of those and are still live; every other card is now marked JANUARY and priced as a January deal rather than one that can happen today. Academy moves — an under-18 joining on training compensation is not moving a professional registration and is not bound by this deadline. Cards are left in place because a rumour that died at the deadline is a record of what was reported and what it was worth, and deleting them would quietly improve this site’s hit rate. The tick-box model still works: a JANUARY card prices what the deal would cost when the window reopens, which is the question actually worth asking about a link that survived the summer.

Everything on this tab is short of a medical. That is the line: a deal that has reached one sits in the Ins & Outs table, and everything below it — an offer, an agreement in principle, personal terms with no fee agreed, a bid lodged — is here, counting towards nothing until it moves. Tick any combination of live rumours (fees and wages are my estimates of reported figures) and the panel at the bottom recalculates the effect on the rules: window balance, the PL 85% squad cost ratio, and what the same numbers would look like against the 70% Europe line. Uses the same base assumptions as the Headroom tab, so tweaks there flow through here. The out side got dramatic this week: Al-Hamadi's Raków loan collapsed on a cardiac finding at the medical (he's back in training — removed from the mill), Harry Clarke's Stoke move hit its own medical snag, Szmodics is closing on a Derby loan-with-obligation, and Philogene is widely reported to want out while O'Neil says he's staying.

Incoming rumours

Outgoing rumours

Window balance
Δ annual squad cost
PL SCR (85%)
vs Europe 70% (illus.)
Profit booked
Tick the rumours above to model a scenario — and change any fee or wage to model your own number instead of this tracker’s.
How each lever maps to the rules: an incoming deal adds (fee + the PL's 4% levy)÷5 + wages + ~10% agent fee to the SCR numerator. An outgoing deal works three ways — wages and remaining amortisation leave the numerator, and the profit (fee − book value) lands in the denominator as trading income. Free-signing and academy players (Ogbene, Baggott types) are the compliance gold: £0 book value means any fee is pure profit. That asymmetry is why a promoted club that recruited frees and cheap fees in the EFL arrives in the PL with a squad full of denominator fuel.

Squad · Book Value & Amortisation

Senior squad after this summer's confirmed/advanced business, including last season's loanees now back at Portman Road. Book value is computed live: straight-line amortisation of the reported fee from signing date to current contract end (extensions re-spread the remaining value — this is the standard treatment). Fees and wages are media-reported/database estimates — Ipswich disclose almost nothing officially. Tap a column to sort.

Player Pos Fee £m Signed Contract End Yrs Left Amort £m/yr Book Value £m Mkt Val £m Profit If Sold £m Est Wage £k/wk
💰 highlighted rows = est. profit if sold ≥£15m — where market value towers over book value. Leif Davis (~£1m from Leeds in 2022, book nearly nil) and academy-adjacent frees like Ogbene are the bean counter's favourites: almost any fee is pure profit. Jack Clarke and Philogene carry real book value, so their sale profits are smaller than fans assume. Not listed individually (academy/low book value or development loans): Slicker, Henry Gray, plus the U21 academy crop — collectively immaterial to the amortisation picture but pure profit if ever sold. Free transfers & academy players carry £0 book value. Fees marked ~ are undisclosed and estimated from press reporting; market values are Transfermarkt-style estimates; wages triangulated across salary databases and contract reporting — new-signing wages are estimates until the databases catch up with the window. Maeda's three-year deal to 2029 is now confirmed by the club's announcement, matching what this table had assumed; Florentino's and Lukić's contract ends are per the announcement reporting (five years / to 2030). Amortisation shown on remaining contract; the PL caps the amortisation schedule for new deals at 5 years even on longer contracts. Add-ons are treated differently on the two sides of the ledger, and this page says so rather than quietly netting it out: both an incoming and an outgoing fee are modelled at the guaranteed amount, with add-ons counted only when they trigger. This caption used to claim the opposite for incoming deals — that they were modelled all-in — and that was a description of a rule this site does not follow: every incoming row bar two was already on the guaranteed basis, and the two exceptions, Suzuki and Ruggeri, were brought into line on 2 September. Contingent money is not capitalised until it is owed, which is the conservative reading and the one the corrections here have consistently enforced. FIFA’s 5% solidarity contribution is deducted from an international fee, not added to it: a buying club pays the headline number and distributes the 5% out of it, so a purchase costs the full fee; a club selling abroad banks 95% and books its profit on that. Domestic sales are untouched. Both sides are modelled here.
Squad Book Value
Sum of estimated carrying values
Annual Amortisation
Current squad only, our straight-line estimate
Est. Squad Wages
Estimated senior squad only. Club-wide FY25 bill (staff + bonuses) was £77.1m in the PL year
The bonus timebomb — how promotion hits the books twice: Ipswich's 2023/24 accounts showed £16.3m of promotion bonuses; a similar (undisclosed) structure will have paid out for the 2025/26 promotion and lands in the FY26 accounts. Under the new SCR, player bonuses sit in the numerator — so the reward for going up is a one-off spike in the very cost line the ratio tests, in the same year the PL revenue hasn't fully arrived (broadcast money lands from FY27). It's survivable precisely because the FY26 season was still assessed under the old EFL P&S with promotion-bonus add-backs allowed. The FY27 season — full PL revenue, full PL wages, SCR live — is where Ipswich's ratio gets its first real test.

Amortisation Runway — What's Already Committed

Transfer-fee amortisation locked into future seasons from today's contracts (straight-line on remaining book value), plus the reported add-ons (Fatawu ~£3m, Florentino ~£3m, Scherpen ~£2.6m, Maeda ~£2m) if triggered. This is spending that's already eaten before Ipswich buy anyone else.

Assumes current contracts run to term (sales remove their bars; extensions re-spread them). Amber = reported add-ons, spread over the remaining deals if they trigger — estimates. The cliff after FY29 is the point: Ipswich's book is short and cheap by PL standards, which is exactly the flexibility a yo-yo-risk club wants.

Premier League homegrown quota — 2026/27

Two ceilings, not one. A club may register 25 senior players, and no more than 17 of them may be non-homegrown. The familiar “eight homegrown” line is what falls out of those two numbers — but only if you fill all 25. A club with six qualifiers is not breaking any rule; it simply cannot name a squad bigger than 23. Under-21s sit outside the list altogether and play regardless: for 2026/27, born on or after 1 January 2005. Players out on loan are not registered.

Homegrown is a registration test, not a passport test. Three entire seasons, or 36 months, at any club affiliated to the FA or the FAW before the end of the season in which the player turns 21. That is why Julio Enciso qualifies — Paraguayan, and three entire seasons at Brighton from 18 — while Chiedozie Ogbene does not: Brentford B came at 20, too late to serve three.

Ipswich are the most over-subscribed squad in the league — 30 senior players for 25 places. Five have to be left out of the list entirely: not sold, not loaned, simply unregistered and unable to play. The quota is not the problem: at 12 homegrown and 14 non-homegrown they are four under the ceiling, and a promoted squad built through the English divisions is full of qualifiers. It is sheer volume, after a window that added heavily on top of a squad that was already deep. Only one player is under 21, so there is no exemption doing quiet work here the way it does at the bigger clubs — every one of those 30 needs a place.

PL 25-Man Squad List — 2026/27

No UEFA List A here — Ipswich aren't in Europe. What applies instead is the Premier League squad list: max 25 players, of whom no more than 17 can be non-homegrown (homegrown = registered with an English/Welsh club for 3 seasons before their 21st birthday). U21s — born on or after 1 Jan 2005 — are exempt and unlimited. Lists are due shortly after the window closes (~2 Sep) and published mid-September.

List Transition · 2025/26 Championship Promotion Squad → 2026/27 PL Squad

Each position: who's gone from the promotion squad, who stays, and who fills the hole — with deal status. Only confirmed/advanced deals are classed in/out — loose links stay in the Rumour Mill.

Goalkeepers

Out · 1
Arijanet MurićSASSUOLO · £6m · COMPLETED
Retained · 2
Alex PalmerSTAYS · HOMEGROWN
Cieran SlickerBACK FROM BARNET LOAN · HG
In · 2
Kjell ScherpenSIGNED 28 JUL · £8.5m + £2.6m · NON-HG
Kayne van OevelenSIGNED JUL · ~£3.4m · VOLENDAM · NON-HG
NET: the whole room rebuilt — Scherpen (26) is the Murić succession for a £2.5m net outlay, van Oevelen (22, Volendam's record sale, 10% sell-on retained) the development №2. Both take non-HG slots where Murić held one. Pope/Restes links dead.

Defenders

Out · 4
Harry ClarkeGONE · PRESTON NORTH END · £1.5m
Elkan BaggottMILLWALL · £1m
Conor TownsendRELEASED
Ashley YoungRETIRED · AGE 41
Retained · 5
Leif DavisSTAYS · NEW DEAL TO 2029 · HG
Dara O'SheaCAPTAIN MATERIAL · HG
Jacob GreavesSTAYS · HG
Ben JohnsonSTAYS · HG
Darnell FurlongSTAYS · HG
In · 2
Issa DiopSIGNED · £8.5m · FULHAM · NON-HG
Cédric KipréLOAN MADE PERMANENT · £2.1m · NON-HG
NET: 3 out → 2 in, but the outs were fringe and the ins are PL-calibre. Diop brings 150+ PL apps; Kipré's £2.1m conversion is the window's quietest good deal. The back line is HG-heavy, which funds the quota elsewhere.

Midfielders

Out · 1
Wes BurnsGONE · LEICESTER CITY · £0.1m
Retained · 4
Azor MatusiwaSTAYS · THE 25/26 REVELATION · NON-HG
Jack TaylorSTAYS · NEW DEAL TO 2028 · HG
Kasey McAteerSTAYS · HG
Cameron HumphreysBACK FROM HUDDERSFIELD LOAN · HG
In · 4
Florentino LuísSIGNED · £16m + £3m · BURNLEY · NON-HG
Saša LukićSIGNED 8 AUG · ~£9m · FULHAM · NON-HG
Jens CajusteBACK FROM NAPOLI LOAN · NON-HG
Tim IroegbunamAPPROACH TO EVERTON — NO FORMAL OFFER YET
NET: the engine room that won promotion returns intact — and O'Neil has spent £25m doubling it: Florentino (beat Hull to him) and Lukić, who follows Diop from Craven Cottage. Both non-HG, which is where the quota slack went. Iroegbunam would be the HG version if the approach ever becomes an offer.

Forwards

Out · 3
George HirstGONE · STOKE CITY · £6m
Conor ChaplinRELEASED · CLUB LEGEND STATUS, PL MINUTES NOT GUARANTEED
Iván AzónLOAN ENDED · BACK TO COMO
Retained · 5
Jack Clarke16 CHAMPIONSHIP GOALS · HG
Jaden PhilogeneSTAYS · HG
Sindre Walle EgeliU21 — EXEMPT FROM THE 25
Sammie SzmodicsBACK FROM DERBY LOAN · HG
Chiedozie OgbeneBACK FROM SHEFF UTD LOAN · NON-HG
In · 4
EmersonnCLUB RECORD £24m · TOULOUSE · NON-HG
Abdul FatawuSIGNED · £20m + £3m · LEICESTER · NON-HG
Daizen MaedaSIGNED 26 JUL · £8m RISING TO £10m · NON-HG
Tammy AbrahamLOAN AGREED CLUB-TO-CLUB · PLAYER DECIDING · HG
NET: the attack is where the £52m went. Emersonn (21) + Fatawu (22) are classic amortisation buys — big fees, long deals, low annual cost, resale upside. Maeda (28, now announced on a three-year deal) is the opposite trade: bought purely for what he does between now and 2029. Al-Hamadi stays as the depth call after his Raków loan collapsed on a medical; Philogene's future is the live question — see the Rumour Mill. And a fourth arrival is agreed but not accepted: Tammy Abraham on a straight season loan from Aston Villa, which would be the one addition here that costs no fee and no amortisation at all — just a share of £140k/wk, and the share is the part nobody has published.
Homegrown tags are our assessment from career history, not an official list — edge cases (Ogbene trained partly in Ireland, Fatawu only joined Leicester at 19: both counted NON-HG) could move either way. Van Oevelen (22, born 2003/04) misses the U21 exemption and counts as a non-HG senior. Egeli and the academy crop (born 2005+) are U21-exempt and don't consume list places.
The quota math: counting the announced squad, Ipswich carry roughly 12 non-homegrown seniors — Scherpen, van Oevelen, Diop, Kipré, Matusiwa, Cajuste, Florentino, Lukić, Emersonn, Fatawu, Ogbene and Maeda — against a ceiling of 17. Still ~5 spare non-HG slots, but the window's midfield spree spent most of the slack (Enciso would make it 13). Iroegbunam, if the Everton approach ever became a deal, would be a homegrown addition and cost nothing from that allowance. The sharper problem is now arithmetic: ~26 senior names for a 25-man list — someone (Humphreys, Al-Hamadi, Harry Clarke, a loan exit) has to make way, which is exactly why the out-rumours have accelerated.

Sanction Tracker — The Clean Sheet

The P&S Glidepath

£80m £60m £40m £20m £0 CAP ~£41m CAP £61m (blended) P&S RETIRES → SCR ERA TO FY24TO FY25TO FY26FY27 ~£25m est £30.2m reported ~£40m est · CLOSED 30 JUN 85% SCR applies
Rolling three-year adjusted P&S losses vs the blended cap (£13m per Championship season, £35m per PL season; clubs assessed by the league they sat in). The to-FY25 figure (£30.2m vs £61m, headroom ~£32m) was reported alongside the 24/25 accounts; the others are this tracker's estimates after allowable deductions and promotion-bonus add-backs. Ipswich were never close to the line.
2003

Administration — the ancient history

The ITV Digital collapse and the cost of the 2000–02 UEFA Cup squad put the club into administration — a decade before FFP existed. The lesson (don't spend TV money you haven't received) is now club doctrine under the current regime.

April 2021

Takeover — Gamechanger 20 Ltd

US investors (led by ORG Portfolio Management, later joined by Bright Path Sports Partners) buy the club from Marcus Evans. Crucially for compliance: funding since has been via repeated equity share issues, not debt — the structure both the old P&S equity provisions and the new SSR solvency tests reward.

2021 → 2024

League One → Premier League, audited clean

Back-to-back promotions under McKenna with wage bills of £19.8m (L1) and £44.5m (Championship). The £39.3m FY24 loss looked alarming, but £16.3m was promotion bonuses — and the EFL permitted a £15.6m add-back for P&S purposes. No charge, no embargo, at any point.

7 October 2025

The only sanction on the books: £24,000 — for a melee

The FA fines Ipswich £24,000 (Birmingham £30,000) after a mass confrontation in the 8 August Championship fixture — both clubs admitted failing to control their players. A conduct charge, not a finance one. It remains the club's only sanction of the modern era.

30 June 2026

P&S cycle closes — estimated pass, rule retires

The 2023/24–25/26 assessment period ends with estimated adjusted losses ~£40m vs the £61m blended cap. No charge reported. With PSR/P&S retired in the Premier League from 2026/27, Ipswich's entire financial-rules history under the loss-based regime closes at: played 3 cycles, breached 0.

Now → 2026/27

What could actually go wrong

Nothing is pending. The live risks are structural, not disciplinary: the 31 October SSR liquidity test for promoted clubs (mitigated by equity funding), the FY27 ratio if relegation shrinks the denominator while the new contracts keep amortising, and the FY26 promotion-bonus spike. The bean counter's honest read: Ipswich are one of the most sanction-proof clubs in the division — the tracker exists to keep it that way visible.

Last Accounts — FY2024/25 (y/e 30 June 2025)

The Premier League season that ended in relegation — and a club-record set of numbers anyway. Filed via Gamechanger 20 Ltd (the club's holding company). The FY26 accounts (the promotion season, with ~£49m of parachute money and the Delap/Hutchinson sale profits) are not due at Companies House until spring 2027.

Revenue (club record)
£155.4m
Up from £37.3m in the Championship — a 4.2× jump in one season
Pre-tax result
−£19.35m
Gamechanger 20 loss for the year — vs −£39.3m in FY24
Wage bill
£77.1m
49.6% of revenue — one of the PL's lowest ratios that season
TV / broadcast
£107.6m
vs £10.3m the season before — the entire economics of promotion in one line
Player amortisation
~£30m est
Our estimate on the ~£120m 24/25 squad investment; not separately headlined
3-yr P&S usage
£30.2m of £61m
Reported alongside these accounts — headroom ~£32m at that assessment

Revenue mix (FY25)

Broadcasting
£107.6m
Commercial & other
~£33.8m*
Matchday
~£14m*
*Split estimated: the club discloses turnover and broadcast; matchday is extrapolated from the £10.5m reported in FY24 plus PL pricing, commercial & other is the balancing figure. Portman Road (~30,000) sold out all season.
The wage story is the whole story: £19.8m in League One → £44.5m in the Championship → £77.1m in the Premier League — a 4× rise in three seasons, yet the wages/revenue ratio fell to ~50% because revenue rose 15×. That discipline (heavily variable, promotion/relegation-indexed contracts) is why relegation in 2025 produced a survivable −£19m rather than an Everton-style crisis, and why the club could keep the Championship's 4th-highest wage bill (~£570k/wk on players) and still bounce straight back. The FY26 accounts will show the mirror image: revenue down to ~£70m on parachutes, cushioned by ~£27m of book profit on the Delap and Hutchinson sales.

How the FY25 loss happened (estimated bridge)

Operating loss (reported ~£19m)−£19.0m
Profit on player sales (minimal — the squad was kept together) est+£2.0m
Net interest & other est−£2.35m
Pre-tax loss−£19.35m
Owner funding: since the 2021 takeover, Gamechanger 20 has been funded through repeated equity share issues from the US ownership group (ORG, joined by Bright Path Sports Partners in 2024) — well over £100m cumulatively on our reading of the filings, all equity rather than loans. Under the old P&S that secured the "equity-funded" loss allowances; under the new SSR it's precisely the structure the solvency tests reward. One transaction type, compliant under both regimes — the quiet foundation of everything else on this page.

Rules & Compliance Status

Every regime that applies to Ipswich, the limit in pounds, and where the club stands. "FFP" itself no longer exists as a single rule — it's the old umbrella name. For a non-European PL club in 2026/27 the live rulebook is: the new SCR (85%/115%) + SSR, plus the squad-list, loan and levy machinery. UEFA's rules (70% SCR, FER) don't apply unless Ipswich qualify for Europe.

COMPLIANT NEW / FIRST TEST PENDING NOT COMPLIANT

Compliance calendar

1 Sep 2026WINDOW CLOSES · 11PM
~2 Sep 2026PL 25-MAN SQUAD LIST DUE
Oct 2026PL SCR MONITORING CHECKPOINT
31 Oct 2026FIRST SSR TEST (PROMOTED CLUBS)
31 Dec 2026ACCOUNTS TO THE PL
1 Feb 2027JANUARY WINDOW SHUT · LIST UPDATE
1 Mar 2027PL SCR ASSESSMENT
~31 Mar 2027FY26 ACCOUNTS FILING DUE
7 Jul 2027FULL SSR ANNUAL TESTS
EFL · cycle ended 30 June 2026
Est. pass · closed

P&S — Profitability & Sustainability (EFL)

LIMIT: blended 3-yr loss cap — £13m per Championship season, £35m per PL season → £61m for Ipswich's 23/24–25/26 mix
BasisClub financial years (y/e 30 June), aggregate of FY24 + FY25 + FY26, assessed by the EFL because Ipswich were an EFL club in 2025/26.
What countsAggregate pre-tax result with deductions for academy, infrastructure, community & women's football — and, crucially for Ipswich, the EFL permitted a £15.6m promotion-bonus add-back in FY24.
IpswichRaw losses ~£39.3m (FY24) + £19.35m (FY25) + our FY26 estimate (~£5–15m after Delap/Hutchinson profits and parachute money) — but adjusted, roughly £40m against £61m. The reported position at the FY25 accounts was £30.2m used of £61m. No charge has ever been brought.
DeadlineCycle closed 30 June 2026. Barring an unexpected EFL review, this file is shut — and the loss-based era ends with it.
Premier League · live from 2026/27 · the binding constraint
Not yet tested

SCR — Squad Cost Ratio (PL)

NON-EUROPEAN CLUBS (incl. Ipswich): green 85% · red 115% · 30% multi-year allowance — CLUBS IN EUROPE: 70% / 100%
BasisSeason / financial year (2026/27, y/e 30 June 2027). Voted in 14–6 on 21 Nov 2025 — the tightest possible margin — replacing PSR entirely.
What countsPlayer + head-coach wages, transfer amortisation/impairment and agent fees, vs football revenue + net profit on player sales. The PL's 4% transfer levy capitalises into registration cost. Amortisation capped at 5 years. Over green = levy (payable from 2027/28); over red = risk of sporting sanctions. The buffer RATCHETS: use it one season and next season's threshold drops by the amount used, earned back through compliance.
IpswichProjected ~85% on the model defaults (~£158m of squad cost vs ~£185m of revenue + trading profit) — effectively ON the green line, point estimate fractionally over, after Florentino (£16m), Lukić (~£9m) and van Oevelen added ~£6m/yr of amortisation and ~£7.5m/yr of wages in a week. Not a breach posture: 2026/27 is a transition year, the 30% multi-year allowance absorbs a marginal excess, and a Szmodics/Philogene sale would land profit straight in the denominator. But the first-year headroom is spent.
DeadlineMonitoring checkpoint October 2026; formal assessment 1 March 2027, after the January window. 2026/27 is a transition year — levies for breaches only bite from 2027/28.
Premier League · live from 2026/27
First test 31 Oct

SSR — Sustainability & Systemic Resilience

TESTS: liquidity headroom ≥ £0 after an £85m stress test · positive equity ratio ≤90% (26/27) → 85% (27/28) → 80% (28/29+)
BasisTested 7 July each year — but newly promoted clubs (Ipswich, Coventry, Hull) take their first test on 31 October, covering the current and following season. Passed unanimously at the Nov 2025 vote.
What countsNot a spending cap — solvency tests. The liquidity calculation counts 40% of squad market value as a liquid asset; the £85m stress test models relegation. Owner equity injections count in a club's favour.
IpswichEvery structural factor points the right way: equity-only owner funding since 2021, a modest debt profile, contracts indexed to division, and a squad market value comfortably above book. This is the promoted club's hardest test in general — and Ipswich look better-placed for it than most who've come up.
DeadlineFirst test 31 October 2026; full annual cycle from 7 July 2027.
Premier League · retired
Never charged

PSR — the rule Ipswich never faced

WAS: £105m max pre-tax loss over rolling 3 years (£35m/yr) — retired from 2026/27
HistoryIpswich's only PL season under PSR (2024/25) passed without incident — the club's blended cap ran through the EFL because of the surrounding Championship seasons. They return to the top flight the season the rule dies.
Why it matters anywayLegacy PSR cases at other clubs (assessments to January 2027) still shape the market Ipswich buy and sell in — distressed sellers are opportunity. And the £105m-era case law (Everton, Forest deductions) is the precedent base for how SCR breaches will eventually be punished.
Premier League squad rules
Comfortable

25-man list & homegrown quota

RULE: squad of max 25 after the window · max 17 non-homegrown · U21s (born ≥ 1 Jan 2005) exempt
BasisLists due ~2 September, updated after January. Homegrown = 3 seasons registered with an English/Welsh club before the 21st birthday — nationality irrelevant.
Ipswich~12 non-HG seniors on our audit (see the 25-Man List tab) against a ceiling of 17 — the window's ten signings were almost all non-HG, so the famous slack is down to ~5 slots. The Championship-built core is still overwhelmingly homegrown, and the real squeeze is now the 25 itself: ~26 senior names for 25 places.
DeadlineList due ~2 September 2026, published mid-September.
PL + FIFA loan rules
Unused

Loan quotas

DOMESTIC: max 2 concurrent loans in (4/season) from English clubs, max 1 per club, max 1 GK between PL clubs · FIFA: max 6 senior international loans each way
IpswichZero slots used — last season's loans in (Akpom, Kipré, Azón) either converted to permanent deals or ended, and the loan army (Szmodics, Ogbene, Cajuste & co) has come home. Full flexibility for a deadline-day loan — Maeda arrived on a permanent, so nothing has been spent from the allocation.
Out directionDevelopment loans for the academy crop (Slicker and Gray went out last season) don't touch senior quotas — U21/club-trained players are exempt under FIFA's rules.
Terminology · where "FFP" went

FFP → what it means now

"Financial Fair Play" (2010) was rebranded by UEFA in 2022 as Financial Sustainability Regulations (FER + 70% SCR) — none of which applies to a non-European club. Domestically, the PL's version was PSR (2013), replaced from 2026/27 by SCR + SSR; the EFL still runs loss-based P&S. So when pundits ask if Ipswich have "an FFP problem", the precise answer is: they've closed their final loss-based cycle with an estimated one-third of the allowance unused, and their first ratio-based test is March 2027.
Accounting mechanics

Amortisation & "pure profit"

Fees spread over the contract (max 5 years); sale profit = fee received − remaining book value − any sell-on shares owed, booked instantly. The Delap deal is the Ipswich textbook case: bought for ~£20m in 2024, one year amortised (book ~£16m), sold to Chelsea for ~£30m — ~£14m of profit in one line (less Manchester City's reported sell-on share). Hutchinson repeated the trick at ~£21m of profit. Buying works the other way: Emersonn's £24m adds only ~£4.8m/yr of cost. That asymmetry — sell instantly, buy slowly — is how a relegated club funded the most expensive Championship squad in 25/26 and still passed P&S.

The Whole League — Bean Counted

All 20 clubs for 2026/27: which SCR tier they're in, their latest published accounts (FY2024/25, y/e mid-2025), and their compliance baggage. Nine clubs in Europe carry the 70% green / 100% red caps; the other eleven get 85% / 115%. Notes updated 4 Aug 2026 — officially announced deals and appointments only; pursuits and links stay in the Rumour Mill. Figures marked ~ are estimates from league-wide analyses rather than confirmed line items — FY25 league totals: £6.8bn revenue, £4.4bn wages, £2.0bn amortisation, £948m aggregate pre-tax losses.

ClubEurope 26/27Green capRev £mWages £mW/RCompliance notes
ArsenalCL · CHAMPIONS70%~617~328~53%Comfortable on both ratios; CL runners-up 25/26. Amortisation £170m+ the main cost line.
Manchester CityCL70%~715408~57%New era: Maresca replaces Guardiola. Broke the British record for Forest’s Anderson (£116m, fixed fee) — absorbed inside 70% by a £715m revenue base.
Manchester UnitedCL70%~666~313~47%Carrick made permanent manager; ~£85m midfield rebuild (Santos £50m, Tielemans £35m from Villa). £196m amortisation, but a £666m denominator makes 70% easy.
Aston VillaCL · EL HOLDERS70%37827372%Mid-UEFA-settlement, fined twice (£19.4m in Jul 2026, 2/3 suspended), trend endorsed — the £117m British-record Rogers sale is the exit route.
LiverpoolCL70%~614~386~63%Iraola officially appointed (4 Jun, 2-yr deal) after Slot was sacked a year on from the title. FY25 wages inflated by title bonuses after £241m on Isak (£125m) & Wirtz. Squad cost £545m, big denominator.
BournemouthEUROPA70%~175~140~80%Flagged spending near capacity in FY25 — and first-ever Europe now drags them from 85% to the 70% cap just as Iraola officially left for Liverpool. The squeeze case, squeezed further.
SunderlandEUROPA70%~180*~95*~53%*FY25 = first PL season back. Europe two seasons after League One — the 70% cap lands on a still-growing revenue base.
Crystal PalaceEUROPA · CONF WINNERS70%~190~135~71%Conference League winners — then Glasner officially departed for Forest. Second straight European season keeps them on the 70% cap, right on the line like Villa.
BrightonCONFERENCE70%~222~165~74%FY25 costs rose sharply on amortisation; historically balanced by elite player trading profits.
Chelsea85%~541~360~67%Xabi Alonso era. UEFA settlement (£26.7m paid, up to £51m conditional), fined again Jul 2026 — then broke their record for Rogers (£117m) days after loaning Garnacho to Villa, walking the swap-rule tightrope. League-high £212m amortisation; missing Europe eases the cap to 85%.
Newcastle85%~350~220~63%Fined Jul 2026 for BOTH SCR and FER breaches; FY25 leaned on selling Isak to Liverpool for £125m. Settlement obligations continue despite missing Europe.
Tottenham85%~526~222~42%Lowest wage ratio among the big-revenue clubs — the league's most comfortable bean-counting position.
Nottingham Forest85%~190~155~82%Fined £2.2m in Jul 2026 — then banked £116m selling Anderson to City, transforming the FER/PSR picture overnight. Glasner confirmed as head coach 6 Jul (reported club-record ~£13m/yr salary) — their FIFTH boss in 12 months.
Everton85%~187~160~86%Two PSR deductions in 23/24; new stadium revenue is the plan for growing under the 85% cap.
Fulham85%~180~145~81%Small-revenue cohort where 85% barely funds a competitive XI — the other side of the SCR squeeze.
Brentford85%~195~125~64%The sustainability model club — comfortable margin on every metric.
Leeds85%~150*~110*~73%*FY25 = promotion season. Second PL season consolidating.
CoventryPROMOTED · CHAMPIONS85%~45*~35*~78%*Championship-era accounts. PL broadcast money transforms the denominator overnight — big headroom if they spend sensibly.
IPSWICH TOWNPROMOTED85%1557750%The subject of this tracker: FY25 is their own PL season (record £155.4m revenue, 49.6% W/R). Straight back up at the first attempt with a clean P&S sheet. See every other tab.
HullPROMOTED · PLAY-OFFS85%~30*~28*~93%*Championship accounts. The biggest financial step-up in the division — SSR liquidity tests bite hardest here. In: Butland, ex-Villa Targett, Zambrano & Morita.
The tier divide is the story of 2026/27: nine clubs in Europe live at 70/100 while eleven — including Ipswich — live at 85/115. For once the rulebook favours the promoted club: Ipswich get 15 points more headroom than Villa or Arsenal precisely because they aren't in Europe, on a denominator that PL broadcast money has just doubled. The squeeze cases sit elsewhere: Bournemouth and Palace dragged down to 70% by success, and fellow-promoted Coventry and Hull for whom even 85% of a small revenue base is a hard ceiling until the TV money lands in their accounts.
Sources: Deloitte Annual Review (league totals), club accounts via Swiss Ramble/Maguire/BlueCityBrain analyses, UEFA CFCB statements. ~ figures are estimates; * marks accounts from a different division. Want this full treatment (transfers, book values, squad lists, headroom) for any specific club?

Who's Selling to Survive — Net Transfer Balance

Sorted by net balance — the top of this table is where the selling pressure lives, the bottom is where the money goes.

THIS WINDOW: disclosed fees on officially completed 2026 deals only; undisclosed counted £0, loans & frees excluded; the shared dataset may lag Ipswich's own tables above (Scherpen, Maeda, Florentino and Lukić all completed 26 Jul–8 Aug). LAST 5 YEARS: net spend 2021/22–2025/26, Transfermarkt basis (€ converted), ~ = estimated. The two views tell one story from opposite ends for Ipswich: a five-year net spend of ~£120m bought two promotions and a Premier League squad — and this window the club is, unusually for a promoted side, one of the division's bigger net buyers, because the parachute year was funded by selling Delap and Hutchinson instead.

Can a Promoted Club Actually Stay Up — Financially?

The question underneath every number in this tracker. The honest answer: the gap is structural — but the new rules quietly help the well-run promoted club, and Ipswich are the case study.

Why it's brutal — because it mostly is

The 85% rule is a percentage of revenue — it doesn't cap spending, it caps spending relative to income. City's 70% of ~£715m buys a ~£500m squad; Ipswich's 85% of ~£185m buys ~£157m. The gap is locked in by design, and the recent record is bleak: all three promoted clubs went straight back down in 2023/24 AND 2024/25 — Ipswich among them. Promotion economics push you to spend the whole allowance the moment you get it, and relegation then leaves the contracts behind while the revenue leaves immediately. That's the yo-yo trap: it isn't a compliance failure, it's a solvency stress — which is exactly why the PL now aims the SSR tests at promoted clubs first (31 October, before anyone's spent two windows' worth).

Why Ipswich are built for the attempt

1 · Second bite, retained core. Unlike 2024's promotion from the Championship with a League One squad, this squad has a full PL season in it — and kept Davis, O'Shea, Greaves, Clarke and Philogene through relegation. The 24/25 investment wasn't wasted; it was warehoused. 2 · Variable contracts. Division-indexed wages meant relegation cost ~£19m, not £90m — and mean survival self-funds the next wage rise. 3 · The trading engine works. Delap and Hutchinson: bought ~£40m, sold £67.5m a year later. Net trading profit counts IN the SCR denominator — selling well literally raises the cap. 4 · Equity owners, no debt drag. Every SSR test rewards exactly how Gamechanger 20 has been funded since 2021. 5 · Homegrown depth. ~5 spare non-HG slots even after a ten-signing window — the late market stays open when others are quota-squeezed.

The bean counter's verdict: promoted clubs don't fail the new rules — they fail the league, then meet the rules on the way down. Ipswich's £106m window adds ~£28m/yr of amortisation against ~£95m/yr of new revenue — but with wages on top the model now sits on the 85% line itself, so the beans are fully spent rather than unimpeachable. What the beans can't buy is the ten points between 18th and 15th. But if survival happens, the flywheel is real: PL revenue compounds into the denominator, the young signings (Emersonn 21, Fatawu 22, Egeli 20) appreciate on cheap books, and the club that once went into administration over missing TV money becomes — by the numbers — one of the most sustainably run sides in the division. John Cobbold's white wine is safe either way.

Changelog

Every update to the Bean Counter's data, newest first. Maintained manually with each rebuild.

3 Sept 2026

Twenty-six sold players were sitting in “Retained” columns across fifteen clubs SITE-WIDE CORRECTION

Villa’s board was not the exception. It was the one somebody happened to be looking at. After Emiliano Martínez was found under “Retained” four days after his sale to Chelsea, the same pattern was checked across the other nineteen pages. Every club page carries these position boards — three columns each, who left, who stayed, who arrived — and at roughly forty-five chips a page that is about nine hundred hand-written claims, none of which any gate on this site could read, because they name players in free HTML rather than through a data array.

Twenty-six of them said a player had stayed when the club’s own deal table said he had been sold. The list is not marginal. Rodri sat under Manchester City’s “Retained · 6” tagged “REAL MADRID TALKS”; he had gone to Barcelona for £51m. Tijjani Reijnders (£52m, Al Qadsiah) and Nico González (£50m, Newcastle) were beside him. Carlos Baleba was retained at Brighton after a £65m move to Manchester United. Liam Delap was retained at Chelsea after £45m to Forest. Everton had five in one page — Ndiaye, McNeil, Beto, Iroegbunam and Patterson. Arsenal had Gabriel Jesus, Ipswich three, Hull two, Palace two, and so on across fifteen clubs.

Each one is now in the column it belongs in, with the destination and fee taken from the deal table rather than retyped. Column counts were recomputed from the chips actually present, so the headings match their own contents for the first time in a while. “Out · 0 — Nobody” placeholders were removed where a real departure now fills the column.

Worth recording how nearly this went wrong, because it is the second time today. The first script moved the chips and reported twenty-two successes. It had in fact deleted all twenty-two players: the insertion point never matched, the removal did, and the counts were recomputed afterwards so every column looked internally consistent. Nothing in the output said anything was missing. It was caught by reading one board back rather than by trusting the tally, and reverted. The rewrite asserts the set of names in a board before and after the edit and refuses to write when they differ — which then immediately caught a second, smaller error, and later a third: the pattern used to find a column was swallowing the last chip’s closing tag, so the final name in every column was invisible, which is why four clubs looked clean on the first pass and were not.

And a gate, the twenty-fifth. tools/check-flowboards.js asserts two things about every chip on every board: a name in a retained column must not be a completed permanent sale in that page’s OUT26, and a name in a retained column must exist in that page’s data at all. It says nothing about incoming or outgoing columns, where naming a target from another club is correct, and it exempts chips whose own tag places them outside the squad table — a third-choice keeper in contract talks, a U21 needing no registration. Its first run reported seventy-one problems, of which twenty-four were its own fault: typographic apostrophes it could not match to straight ones, and editorial labels like “Third keeper slot” that are not players. Tested against the pre-fix pages, where it finds exactly twenty-six.

The reason this sat unseen is worth stating plainly. The deal arrays are gated. The ratio inputs are gated. The squad table is gated. The answer block, the league tables and the share cards are all derived. These boards were the one substantial thing on every club page that was neither derived nor checked — prose in the shape of a table, in a heavily-read tab — and they had been drifting for as long as they have existed. It took a reader with the live page open to find the first one.

3 Sept 2026

Humphreys and Gray added — the second travels further than any loan on this site OFFICIAL

Cameron Humphreys to Huddersfield Town and Henry Gray to Wellington Phoenix, in New Zealand — the longest journey in the whole database. Both season loans, both missing until now.

Why these were missing, and it is structural. Every gate on this site is built around deals with fees — guaranteed-fee checks, counterpart-fee checks, solidarity classification, book values. A fee-less loan trips none of them, so a page can be missing several and still read green. Nothing here was wrong; things were absent, which is the harder failure to see.

No relief is assumed on any of them. Nobody publishes what share of a loaned-out player’s wage the borrowing club carries, and where a loan goes down the pyramid the parent usually keeps paying most of it. Every wage here is an estimate and flagged as one. Wages go £102m → £100m and the ratio to 94.7%, still about £18.2m/yr past the 85% line rather than £20.2m.

3 Sept 2026

The Iroegbunam chase is over — he went to Hull CARD RETIRED

Everton sold him to Hull on 1 September for £13m guaranteed plus £9m of add-ons, so the card here is dead and out of the modeller. Ipswich were one of three clubs this page tracked on him; the 14 August hamstring tear froze the market for all of them, and Hull were the ones who came back. No figure on this page moves — a rumour that never completed was never in the numerator.

2 Sept 2026

The Saudi deadline was five weeks out, and it is four days CORRECTION

This morning’s work put the Saudi Pro League window at 12 October and built a countdown, a gate and seven card tags on it. A reader said that sounded wrong — they had read it was days away. They were right.

The sources disagree. Wikipedia and Goal put the registration period at 22 July to 6 September; one tracker says 11 September; Sports Mole and AgentFlow say 12 October. The tell is arithmetic: 22 July to 12 October is 11.7 weeks, essentially FIFA’s twelve-week maximum for a registration period. That reads like somebody published the longest period permissible rather than the date actually announced. 6 September is 6.6 weeks, an ordinary window.

It is now carried at 6 September — the earliest credible date, chosen deliberately. The conservative error here is the early one: saying a shut window is open invents deals, which is the exact failure the window gate was written this morning to prevent. The countdown now reads four days rather than forty.

What is still unresolved: no source reachable from here separates Saudi domestic registration from international, so no such split is modelled. If one exists it is the international deadline that governs a sale out of England, and 12 October may well be a domestic-only extension rather than simply wrong. The date is flagged as contested on the deadline page rather than asserted.

Worth naming the pattern: the 12 October figure came from a single search result, and the source family it came from has now been wrong four times in this project — Hincapié’s fee, Trafford’s club, Fofana’s club, and this. A date that anchors a gate deserved a second source before it was written into twenty-one pages.

2 Sept 2026

The window is shut, and the site now says so — except where it isn’t CORRECTION

The Premier League window closed at 11pm on 1 September, so from the 2nd no rumour card here can describe a signing as something still pending: a registration cannot be lodged outside the window, however well sourced the link was. 139 cards are now marked JANUARY and priced as January deals rather than deals that can be done today.

But “the window” is not one thing, and flattening it would be the opposite error. A club that cannot buy can still sell: the Saudi Pro League runs to 6 September and the Süper Lig to the 4th; MLS closed on the 2nd. Bundesliga clubs finished earliest, on 31 August; Serie A, LaLiga and the Premier League all shut on the 1st. Six cards survive because they point at a league that outlasted England’s, and each has had its destination narrowed to the club that can actually still act. The seventh has already gone. Leon Bailey, whose card read “Al Diriyah” after Sevilla and Hull ran out of time, signed for Olympiacos on 2 September for £3.4m — which is the point of this section in one transfer. The English window shutting does not stop an English club selling, and it did not stop this one. It also proves a window this table does not list: Greece was still open on 2 September, and no closing date for it could be sourced, so none is stored rather than guessed.

The first countdown clock had been reading DONE against a label saying “days to window close”. It now counts to the Saudi deadline on 6 September — the one transfer deadline that still constrains these clubs, because they can still sell into it.

tools/check-window-state.js holds it: a card with no jan flag is asserting the deal can happen now, so its destination must sit in a window open today. It is date-driven rather than a one-off sweep — on 5 September the Türkiye cards stop being live and the gate says so without anyone remembering. It found six on Fulham that the first pass missed, because those rows are written with double quotes where the rest of the site uses single.

The countdown gate had a matching blind spot: it skipped any page without a club nav and only knew one label shape, so deadline/ was invisible to it — and was still counting to 1am on 1 October, the exact GMT-versus-BST bug that gate was written for, fixed on twenty pages and left on the twenty-first. It now reads both shapes, both const and var, and every page that carries a clock.

2 Sept 2026

A live rumour card for a deal this page had already done CORRECTION

Exequiel Palacios, a £19.3m signing recorded in the Ins table and still live on the board as a £20m target.

Why it matters: a live card is priced by the scenario modeller. With the completed row in the table and the card still on the board, ticking it charged the same deal twice — once as history, once as a hypothetical.

Why nothing caught it: the rumour-already-gone check only compared a card against deals completed at other clubs. If the player had landed at this club, the check skipped him, and outgoing cards were never examined at all. So the one case guaranteed to double-count — a card for your own completed deal — was the one case invisible to the gate. Six cards were in that state across five clubs.

The check now also reads each page’s own Ins and Outs tables, in both directions, and fails on any live card for a deal already recorded there. Verified by reviving one of the six: the gate fails, and passes again once the card is dead. Marking a card dead does not move the headline ratio — the completed row was always counted — it only removes the card from the modeller.

2 Sept 2026

£7.6m of sales and five loans out were missing from the outs table CORRECTION

This page listed seven departures against thirteen that actually happened. The three that carried money: George Hirst to Stoke (~£6m), Wes Burns to Leicester at a nominal ~£75,000, and Harry Clarke to Preston, whose row said fee undisclosed and counted £0 when the reported figure is ~£1.5m.

Five loans out were absent too — Kayne van Oevelen to Valencia, Ali Al-Hamadi to Sheffield Wednesday, Ben Johnson to Stoke, Cieran Slicker to Barnsley and Somto Boniface to Leyton Orient. Van Oevelen is the odd one: bought from Volendam for £3.4m this window and loaned straight out, so Ipswich carry his amortisation on a player they have not used.

All of it helps, which is why leaving it out mattered. Every one of those players was free or academy-signed, so book value is nil and the fees are pure profit — and profit feeds the denominator. Sales banked go £7m → £14.6m, the trading input rises, and the ratio comes down from 97.3% to 95.7%. Still the worst in the league and still about eleven points over the 85% limit, but the number was wrong in the direction that flattered nobody.

Hirst and Burns were also still sitting in the squad table after being sold, inflating wages and amortisation they no longer cost. The registration count falls to 12 homegrown and 14 non-homegrown.

2 Sept 2026

A World Cup winner was signed on 27 August and sat on the Rumour Mill CORRECTION

Exequiel Palacios was announced by Ipswich on 27 August — €22.5m, about £19.3m, from Bayer Leverkusen on a contract to 2030 — and this page carried him as a rumour. He won the World Cup with Argentina in 2022 and reached the final again in 2026.

About £5m/yr of amortisation over the four-year deal with the levy, plus agent fee and wage. Argentine, arriving at 27, so no homegrown qualifier on a page where the registration list is already the tightest in the league.

2 Sept 2026

Sammie Szmodics gets a squad row — the club-record signing was carrying no book value CORRECTION

Szmodics went to Derby County on loan and had no squad row on this page, so the roughly £8.5m Ipswich paid Blackburn Rovers in August 2024 was amortising against nothing. He is still Ipswich’s asset while he plays at Pride Park, and the charge runs whether he is here or not.

The squad floor stays below the amortisation input, so the headline ratio is unmoved at 94.6% — the highest in the league, and a long way past the 85% limit. The correction does not change that number; it changes whether the number is built on a complete squad.

His contract end is not published and is carried as an estimate to June 2028, flagged as one, which is what sets the annual charge.

31 Aug 2026

Three pages had the window shutting four hours early CORRECTION

Hull, Coventry and Newcastle counted down to 7pm on 1 September. The window shuts at 11pm, which is what the other seventeen pages said and what their clocks ran to. On the eve of deadline day, three club pages were telling readers they had four hours less than they did.

Both halves were wrong together, which is why nothing looked odd on those pages: the label said 7PM and the clock counted to 19:00, so they agreed with each other and disagreed with the rest of the site. The first fix here only corrected the labels, and the new gate immediately failed for the right reason, catching a symptom fixed without its cause.

Also tidied: a squad-list deadline written as “after the window closes (~2 September)”, where the date belongs to the list and the parenthetical made it read as hedging on the window itself. And the Premier League checkpoint countdown was set to midnight UTC on 1 October, which is one o’clock in the morning here, because it was stored as though Britain were on GMT in October rather than BST.

tools/check-countdowns.js now renders each stored target through Europe/London and compares it to the label written beside it. Timezone is the whole difficulty: 22:00 UTC is 11pm in September and would not be in December, so the two can only be compared after conversion. Broken on purpose in both directions before being trusted, once with a wrong label against a right clock and once the other way about.

This was found because a reader corrected something said in conversation, not by anything that runs. Sixteen gates check this site and none of them read a clock.

31 Aug 2026

The bolding was doing too much work — 2,316 signposts dropped EDITORIAL

A reader said the site reads as though a machine wrote it. That is worth measuring rather than arguing with, so it was measured.

The design came out fine. Claret and blue are the club’s own rather than the cream-and-terracotta that generated pages default to, the display face is Barlow Condensed rather than Inter, corners are three or four pixels rather than fully rounded, and there are five emoji on a 530KB page. Nothing there needed changing.

The prose was the problem, and one habit dominated: a bolded editorial sentence opening almost every paragraph. There were 2,612 of them, roughly one bold span every 62 words across half a million words of text. Bold is for things a reader scans for — a fee, a name, a date, a verdict. Used on the thesis of every paragraph it stops marking anything at all, and it is one of the most recognisable tells there is.

2,316 of those have gone. Figures, names, labels and short verdicts keep theirs. No wording changed anywhere, only tags, so nothing about the analysis moved and the whole pass reverts with one command. Density goes from one bold every 62 words to one every 85.

Two things this does not fix, stated plainly because the difference matters. The em-dash rate is 17.3 per thousand words against one to three in edited prose, and that needs a slower pass: a blanket substitution produces comma splices. And underneath both is a rhetorical habit no script reaches — signpost, then aphorism, then antithesis, three times a paragraph. That is the thing the reader actually noticed, and it has to be rewritten by hand.

One note on method: the first attempt stripped the bold from the two sentences that state the medical rule, which tools/check-deal-stage.js holds byte-identical across all twenty pages. The gate failed and the sentences are excluded now. It was written to guard a transfer convention and it caught a typography change, which is the argument for gating wording as well as arithmetic.

31 Aug 2026

Agent fees to 10%, the wage gross-up to 1.55x — both were too low, and the FA publishes the proof MODEL CHANGE

Two constants underneath every figure on this site have moved, at a reader’s prompting. The agent fee charged on a signing goes from 5% of the transfer fee to 10%, and the wage gross-up from 1.45x to 1.55x. Both were estimates that had never been checked against a published source. Both now have one.

The agent rate was checkable all along. The FA publishes what every club pays intermediaries. Between 4 February 2025 and 2 February 2026, Premier League clubs paid £460.3m — against the £3,137m of incoming fees this site records for that window, an implied rate of 14.7%, nearly three times the 5% being charged. Chelsea alone paid £65.1m, Aston Villa £38.4m. 10% is the figure taken, deliberately below the implied ceiling: the FA total also covers sales, loans and contract renewals, and only the buy-side portion is capitalised into a transfer’s cost. It is a floor with evidence under it rather than a rule of thumb.

The gross-up was missing a whole category of pay. It covered employer NI, bonuses and image rights — but not signing-on fees, and UEFA is explicit that they count. Annex G.3 of the Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations: all forms of consideration to and/or benefit of players, such as sign-on fees, must be treated as employee benefit expenses and not costs of a player’s registration. So they belong in the numerator, they sit with the wage rather than the amortisation, and they spread across the contract as a prepayment for services. Employer NI alone is 15%, so of the old 45% only about 30 points were doing the work of bonuses, image rights and signing-on fees together. 55% gives that last item somewhere to live.

What actually moved. League-wide, the annual cost this window adds rises from £1,257m to £1,330m. Twelve clubs’ wage inputs were re-derived by the bridge and reset to it; no club crossed a limit, and headline ratios moved by at most 0.9 of a point — mostly downwards, which is worth understanding rather than glossing: the gross-up applies to the net wage movement, and most clubs sold more wage than they bought, so a bigger multiplier makes a negative movement more negative. Every projection built on an old baseline was recomputed too, not just the baselines.

One piece of tidying that mattered more than it looks. The gross-up existed as a named constant and then as five hard-coded copies of 1.45 in the same file, on all twenty pages. They all now read the constant. A number duplicated a hundred times across a site is not a convention, it is a hundred chances to change ninety-nine of them.

30 Aug 2026

Tammy Abraham, on loan from Aston Villa — and the number that decides it is the one nobody has published RUMOUR

Added to the Rumour Mill, not the Ins table. The clubs have agreed a straight season-long loan with no option and no obligation, and the No.9 shirt is reported to be waiting — but Abraham has not accepted and there has been no medical, so under the rule set today it is interest, however firm. This is the first deal to test that rule, and it is the right side of it: two clubs agreeing is not the same as a player going.

It is all wage, which makes it the purest squad-cost story of the window. No fee means no amortisation, no capitalised agent fee, and no movement in the window balance. The entire cost is the share of Abraham’s ~£140k/wk that Ipswich cover — and no report says what that share is. Modelled at half, ~£70k/wk, which is this tracker’s estimate and editable on the card. At half he costs ~£5.3m/yr grossed and takes the ratio from 94.6% to ~97.4%. At the full wage he costs ~£10.6m/yr and takes it past 100%. One unpublished percentage, five and a half points of ratio.

For scale: Ipswich’s best-paid player is Saša Lukić on £75k/wk. Even the half share signs the joint-highest earner at the club, on a ratio already 9.6 points the wrong side of the 85% line. Cheap in cash and expensive in the only currency the rule counts — a loan buys a striker without buying an asset, so there is nothing to resell and nothing to write down. Registration is the easy part: both domestic loan slots are free, and Abraham is homegrown through the Chelsea academy, so he brings a qualifier to the 25 rather than taking a non-homegrown place.

The Rumour Mill could not price a loan, and nobody had noticed because nobody had put one in it. All 172 cards across the site were sales or signings; every outgoing card was costed as a sale. Priced that way, Abraham’s card read “FREES £14.2m/yr COST · BOOKS ~−£15.9m PROFIT” — both halves wrong. A loan does not free the amortisation: the £18m paid to Beşiktaş in January is still being written down against a contract to 2031 whether he plays in Birmingham or Suffolk. And a loan books nothing: nothing is sold, so a “sale” at no fee looks exactly like writing off his entire remaining book value — a £15.9m phantom loss that would have gone into the denominator and moved the ratio the wrong way. The card now reads “FREES £5.3m/yr OF WAGE · AMORTISATION STAYS · NO PROFIT”. A loan in already worked, because a zero fee carries no amortisation and no agent fee by arithmetic rather than by intent.

One more thing changed with it. On a sale the wage box is locked, because the cost freed comes from the player’s own squad row and is not the reader’s to move. On a loan out it is the opposite: what leaves is the share the parent club stops paying, which is the negotiation and not a fact, so that box is now open on both sides of a loan. The branch is held identical on all twenty pages by tools/check-deal-stage.js, and was broken on purpose before being trusted.

30 Aug 2026

Nothing below a medical belongs in the Ins & Outs tables RULE CHANGE

No row on this page had to move — every deal in the tables here was already at a medical or announced. The rule and its gate apply the same way, and the wording on both tabs now states it.

The status ladder ran done → advanced → in talks → offer, and all four rungs were rendered as rows in the deal tables. The bottom two contributed nothing to any figure — every total on this site filters to done and advanced — which made them arithmetically harmless and editorially loud. A reader scanning the Ins table saw rows the club had never agreed to, in the same table, in the same shape, as business that is done. Being excluded from the totals is not visible; being in the table is.

The threshold is now a medical. A deal enters at advanced — terms agreed and the medical taken or booked, awaiting only an announcement — and moves to done when a club announces it. A loan row is an agreed loan. Everything short of that is interest, however well sourced, and interest lives in the Rumour Mill, where it can still be ticked and modelled against the ratio. Nothing has been deleted. A row that counted towards nothing still counts towards nothing; it is just no longer sitting where settled business sits.

Four figures did move, and they moved because they had been wrong. The headline ratios, the swing and the window balance all filter to done and advanced and were untouched. But the amortisation column added to the deal tables sums every row in the table with no filter at all, and writes its total into a footer labelled “TOTALS IN (confirmed/advanced)” — a total that named a filter it did not apply. The same total feeds the “Added by this window’s deals” and “Net change” lines under the run-off chart. So unagreed deals were being amortised into figures that said they excluded them:

  • Crystal Palace — added by this window’s deals +£12.4m/yr → +£6.6m/yr, nearly halved, because Le Guen (£12m) and Njie (£16m) were being amortised though neither fee exists; freed −£18.3m/yr → −£12.3m/yr; net −£5.9m → −£5.7m/yr.
  • Sunderland — added +£11.2m/yr → +£6.7m/yr and net change +£9.2m → +£4.8m/yr, on an asking price for Poku that no one had agreed to pay.
  • Brentford — added +£16.9m/yr → +£16.1m/yr, net +£16.5m → +£15.6m/yr.
  • Liverpool — totals out, wage ~£735k/wk → ~£725k/wk and cost freed £61m → £60.2m/yr, for a loan with no agreed destination.

The amortisation code has deliberately not been changed. Its filter is now the whole table, because the whole table is now business at a medical or beyond — and the fix belongs at the input, in one gate, rather than as a twenty-first copy of the same rule pasted into twenty pages of inline script. That is also the answer to why this survived: nothing compared a table’s footer against the label printed on it, and the rows doing the damage were invisible in every figure a reader would have checked.

Twelve rows moved across eight clubs, and the wording moved on all twenty. The ledes described the threshold nine different ways — “medical/verbal”, “option/verbal”, “talks/verbal”, “medical or negotiating” — and three of those promised a table that now excludes what they promised. One sentence states the rule on the Ins & Outs tab and its counterpart on the Rumours tab, identical on every page, and tools/check-deal-stage.js holds both to the letter as well as failing any deal row below the threshold. The gate was broken on purpose twice before being trusted: once by dropping a row’s stage entirely, which is the obvious way round a stage check, and once by adding a season array no hard-coded list would have known about.

30 Aug 2026

The Ins & Outs tab scrolled sideways on a phone, and so did every other tab CORRECTION

One table on this site sat outside a scroll container. The amortisation runoff — Season, Already here, This window, Combined — is 560px wide and had nothing but a margin on its wrapper, while every other table on the page sits inside .twrap with overflow-x:auto. At phone width it stretched the whole document about 200px past the viewport, and because it was the document scrolling rather than a box inside it, every tab slid sideways, not just the one containing the table. All twenty club pages, identically.

It is not new and it was not the Read more button. The version of this page from before that change overflows by exactly the same 597 pixels against a 390-pixel viewport, which is worth stating plainly rather than letting the newest change take the blame for the oldest bug.

Why it went unseen is the more useful part. The browser check that runs against every page loaded it at desktop width and never clicked a tab, so it could not have seen either half of this: not the narrow viewport, and not the tab the table lives on. It now runs at 390px and walks all twelve tabs on all twenty pages, failing on any page whose document scrolls horizontally. That costs real time on each run, which is the honest price of catching a class of fault that only exists on the device most readers use.

30 Aug 2026

The deal notes now fold away behind a button LAYOUT

The note under a player’s name is where the reasoning for a deal lives, and on the busiest rows it runs to several hundred words. Read end to end that is the point of the table; scrolled past on a phone it buries the row underneath and everything after it. Long notes now clamp to two lines with a Read more button, and short ones are left exactly as they were — a note that fits gets no furniture around it. The full text stays in the page whether or not it is open, so it is still searchable, copyable and printable.

It did not work the first time, and the reason is worth writing down. The clamp was styled on a single class, and the table already carried a td .glide-cap rule setting the notes to display as blocks — a more specific selector, so it won. The result was a button that toggled its own label and changed nothing else: the line-clamp property applied, the display property it depends on did not, and the note stayed full height. Checked in a browser at phone width rather than by reading the stylesheet, which is the only way that particular failure shows up.

30 Aug 2026

A sell-on reduces the profit, not just the cash — and the gate that should have said so was reading a different page CORRECTION

Asked whether everything a transfer actually contains was applied to the deals on this site, and one thing was not. A sell-on owed to a former club is a cost of the disposal: it comes off the profit booked, not only off the cash banked. This site deducted it from the window balance and the List A test and then left it out of profit entirely — and profit is what feeds the squad-cost denominator through the three-year average. It now comes off booked profit, so the only quantified clause on the site, Villa’s £15m to Middlesbrough on the £117m Rogers fee, is handled by the model rather than by hand.

The gate was passing green on a £15m disagreement, and the reason is worth recording. The trading bridge’s check pulls the profit function out of the page and runs it — but that function reaches outside its own block for the sell-on data, which the extract did not include. Undefined dependency, guard returns zero, and the checker quietly computed a different profit from the one the page computes. A checker that does not mirror the page is not checking the page. It now pulls its dependencies across too, and it failed immediately when it did.

No figure moves today. The £15m had already been taken off this club’s denominator by hand when the sell-on was first noticed; the anchor gives that third back so the arithmetic lands in the same place, and from here it flows automatically. The three other clauses on the site — Baleba, Reijnders and Chérif — are recorded as unquantified and still contribute nothing, which is honest rather than convenient: the exposure is real and the percentage has never been reported.

30 Aug 2026

Thirty senior players for twenty-five places NEW

The Premier League’s own squad rule arrives on this page. Until today it carried UEFA’s List A and nothing about the domestic quota — a different rule with different arithmetic: 25 senior places, no more than 17 non-homegrown, under-21s outside the list altogether, and players out on loan not registered at all.

Where this squad stands: 30 of the 25 places used, 12 homegrown and 14 non-homegrown, with 1 under-21 playing free of the list. 5 too many for the 25 places available, so that many players are left out of the list entirely.

Homegrown is a registration test, not a passport test, which is why every player now carries a stated basis rather than a bare flag: three entire seasons, or 36 months, at any club affiliated to the FA or the FAW before the end of the season in which he turns 21. Nationality is not the question and repeatedly gives the wrong answer.

Why it was missing until now. The section was built for one club eleven months ago and the commit that shipped it said the other nineteen would follow. They did not, because an absent feature breaks no gate and nothing was watching for absence. Every count here derives from the squad table, and the same headcount gate that holds every other page holds this one.

30 Aug 2026

The sale-profit input now derives itself, like the wage input above it METHOD

in-psp is the three-year average player-trading profit in the squad-cost denominator, and it was hand-set on all twenty pages. The failure mode is the one the wage bridge was built to stop, one input along: a sale completes, its profit is booked in the table, and the figure meant to carry a third of it stays where somebody last typed it. It only ever moved when whoever booked the deal remembered — which is the definition of a number that will eventually be wrong.

The page now shows its working beside the input: the earlier years’ contribution, plus this window’s booked profit divided by three, because UEFA smooths player-trading profit over three years so one window enters at roughly a third. Booked means done and not a loan — an advanced deal has not completed and its profit is not in the accounts, which is also the convention this page was already kept on. The profit is net of the FIFA solidarity taken out of a foreign sale.

One thing about the anchor is worth stating rather than glossing. The earlier years’ figure is carried forward from the number this page already used, not sourced from published accounts, so the bridge agrees with today’s input by construction. It earns its keep from here on, by moving when a deal lands. Tested by planting a completed sale into the tables and leaving the input alone: the gate said the denominator was £20m short, which is exactly the silence it exists to break.

30 Aug 2026

A sale can lose money once FIFA has taken its 5%, and the formatter could not write it down CORRECTION

Modelling solidarity produced the site’s first negative profit on a completed sale. Villa banked ~£8.08m of Lucas Digne’s £8.5m fee against a book value of £8.5m, so that deal is a small loss rather than a break-even — which is the correct answer, and one the gross-fee basis could never produce.

The money formatter could not render it. It put the pound sign first and the minus wherever the number happened to start, so the cell read “£-0.4m” against a site that writes −£0.4m everywhere else. Nineteen pages had that version. Bournemouth had the correct one, negative-aware, written when its own trading profit went below zero — so the fix was to adopt the version already in the codebase rather than invent a twentieth. All twenty now share one formatter.

Checked in a browser rather than by inspection, because the failure this could introduce is a doubled sign where a caller already prepends its own minus: no malformed negative on any of the twenty, and no JavaScript error.

30 Aug 2026

FIFA takes 5% of every fee sold abroad, and this site had been booking 100% of it CORRECTION

Asked what else is inside a completed deal that these numbers miss, and the answer was the solidarity contribution. 5% of any international transfer fee is deducted from the fee and shared among the clubs that trained the player between 12 and 23. The mechanics decide who pays: the buying club hands over the headline number and distributes the 5% out of it, so a purchase costs exactly the fee already capitalised here — nothing was wrong on that side. The selling club banks 95%. Every profit booked on a sale abroad was therefore 5% too high, across all twenty pages, from launch. Around £28m league-wide.

On this page it is £0.30m, from the foreign sales of Arijanet Murić. That comes off booked profit, and a third of it off the denominator, because sale profit feeds the squad-cost ratio through a three-year average.

The glossary had been claiming this was modelled the whole time. It said the 4% Premier League levy and FIFA’s 5% solidarity contribution both capitalise into registration cost — true of the levy, true of solidarity for a buyer, and quietly untrue of the thing that actually matters, which is what a seller keeps. Documentation that describes a calculation the code does not perform is worse than no documentation, because it stops anyone looking.

It is derived, not typed. The deduction comes from where the player went, which puts all the weight on classifying a destination — and getting that wrong is silent: an English club missing from the list costs its seller 5% of a fee it actually keeps, and no total looks odd. So tools/check-solidarity.js refuses to classify by default. Every fee-carrying destination must be a club one of the two lists already knows; a name in neither fails until a human decides which it is. The gate also holds the twenty inline copies of the classifier to being identical, for the same reason the wage gross-up is a single constant.

One assumption is recorded rather than hidden: Cardiff, Newport, Swansea and Wrexham are Welsh clubs inside the English pyramid, and are treated here as domestic because their registrations run through the English system.

Also documented, deliberately not changed: add-ons are modelled all-in on a purchase and guaranteed-only on a sale. That asymmetry makes the buy column a best case and the sell column a conservative one, and it now says so on the page instead of being visible only to whoever recomputes the fees.

30 Aug 2026

Wages in the deal tables were understated by 45%, and the sentence describing the fix was wrong on nine other pages CORRECTION

The site grosses wages by 1.45 to cover employer NI, bonuses and image rights — everywhere except the two columns readers actually look at. The cost of an arrival and the relief from a departure in the Incomings and Outgoings tables were built from raw weekly wages, so every one of them understated the real charge. Both columns are now grossed through a single GROSS constant, so they cannot come apart again. The headline ratio does not move: it is computed from the wage, amortisation and agent inputs, which were already on the grossed basis. What moves is the Net SCR Swing card and the two columns feeding it.

Which is where the second problem was. The swing is derived from the deal arrays and was therefore right the moment the gross-up landed — but the same figure is also typed into the overview callout, and typed figures do not move. Nothing on this page stated either figure wrongly — the gross-up moved its table columns and nothing else. Palace’s was the clearest case: it read “still negative” where the page computed a positive swing, so the sentence was not stale but inverted.

Nothing showed this in a browser. A small script copies the derived card into the overview span at load, so the screen self-healed while the file stayed wrong — the same failure as the share card that displayed correctly and shipped a stale number to anyone who read the source. tools/check-overview-figures.js now runs the page’s own formulas against the page’s own arrays and fails on any stated swing or profit that disagrees, in the callout or in prose. The changelog is excluded, because a dated entry is a record.

Two more holes closed while the gate was being written. The baseline gate knew five ways of phrasing a ratio and not the one in the most-read sentence on every page, which is how City carried “~65% ratio vs the 70% wall” against a computed 57.1%; it now reads that shape too. And tools/check-parity.js checks that CI runs every gate the local suite runs — twice a gate had been wired into one and not the other, and both times it was caught by eye rather than by anything.

30 Aug 2026

Ten answer blocks disagreed with their own pages — and the rule that lets that happen is now written down CORRECTION

The answer block is the first paragraph on every club page and the one a search engine quotes. It states four things that are all derivable — the ratio, the headroom or overshoot, what the club has banked from sales, what it has committed on signings — and only the ratio had a gate. Ten of the twenty disagreed with their own data. Brighton said £91.9m banked against £156.9m of completed sales; Manchester United £89m committed against £154m; Sunderland £0m against £32.6m; Forest was wrong on all three. Every answer block is now written from the deal tables and the ratio inputs rather than typed, and a gate holds them there.

One of the ten was two days old and mine. Manchester City’s said “£338m banked from sales”, which came from reading a total that includes advanced deals into a sentence that says banked. It is £288m. Advanced business is committed, not banked, and the gate now applies that distinction rather than trusting whoever writes the sentence to remember it.

Chelsea, Fulham and Ipswich stated no headroom at all, because they are over their line and the sentence had been written for clubs that are under it. They now say by how much: −£23.3m, −£19.2m and −£17.7m per year.

And the underlying rule is now recorded in the repo rather than relied on. A club page is twelve sections plus the head, the same quantity is stated in several of them, and every significant error here has had one shape: a figure corrected where somebody noticed it and left standing everywhere else. tools/echoes.js reports which sections state a given figure before it is edited, and the gates that exist because of this rule are listed alongside it. Anything derivable gets derived; anything typed gets a gate.

30 Aug 2026

No gate had ever read a headcount CORRECTION

Ten gates run on every build and not one of them counted players. They read percentages, deal statuses, transfer rows, bar widths and card images — so a sentence saying “nineteen senior players, six places unused” could sit beside a card correctly showing 22 and 3, indefinitely, with everything green.

There is now a gate that recounts from the squad table, using the page’s own registration rule rather than a second copy of it: a player is on the list unless he is loaned out or under 21 on the season’s cut-off, and the cut-off is read from the page rather than assumed. It checks the registered total, the homegrown and non-homegrown split, the free places and the under-21 count, in both digits and words.

It missed one of its own test cases on the first run. “Six more players are under 21” begins a sentence, so the word is capitalised, and a lowercase-only pattern walked straight past it — found only by planting each stale figure back and checking the build failed. Four claim types, four confirmed failures, then green. A check you have not watched fail is a guess about what it catches.

30 Aug 2026

The hero stat cards were three-across on a phone, and four of them left an orphan LAYOUT

Reported on Villa: three columns on a 430px screen squeezed the longest card into a ribbon, and because that page carries four cards rather than three, the fourth dropped alone onto a second row beside two empty cells. Below 760px the grid is now two columns, which gives Villa a clean 2×2.

The other nineteen pages carry three cards, so two columns would have left an orphan there instead. A lone last card now spans the full row rather than sitting beside a hole — so three reads as two-then-one and four reads as two-and-two, without a special case for either.

Desktop had the same orphan and nobody had mentioned it. Four cards in a fixed three-column grid is unbalanced at every width, not just on a phone. The grid fits its own content now, so Villa gets four across on a wide screen and the three-card pages are unchanged. Measured at 390, 430 and 1400px rather than eyeballed.

And the card that caused it got shorter. Villa’s List A churn description had just been lengthened to fix an arrival count, which is what made it tower over its neighbour. The names moved out — they are on the Ins & Outs tab — and every figure in it stayed.

30 Aug 2026

A stale ratio phrased one way slipped a gate built for another CORRECTION

The prose-baseline gate catches “roughly N% of football revenue”. It did not catch “sit at roughly N%”, which is how the glossary phrases the same claim — so a stale ratio could sit in a definition indefinitely while the identical statement in the FAQ was checked on every build. Found on Villa, where the glossary was two revisions behind the page.

Extending the rule found the same fault on three more pages nobody had asked about. Arsenal’s glossary said 64% against 66.1% computed; Fulham’s said 90% against 94.0%; Ipswich’s said the ratio “sits at roughly 85% — on the line” when it is 94.6%, about ten points over. Ipswich’s sentence also quoted a “~£106m gross window” that the deal table puts at ~£147m. That one was wrong twice and read as reassurance both times.

A gate that matches one phrasing of a claim is a gate against that phrasing, not against the claim. Both forms are checked now, and the extension was tested by planting the old figure back and confirming the build fails.

30 Aug 2026

Both loan bars read as full when only one quota was used CORRECTION

Reported by a reader looking at Villa on a phone, and right. The card showed two full amber bars, so both ceilings looked hit — when the line under the second one said 6 of 6 international slots still free. Only the domestic quota was used. The bar was hard-coded to 100% and had nothing to do with the sentence beneath it.

Every one of these bars was a literal width typed in beside the text it was meant to summarise. That is the same fault as the headline reading “1 + 6 Left” above a body saying none left, which already had a gate; the bar had simply never been looked at. They are derived now — “N of M remaining” means M−N used, and the width and the colour come from that, so the picture and the sentence cannot disagree. Amber only when nothing is left, which is the point at which a quota starts deciding what a club can do.

Writing the check found four more pages the report had not mentioned. Fulham, Ipswich, Tottenham and Coventry each had a quota line with no bar above it at all, so the international ceiling was invisible on those cards. And Chelsea’s international bar sat at 33% beside a sentence that stated no count whatsoever — nothing could have derived it and nobody could have checked it. That line now says 5 of 6 senior slots remaining and shows its working: Badiashile at Napoli is the one senior non-club-trained loan abroad, with Antwi and Murray-Campbell treated as academy and therefore exempt. Disagree with that classification if you like — the point is that it is now possible to.

The gate checks the source, not just the screen. Villa’s rendered card was fixed by the derivation the moment it was added, while the hard-coded 100% was still sitting in the file — correct in the browser, wrong in the thing a checker reads and the thing that renders before any script runs. Both are right now, and the gate compares the typed width against the stated numbers so a hand edit cannot quietly reintroduce it.

30 Aug 2026

Deep audit of the rules and the inputs: the wage figure had drifted from its own derivation on five clubs CORRECTION

The rule constants are unanimous across all twenty pages and all correct — the £105m PSR cap, the €60m earnings limit, the five-year amortisation cap and its 1 July 2023 start, the 4% Premier League levy, the 1 January 2005 under-21 cut-off, 17 non-homegrown of 25, two concurrent domestic loans and six international. Thirty-nine separate statements of the five-year cap; not one disagreed with another. That is the half of this audit with nothing to report, and it is worth reporting that it has nothing to report.

Every club’s cap now agrees with its European status. In Europe the UEFA line is 70%, outside it the Premier League’s is 85% — fifteen points of headroom turning on a single yes/no, asserted in three places at once and checked in none. All twenty agree: nine in Europe at 70%, eleven outside at 85%. A gate now enforces it, because a club’s European status is exactly what changes between seasons.

The real finding is the wage input. This site’s stated convention is that the wage figure IS the wage bridge’s own derivation on every accounts-basis club — that is what makes the league table comparable, and what makes the input track the window instead of sitting at a pre-window figure nobody updates. It had decayed on five clubs, because deals get booked by hand and the input gets nudged by hand with them, and a nudge drifts from the derivation the moment the arithmetic differs by a rounding. Tottenham were £22m adrift. All five are now set to the derivation and a gate holds them there. Promoted clubs are correctly exempt and the bridge explains why in its own text: a wage bill roughly doubles on going up, so last season’s accounts are the wrong anchor in both directions at once.

One club changes compliance status as a result. Bournemouth go from 69.8% to 71.2% — from just inside the 70% cap to about £3.4m/yr over it, in their first European season, on the tighter cap that European qualification brings. Tottenham move 64.6% to 68.3%, Forest 81.9% to 82.7%, Manchester City 57.7% to 57.1%, Villa 64.0% to 63.8%.

And two more pages were flooring their headroom at zero. Ipswich read “£0m of room” while sitting £17.8m/yr over the 85% line; Bournemouth would have done the same on crossing it. The same defect was fixed on Palace four days ago and not looked for elsewhere — which is the lesson, not the bug. Both now state the overshoot.

What the audit could not do. Every football site and reference database is blocked from this environment, so the transfer tables were reconciled internally — squad rows against deal rows, amortisation floors against inputs, both sides of every intra-league move — and checked externally only as far as search summaries allow. Internally they reconcile on all twenty clubs. That is a real guarantee about consistency and not a guarantee about completeness, and the £50m signing found missing yesterday is what the difference looks like.

30 Aug 2026

The share card is now checked like everything else — and two gates had never run in CI at all CORRECTION

Rebuilding the cards fixed today’s figures and fixed nothing about tomorrow’s. A generator someone has to remember to run is exactly what produced a card reading 60.2% four days out of date, so the question is not whether the cards are right now but whether they can go wrong again quietly. A gate now recomputes the card’s figures from the page and compares them against the token the builder stamped into the meta tag. Move any input — a wage, a fee, a sale — and the build fails until the card is rebuilt. It was tested by nudging Villa’s wage input and confirming the failure, and by stripping the token to confirm that fails too.

The builder and the gate read the figures through one shared module. Two copies of the same calculation drifting apart is the failure this site has hit more than any other, and it would be absurd to reintroduce it in the check designed to prevent it.

And checking the CI list against the local one turned up a real gap. Two gates — the one that catches stale ratio figures in prose, and the loan-quota headline check — existed, worked, and had never run in CI. They only ran when someone ran the full suite by hand, which means a direct push could have deployed stale numbers with a green tick. Both now run on every push, and the two lists are asserted to match. The prose-baseline gate is the one that has caught the most this week, and it was the one running least often.

30 Aug 2026

The share cards were showing a ratio four days and six deals out of date CORRECTION

The squad cost ratio is printed into the card image itself, which is fine until the ratio moves. Villa’s card said 60.2% against a page saying 64.0% — the figure from before the Goretzka wage correction, and before Jackson, Martínez, Suzuki, Ruggeri and the rest. Anyone sharing the link was posting a number this site had stopped believing on 27 August. Chelsea’s said 83% against 88.7%; Manchester City’s said ~65% against 57.7%.

There was no generator. The cards were made once, by hand, on 26 August and left, so nothing could have kept them current. There is one now: tools/build-og-cards.js reads every figure from the page it belongs to and rebuilds all twenty, and it runs like any other build step.

Cache-busting is the part that actually matters for sharing. X and Facebook cache a card image against its URL for days, so replacing the file in place does nothing for a link anyone has already posted. Each card’s meta tag now carries a version token derived from the figures on it, so the URL changes exactly when the picture changes and not otherwise.

The number is now coloured the way the page colours it — green three points clear of the limit, amber up to it, red past it. A card showing Ipswich at 94.6% against an 85% line in the same neutral cream as one showing Manchester United at 56.9% throws away the only thing a reader takes from a shared image.

And a gate now checks the alt text against the computed ratio, because that was stale too and in a way nobody would ever notice: six pages carried figures in the card’s alt attribute that no longer matched, including one that had never matched any published base. It was tested by planting the old 60.2% and confirming the build fails.

30 Aug 2026

Full pre-deadline audit of all 20 clubs — one £50m transfer was missing entirely SWEEP

Nico González, Manchester City to Newcastle, ~£50m, completed and announced. Medical taken, presented to supporters before the West Brom cup tie, No.6 shirt issued — and absent from both pages. It is the largest single omission this site has had to correct, and it moved two ratios materially: City 60.4% → 57.7% with headroom out to £100.2m, Newcastle 70.8% → 74.7% with headroom down to £46.8m against their 85% line. The fee is reported as reaching £50m after add-ons, so the guaranteed portion is lower and unpublished; £50m is carried on both sides because a counterpart has to agree, and it is flagged. The same number cannot be conservative for both clubs at once — it flatters City’s profit while overstating Newcastle’s charge — and that is stated rather than smoothed over.

Everything else checked out, which is the more useful result. Forty-odd names drawn from external reporting were tested against the pages one by one and every single one was already there. Where the reporting and this site disagreed, this site was right: one summary placed Detourbet, Monga and Rulli at Nottingham Forest when all three are Manchester City signings, and another had Bouaddi at Forest when City announced him.

Two numeric errors found by audit rather than by reading. Manchester City’s Kalvin Phillips loan credited £11.3m of relief when a loan frees the wage and none of the amortisation — the registration stays, and so does the charge. Corrected to £7.8m. Nottingham Forest’s Gustavo Sá loan freed nothing at all when Olympiacos pay his wages; corrected to £1.8m. Two more outgoing loans, at Leeds and Liverpool, carried no loan flag, so the amortisation book and the List A gate were treating them as permanent sales.

Eight new checks, and they were run against real data before being trusted. A completed permanent signing must have a squad row; a sold player must not still be in one; a destination reading “loan” must carry a loan flag; no duplicate squad rows; no fee without contract dates; no end date before the signing date; no signing dated in the future; no expired contract still in the squad. All eight are clean across all twenty clubs, and two were deliberately broken to confirm they fail. Three earlier checks this week passed on their first run because they were wrong, not because the data was right, so nothing goes in now without being made to fail first.

What this sweep cannot claim. Every football site, news aggregator and reference database is blocked from this environment, so external checking is search summaries only — and those summaries mixed up clubs twice in this pass alone. The internal consistency of these pages is now verified exhaustively and mechanically. Their completeness against the real world is verified as far as search allows, which is not the same thing, and the González miss is what that gap looks like.

30 Aug 2026

The stale-rumour gate could only see half the market — two more boards were selling players who had left CORRECTION

Yesterday’s gate checked live rumours against completed incomings at other clubs. That catches a player who moved between Premier League clubs and nothing else. Two whole classes of exit were invisible to it, and both had live cards sitting on boards.

A player sold abroad appears in no incoming table anywhere. Spurs sold Cristian Romero to Atlético Madrid and announced it on 15 August; Arsenal’s board went on offering him to the scenario modeller for a fortnight. The gate now reads completed outgoing rows as well, taking the destination from the row itself — which is derivable, and should have been there first time.

And a move between two non-Premier-League clubs is recorded on no page at all. Bayern sold João Palhinha to Benfica on 26 August — €14m plus up to €5m, contract to 2030 — and Newcastle’s card still read “door ajar again”. Nothing structural could ever have caught that, so there is now a small list at tools/gone.json for exactly this case, and the gate fails against it. Two names so far: Palhinha, and Leão to Galatasaray.

One false positive, worth recording because it nearly shipped. The first version read Jadon Sancho’s outgoing row — destination “Free agent” — as him having joined a club called Free agent, and would have killed two perfectly live cards. A released player has left a club and joined nobody: he is more signable, not less. Release destinations are now excluded, while a row naming an onward club after an arrow still counts. All three arms were then tested by un-flagging a closed card and checking the gate fired, because a check nobody has seen fail is not yet a check.

Cards closed: Romero (Arsenal), Palhinha (Newcastle), Cho (Hull, where Hull themselves ended the talks on 10 August). Each keeps its note as the record and leaves the modeller.

30 Aug 2026

Dead rumours were still tickable — three players could be “signed” on boards they had already left CORRECTION

The scenario modeller priced any card you ticked, including cards whose own tag said the player was gone. Newcastle’s board offered Nicolas Jackson after he had joined Villa; the tag read “DEAD — JOINED ASTON VILLA” and ticking it still moved the ratio. Liverpool’s offered Ezri Konsa, an Arsenal player since 20 August. Chelsea’s offered Ousmane Diomande, who is at Forest. This site has named that exact contradiction in its own changelog — “a completed deal and a live rumour for the same player” — and then kept shipping it, because nothing was looking for it.

Now something looks. A gate fails any live incoming rumour naming a player who has completed a move to another club, which is derivable from the transfer tables rather than from a tag somebody remembered to type. Only incoming cards are checked: an outgoing rumour naming a player another club has signed is the same move seen from the selling side, and that is correct. It found all three on its first run.

Dead cards now stay on the board and leave the model. They keep their note as the record of what a club looked at, greyed, with the tick removed and the impact line replaced by “no longer available”. Deleting them would lose the history; leaving them live was worse.

30 Aug 2026

Deadline-week sweep: four announced deals the tables had missed, and a gate that was crying wolf SWEEP

Four deals were sitting at “advanced” after their clubs had announced them. Bouaddi to Manchester City — announced on the club’s own site on 26 August, and carried here as unannounced for four days, with the prose quoting “~£95m/€110m… agreed in principle” when the real deal is £81.3m fixed plus £4.3m of add-ons on a contract to 2031. Badiashile to Napoli, announced 22 August. Disasi to Crystal Palace, announced 26 August by both clubs. And Emi Martínez to Chelsea, announced by Villa on 30 August. All four are now booked, with the ratios on five pages moving as a result.

The Disasi loan is the one with a consequence nobody was watching. Palace were sitting a whisker inside the 70% cap that their European qualification imposes. Taking a £120k/wk centre-back on loan added ~£9.0m/yr of grossed wages and put them over it — a loan, with no fee, no amortisation and no transfer to report, moving a compliance position that a £30m signing would have been scrutinised for. This page has argued all summer that loans are treated as free when they are not; this is the arithmetic saying it.

And the prose-baseline gate was flagging a correct sentence. It reads any “roughly N% of football revenue” as a claim about the club’s own ratio — but “capped at roughly 70% of football revenue” describes the LIMIT, and Palace’s page says exactly that, twice. A gate that fails on correct text is worse than one that stays quiet, because the next person learns to skim past it. It now ignores the phrase when cap or limit wording precedes it, and it still fails on a genuinely stale figure — checked by planting one before shipping.

28 Aug 2026

The league window table was wrong on 19 of its 20 rows — and an edit ate two deal rows without a single gate noticing CORRECTION

The “Who’s Selling to Survive” table is a derivation and had stopped being one. Its own caption defines it exactly — disclosed fees on officially completed 2026 deals, loans and frees excluded — so every figure in it can be recomputed from the transfer tables it summarises. Nineteen of the twenty rows disagreed with those tables. Six clubs were shown as having spent nothing at all, including Newcastle at £0 against £174.9m of completed incomings and Manchester City at £0 of sales against £238m. The rows were hand-maintained, the pages moved on, and nothing compared the two. All twenty are now derived from the pages, with the hand-written notes kept, and a gate recomputes them so the table cannot drift from the deals again.

The second fault is worse, because it was self-inflicted and invisible. Promoting Jackson spliced his row out of one array and into another by matching the next }, — and deal rows share source lines, so the edit swallowed whatever followed on the same line. Goretzka’s incoming row vanished from Villa and Kellyman’s outgoing row from Chelsea. All eight gates passed. A missing row breaks no parse, satisfies every invariant, and simply makes the totals smaller — and nothing on the page knew what they should have been.

Two things now catch it. A squad player signed inside the window must also appear in the incoming table, which is a real structural invariant: the squad row survives when the deal row dies, so it is the witness. That check found a third case immediately, one nobody had touched today — Forest’s Gustavo Sá has had a squad row since July, with a book value and an amortisation charge, and his incoming row was never written. A changelog entry from that sweep claims he was added “both halves of him”. One half was missing. And for outgoing rows, which leave no trace on the page once the player has gone, there is now tools/diff-rows.js: it reports every deal row added or removed against a git ref, to be read before committing rather than after.

27 Aug 2026

A free transfer was costing the window totals nothing at all — £35.7m/yr across six pages CORRECTION

The cost-per-arrival calculation returned zero for any signing without a fee unless the row also carried a loan flag. So a free signing’s wages vanished from “cost added by this window” entirely. Goretzka was showing as costing Villa £0.0m. On the very page whose card argues that “the free one is the expensive one — a fee buys an asset that amortises and can be sold, a wage buys nothing and recurs”. The card was right and the arithmetic underneath it dropped the wage.

£35.7m/yr was missing across six pages: Villa £13.6m (Goretzka, Özcan, Guessand), Palace £8.1m (McNeil, Guessand), Liverpool £7.8m (Araújo), Everton £4.9m (Johnson), Coventry £1.1m, Fulham £0.2m. Villa’s window swing moves from +£12.4m/yr to +£26.0m/yr.

There were seven different versions of that one line across twenty pages, each special-casing frees and loans slightly differently, and the differences were exactly what caused this. They are now one formula — the one Hull already used: amortisation and the agent fee when there is a fee, and the wage on every arrival, fee or not.

And it exposes something this card cannot fix by itself. The List A gate carried a hand-typed margin of “Villa pass by ~£3.5m/yr” on the cost-based test. The page’s own sums now put the window at adding ~£26m/yr. That figure predates Jackson and Watkins, and the window totals count wages ungrossed while the ratio grosses them, so the two were never on one basis. The cost-based margin is now marked UNVERIFIED rather than passing — the fee-based balance above it is sound, that one is not, and saying so beats printing a number that cannot be reproduced.

27 Aug 2026

A headline that contradicted its own paragraph — and nine more stale ratios behind it CORRECTION

Villa’s loan-quota card said “1 + 6 Left” in green, directly above a paragraph reading “0 of 2 concurrent remaining” and “ROOM: none left domestically”. Wan-Bissaka’s loan on 18 August took the second slot. The body was updated; the big number at the top was not. So the figure a reader sees first said a slot was free while the text underneath called the same thing a binding constraint. The bar sat at 50% with nothing left, and the card was still green. Crystal Palace had the same shape — “2 + 6” above “1 of 2”, left over from before the Guessand loan.

The failure runs one way every time: the prose gets edited and the summary above it does not. tools/check-quotas.js now fails when a loan-quota headline disagrees with its own body, including when the room note says “none left” and the headline disagrees. Verified by sabotage — put the wrong number back and it fails on exactly that.

Then the baseline gate was widened and found nine more. It was matching “ratio is X%” and “X% → Y%” but not the Quick Answers phrasing, “roughly 63% of football revenue” — which is the plain-English answer a reader or a search engine is most likely to lift. Brentford were claiming 75% while computing 84.9%. Manchester City 65% against 57.3%. Newcastle 74% against 70.8%. Ten pages rebased from their own inputs.

Two gates, two days, and both found more than the bug that prompted them. That is the argument for writing the check rather than the fix: the fix closes one hole, the check tells you how many others there were.

27 Aug 2026

The baseline gate had a hole in it and was passing on what it could not see CORRECTION

The gate shipped this morning excluded the changelog by truncating each page at <section id="log">. The data arrays holding every rumour card sit in a script block after that point. So it was scanning 167KB of a 422KB page, never saw a single card’s projection, and reported green.

It now removes only that section and keeps the rest. On the first honest run it immediately found eleven stale figures across three pages — every Villa projection still quoting a baseline two changes old, and two on Chelsea. All recomputed.

A gate with a hole in it is worse than no gate, because no gate makes you check and a green one stops you looking. This one was written, tested against the case that prompted it, and shipped — and the case that prompted it happened to sit in the part of the file it could still see.

One rule came out of it. A live rumour card may state a projection, because the gate now keeps it honest against the current base. A completed deal may not: “60.2% → 63.4%” was true the day it was written and decays the moment anything else moves, and the effect is already in the headline. Those now state what the deal costs instead.

27 Aug 2026

A new gate: does the prose still quote the ratio the page computes? CORRECTION

Twelve of the twenty pages were asserting a squad cost ratio their own inputs no longer produced. Manchester City claimed 63.0% while computing 57.3%. Manchester United said 53.9% against 56.9%, Sunderland 60.9% against 63.2%, Coventry 69.7% against 71.0%. Every one has been rebased from the page’s own figures.

Most of it sat in the answer paragraph and its structured-data twin — the text search engines and AI crawlers read before anything else, which makes it the worst place on the page to be stale. The headroom figures beside them were rebased too.

Nothing was catching this. The status gate reads deal status; the invariants gate reads the arrays; neither reads a percentage in a sentence. It surfaced only because a single free transfer moved one club’s baseline and the knock-on was visible. tools/check-baselines.js now recomputes every page’s ratio from its inputs and fails on prose asserting a different one, and it runs with the rest on every change.

Two things it deliberately does not flag. A sentence reading “68.6% → 62.0%” where 62.0% is the current ratio is a completed move being described, not a stale claim, so a done deal can still say what it did. And the changelog is excluded entirely: a dated entry recording August’s number is the record, and rewriting it to match today would be the opposite of what this tab is for.

26 Aug 2026

The amortisation graph now splits the squad you had from the squad you bought FEATURE

One bar was hiding the more interesting number. The run-off now stacks two series — the squad that was already here in blue, and everyone signed this window in amber — with both totals and a combined figure above it, and a per-season split beside each bar.

It changes what the chart says about a club. A settled squad shows a thin amber band on a thick blue one; a rebuild inverts it. Coventry carry £14.0m already here against £28.9m signed this window, so two-thirds of their amortisation arrived in ten weeks, and their inherited book runs out entirely by 2028/29 while the new one still has three years to run. Liverpool are the other extreme at £143.6m against £18.4m. Same chart, opposite stories, and neither was visible when it was one bar.

Who counts as “this window” is taken from the signing date, not from the flag the squad rows carry. The two disagree: the date catches six players the flag had missed — Garnacho and Cissé here at Villa, Bentley at Coventry, Charles at Fulham, Sá and Diomande at Forest — and never disagrees the other way. A derived test cannot be forgotten the way a hand-set one can, which is the same reasoning that put the sell-ons and the outgoing amortisation on derivations.

Two rows of figures now sit above the chart and they will not always agree, so the panel says which is which rather than leaving a reader to spot it. The first row and the graph are the SQUAD, split by arrival date. The second row is the DEALS, including advanced ones whose players are not in the squad table yet. Where they differ the panel names the gap and what it is — agreed business that has not completed.

26 Aug 2026

Every deal now shows what it costs per year — and the agent fee was being charged five times over FEATURE + FIX

A fee only means something against the charge it creates. £47.5m is a headline; £9.9m a year for five years is the thing that reaches the squad cost ratio. Until now this page printed the fee on every row and the amortisation on none of them. Both tables now carry an AMORT £m/yr column, and a panel underneath gives the number those rows add up into: the squad’s total annual amortisation, what this window has added and freed, and how the charge runs off over the next five seasons as existing deals finish.

None of it is newly typed data, which is the point. Incoming charges come from the player’s own squad row where one exists — real contract dates, five-year cap applied where it bites — and from fee over five years where a deal is advanced and the player is not in the squad yet, flagged est when that happens. Outgoing charges are derived rather than stored: a row’s cost-freed figure is the ungrossed wage plus the amortisation, so subtracting the wage leaves the charge that stops. They cannot drift from the totals above them because they are computed from them.

Loans show a zero, and that is the correct answer rather than a missing one. A loan moves the wage and leaves the registration here, so the amortisation stays too — the point this site has made about loans since the wage bridge, now visible as a column entry instead of a paragraph.

And a bug the new column sat straight on top of. The cost-per-year calculation behind these tables charged the agent fee in full every single year instead of capitalising it and spreading it over five — the same error corrected in the scenario modeller last week and missed here. On a £47.5m signing it overstated the annual cost by £1.9m. Every SCR-cost figure in the Ins and Outs tables, and the window’s cost-added total, move down accordingly.

One thing the new column makes visible and this page is not hiding: the SCR cost figures in these tables count wages at face value, while the rumour cards, the scenario panel and the wage bridge gross them up 1.45x for employer NI, bonuses and image rights. The same signing can therefore read £17.1m in the table and £20.2m on its card. The grossed figure is this site’s convention and the table is the odd one out. It is stated in the panel rather than quietly reconciled, because restating it moves every published window total on all twenty pages and deserves its own pass.

25 Aug 2026

The “last updated” notice is gone — it had stopped telling the truth REMOVED

There were two of them. A line under the header reading “DEALS & FEES AS REPORTED [date] · BOOK VALUES & CALCS RECOMPUTE DAILY”, and a script that read that date and, once it was four days old, pushed an amber banner above the header warning that the page had last been checked N days ago.

The second one was firing on all twenty pages. The date it keyed off was hand-typed and ranged from 9 to 19 August across the site — while the deals underneath had in fact been swept on the 24th and 25th. So the site was leading with a warning about itself, generated from the one number on the page that nobody was maintaining. A staleness notice that is itself stale is worse than none: it tells readers to distrust figures that are current.

Both are removed, with their CSS. Nothing else changes — every ratio, book value and window total is unaffected, and the dated entries in this changelog remain the honest record of when each page was actually worked on.

23 Aug 2026

You can now change the numbers — and the card line beside them was still wrong FEATURE + FIX

Every fee on the rumour board is somebody’s estimate. Brugge “value him around €45m”. Al-Hilal’s bid reached this site in the wrong currency and had to be chased down. Marmoush’s fee is arithmetic off a reported two-player budget rather than a figure anyone published. Readers were being asked to take those guesses as given.

So the amounts are editable now. Every card carries a fee box, and incoming cards a wage box too. Type your own number and the card’s cost line and the scenario panel both follow it immediately. Reset puts the reported figure back — overrides are held separately and the underlying data is never overwritten, so there is always something true to return to. Outgoing cards expose the fee but not the wage, because an outgoing player’s relief is derived from his squad row rather than typed, and the fee is the part that actually moves the profit on the sale.

And a fix that should have landed with the modeller rebuild. The card’s own “ADDS £Xm/yr” line was still running the OLD formula — ungrossed wages, and the agent fee charged in full every year. The calculation underneath was corrected; the display beside it was not, so every card showed one number while the panel below computed another. On this site’s own worked example the card said £10.1m and the panel used £10.7m — the exact discrepancy that rebuild was written to explain, sitting in the markup the whole time. Both now call the same helper, and that is checked on all twenty pages: tick a card, and its figure and the panel’s agree.

22 Aug 2026

The 22 August sweep, and a modeller that was wrong three ways DATA + METHOD

The Harry Clarke row had the wrong club and a fee from a deal that never happened. The £3.5m Stoke package did die at the medical, exactly as recorded — and then Preston signed him permanently and Ipswich announced it on 14 August. The £3m this page was modelling described the Stoke transaction; the Preston fee is undisclosed and is now carried at zero rather than inherited. Szmodics is announced too, a season loan with an obligation on Derby to buy next summer, which makes it a committed sale in 2027 rather than a loan.

The scenario modeller was wrong in three ways at once, on every page on this site. An incoming signing's wage was charged with no gross-up, while the wage bridge, the ratio inputs and every note here gross wages by 1.45x for employer NI and image rights — so every modelled signing was 45% cheaper on the wage line than the same player would be in the ratio directly above it. The agent fee was charged in full every year instead of being capitalised with the fee and amortised, so a £60m signing carried £3m/yr of agent cost rather than £0.6m. And sale profit never reached the denominator: nineteen pages let a sale relieve the numerator and stop, when the profit also lands in the denominator through the three-year average, and the twentieth added the whole window's profit when one window belongs at roughly a third.

Why none of it showed up. The first two faults pull in opposite directions and roughly cancel at a typical fee-to-wage ratio — for a £25m signing on £70k/wk the old code gave £10.09m/yr against a true £10.73m, close enough to look right. They do not cancel at the edges: a free transfer on big wages was understated by 45%, a big fee on modest wages overstated by about 9%. Two errors that hide each other are worse than one that does not.

Outgoing relief is now derived, not typed. The hand-set relief on all eighty outgoing rumour cards carried the same ungrossed wage — checked against the squad, the stated figures reproduced the ungrossed derivation almost exactly. Relief and profit now come from the squad row, on the same gross-up and the same five-year cap as everything else, with the typed figure kept as a fallback for the handful of names with no squad row. Profit is allowed to be negative, because some of these sales are losses and the page should say so.

20 Aug 2026

Amortisation input raised to the squad floor: £53m → £65m INPUT CORRECTION

Why it moved. The amortisation input is the club-wide charge, which must be at least the current squad's, since it also covers players who have left mid-season and academy registrations the squad table does not carry. On this page it had fallen below that floor, which cannot be right — the summer's signings went into the squad table and the input stayed where it was. It is now raised to the floor.

Read it as a floor, not a figure. The true club-wide charge is higher by whatever departed players and fringe registrations add. This is a conservative correction, and it moves the ratio the wrong way for the club, which is the direction an honest correction usually goes.

Ipswich were already above the 85% line before this. They are further above it now.

19 Aug 2026

Enciso and Ouattara announced — a club record, and a marker card that earned its keep TWO DEALS DONE

What happened. Ipswich announced both Strasbourg players on 17 August: Julio Enciso at a reported £23.1m, a new club record, and Abdoul Ouattara at £17.1m. £40.2m in an afternoon, from a squad that was promoted three months ago.

Two corrections, in opposite directions. Enciso was carried at ADVANCED and modelled at £30m — Strasbourg’s reported €35m ask, flagged at the time as an ask rather than an agreed fee. It came in £6.9m lower. Ouattara was carried as a low-confidence marker at £12m that could not even say which Ouattara was meant; it is Abdoul, 20, and the fee is £5.1m higher. Between them the guesses were off by £12m in total and by £1.8m net, which is roughly what an honest placeholder should look like.

What it does to the numbers. ~£8.4m/yr of new amortisation and ~£8.7m of grossed-up wages on a wage input that was already a projection rather than a derivation, because Ipswich have no clean Premier League anchor year. The wage bridge on this page says so; this pushes it further.

15 Aug 2026

Iroegbunam’s injury freezes that file · Palacios talks stall on price · a second Strasbourg thread RUMOUR MOVES ONLY

Tim Iroegbunam. Hull outbid everyone at £15m+ on the 13th — then a hamstring injury (17 minutes vs Stuttgart, lengthy prognosis) killed the move on the 14th. The file freezes for every suitor, Ipswich included. Parked, not dead.

Exequiel Palacios. New card: talks reported, then put on hold by Leverkusen after a ~€20m proposal was called “far too low”. The ambition is real; the gap is too.

Strasbourg double. Reporting has Ipswich closing on Enciso (already advanced here) plus Ouattara — the second name is carried at low confidence until properly sourced.

09 Aug 2026

The £100m window: Florentino and Lukić land, a missed keeper surfaces, two "advanced" deals turn out long since announced — and the ratio hits the 85% line

Four corrections and three new deals in one pass. First, the corrections this tracker owed its readers: Kjell Scherpen was officially announced on 28 July (£8.5m + £2.6m add-ons, four years to 2030) and Daizen Maeda on 26 July (£8m rising to £10m, three years to 2029 — the contract shape this page had assumed). Both had been carried at Advanced for nearly two weeks after their announcements; both are now Done, with dates corrected in the squad table. Third, a signing we missed entirely: Kayne van Oevelen, a 22-year-old keeper from Volendam (€4m ≈ £3.4m, five years to 2031, 10% sell-on retained), joined in July as the window's second arrival and appears on this page for the first time — added to the Ins table, the squad table and the homegrown audit, where he counts non-HG because he misses the U21 cutoff. Fourth, a bigger error: this page had been crediting the rebuild to Kieran McKenna, who in fact stepped down on 10 June; Gary O'Neil was appointed on 23 June on a three-year deal, before this page even launched. Prose corrected throughout; McKenna remains in the historical entries he belongs in. The new business: Florentino Luís from Burnley (£16m + £3m, five years, completed in early August after Hull withdrew) and Saša Lukić from Fulham (~£9m, to 2030, announced 8 August), who graduates from the Rumour Mill. Julio Enciso moves up the mill to the Advanced rung of the Ins table: EADT and Sky report Town are expected to sign him, an O'Neil reunion — no agreed fee is reported, so he is counted at Strasbourg's ~€35m (~£30m) ask and clearly flagged. The outs got chaotic: Ali Al-Hamadi's Raków Częstochowa loan collapsed on a cardiac finding at the medical (he is back in Town training — removed from the mill); Harry Clarke's ~£3.5m Stoke move hit its own medical snag and is in doubt; O'Neil says Szmodics will leave within days on a Derby loan-with-obligation; and Philogene is widely reported to want out (Town's reported ask ~€47m) while O'Neil insists he stays — a new out-rumour, the biggest single lever on the page. The dead Pope link is removed. Every figure moved: completed gross fees ~£106.5m (~£136.5m committed including the Enciso ask), completed net spend ~£100m; SCR wages estimate 85 → 93; derived amortisation ~£50m → ~£57m; the estimated squad cost ratio ~77% → ~85% — on the green line, point estimate fractionally over, headroom effectively zero (transition year, no levies, multi-year allowance available); non-HG seniors 9 → 12 of 17. One mechanical fix: the amortisation sync documented on 04 Aug now actually runs at page load rather than first refresh. Nothing new on sanctions: the sheet stays clean.

05 Aug 2026

Maeda promoted to Advanced; an Everton midfielder enters the mill; the ratio moves for the first time this window

Daizen Maeda moves from "in talks" to "Advanced." The Celtic forward was carried here as agreed-in-principle and explicitly not at medical stage; he is now being reported as a concluded £8m deal rising to £10m with add-ons. We have not seen an official Ipswich announcement, so he sits on the Advanced rung rather than Done and will be promoted the moment the club confirms — but the money is committed, so he now counts. Consequences, all of them: committed fees rise from ~£70m to ~£78m and net spend from ~£63m to ~£71m; he joins the squad table on an assumed three-year deal to 2029, which lifts derived annual amortisation from ~£48m to ~£50m and pushes the estimated squad cost ratio from ~76% to ~77%, cutting annual headroom from ~£16m to ~£14m. The prose figures that had drifted since the amortisation model changed yesterday — the "74–75%" in the Rules and Glossary tabs, the "~£20m of room" in the FAQ — have been corrected to match the computed number rather than left to disagree with it. Non-homegrown seniors go from 8 to 9 of a permitted 17. Added to the Rumour Mill: Tim Iroegbunam (Everton, 23) — Ipswich are one of three promoted clubs to have approached Everton, alongside Hull, who are reported nearest at around £20m, and Coventry; Everton are said to be willing to listen now Nørgaard has arrived. That is an approach, not a negotiation with an agreed price, so it stays in the mill. He would be a homegrown signing, which is why the 25-man tab now says so. Removed: Maeda's mill entry, which has graduated to the Ins & Outs table. Unchanged and still unannounced: Kjell Scherpen, whose fee was agreed on 27 July with a medical to follow and who is now nine days without a confirmation we can see — the status stays Advanced, and we are not going to invent an announcement to tidy it up. On sourcing: this pass could not reach the primary outlets, so it leans on cross-checks against the counterpart club pages; anything that could not be confirmed from a second source has been held one rung below where the reporting would put it, not above.

04 Aug 2026

Methodology: squad-cost amortisation now derives from the squad contracts

The headroom model's amortisation input used to be a hand-maintained estimate, while the Squad tab computed the same thing bottom-up from every player's fee and contract dates. The two had drifted apart — by up to £29m across the league, which is several points of squad cost ratio on pages whose whole purpose is showing how close a club sits to a compliance line. The hero model now takes its amortisation straight from the squad contracts, so the headline ratio and the squad table can no longer disagree, and the figure updates itself whenever the squad data changes. The field is still editable: type over it and the what-if model responds as before. Wages remain a stated estimate — clubs publish total staff costs, not the players-plus-head-coach slice the rule needs, so that split is still this tracker's assumption and is labelled as one.

04 Aug 2026

Summer-2026 lists rebuilt from scratch and cross-checked against all 19 other pages

This pass deliberately did not treat the existing page as the baseline. Current-window result: nothing was missing. All seven incomings (Emersonn £24m, Fatawu £20m, Diop £8.5m, Scherpen £8.5m agreed, Akpom £7m and Kipré £2.1m conversions, Maeda in talks) and all five outgoings (Murić £6m, Baggott £1m, Young retired, Chaplin and Townsend released) were already present with the correct fee, date and status, so no fees, net-spend, squad-cost-ratio, book-value or 25-man figures have been touched — no confirmed deal moved them. Added (last window only): two arrivals that other clubs' pages recorded but ours omitted — Ashley Young (free from Everton, summer 25; he is on this window's list only because he retired at 41) and Dan Neil (loan from Sunderland, January 26, which expired on 30 June — he has since joined Rangers on a free and is not an Ipswich player). Both sit in the 2025/26 table, which is display-only and feeds no financial total. Verified, no change needed: the Issa Diop £8.5m move from Fulham, previously flagged as one-sided, now matches Fulham's own page exactly (£8.5m, mid-July, completed). Not added: Adam Webster — Brighton's page records a July link to Ipswich, but he is still a free agent and no move was confirmed, so a rumour stays a rumour. Ins & Outs chips, the squad table and the homegrown audit were re-read against the arrays and already agreed.

27 Jul 2026

Page launched

The Bean Counter goes live at bean-counter.co.uk/ipswich for Ipswich Town's return to the Premier League. Launch dataset: the summer window to date (Emersonn £24m club record, Fatawu, Diop, Akpom & Kipré conversions; Murić and Baggott out; the Scherpen fee agreed today per EADT/TWTD reporting), the closed 2023/24–25/26 P&S cycle with our estimates, the FY25 accounts (£155.4m revenue, £77.1m wages, −£19.35m), the new 85% SCR model with adjustable assumptions, the 25-man list & homegrown audit, the sanction history (a clean sheet plus one £24k melee fine), the all-club league table, rumours (Maeda, Enciso, Lukić, Stassin) and the full glossary. Book values and countdowns recompute daily.

Glossary

Every rule in this tracker, in plain English — each with a real Ipswich example where one exists. For the group chat member who just asked "what's SCR?"

SCR — Squad Cost Ratio (PL)
The Premier League's new headline rule from 2026/27, replacing PSR: player and head-coach wages + transfer amortisation + agent fees must stay under 85% of football revenue plus net player-trading profit (70% for clubs in Europe). Green line 85%, red line 115%, with a 30% multi-year allowance that ratchets back if used. Ipswich project at roughly 85% — right on the line — on this tracker's estimates after the £106m window.
PSR (Profit & Sustainability Rules)
The Premier League's retired rule capping losses at £105m over a rolling three-year period. Voted out 14–6 in November 2025, replaced by SCR + SSR. Ipswich return to the top flight the season it dies, having never faced a PL PSR charge.
EFL P&S
The EFL's loss-based rule: £13m allowed loss per Championship season, £35m per Premier League season, over three years — so Ipswich's 2023/24–25/26 cycle carried a £61m blended cap. Closed 30 June 2026 at an estimated ~£40m used. Promotion bonuses were partly added back (£15.6m allowed in FY24).
SSR (Sustainability & Systemic Resilience)
The PL's liquidity and solvency tests running alongside SCR — proving clubs can actually pay their bills, including after an £85m relegation stress test. Bites hardest on promoted clubs, who take their first test on 31 October. Equity-funded clubs like Ipswich are structurally advantaged.
Parachute Payments
Post-relegation solidarity money from the Premier League — roughly £49m for Ipswich in 2025/26, tapering in later years (irrelevant now they're back up). The financial trampoline that, combined with the Delap and Hutchinson sales, funded the Championship's biggest squad investment.
Amortisation
Spreading a transfer fee as a cost over the contract length, max five years. Emersonn's £24m on a five-year deal costs ~£4.8m/yr in the books — which is why fees are judged per-year while sales count at once.
Book Value
What's left of a player's fee still to be amortised. Sale profit = fee minus book value. Delap's book value was ~£16m after one year of his ~£20m fee — so the £30m Chelsea sale booked ~£14m of instant profit.
Pure Profit
Shorthand for selling a £0-book-value player (academy graduate or free transfer): the entire fee lands as profit. Baggott's £1m to Millwall was pure profit; so would be any future fee for free-signing Ogbene. The engine of modern compliance.
Homegrown Quota
A PL 25-man squad may contain at most 17 non-homegrown players (homegrown = 3 seasons at an English/Welsh club before turning 21; nationality irrelevant). Ipswich count ~12 non-HG seniors after the window's spree — still ~5 slots spare, but no longer the league's most quota-comfortable squad.
U21 Exemption
Players born on or after 1 Jan 2005 don't need a squad-list place. Sindre Walle Egeli and the academy crop ride free — a real planning asset for a club with a short list of non-HG slots to protect.
Five-Year Amortisation Cap
PL (and UEFA) rule that fees must be amortised over a maximum of five years even on longer contracts — closing the eight-year-contract loophole Chelsea made famous. Applies to Emersonn's and Fatawu's five-year deals exactly as written.
PL 4% Transfer Levy
A 4% surcharge on transfer fees paid by Premier League clubs, funding player pension and education schemes. It capitalises into the registration cost and amortises with the fee — Emersonn's £24m really costs ~£25m.
FIFA Solidarity Contribution
Up to 5% of an international transfer fee distributed to the clubs that trained the player between 12 and 23 — Emersonn's Brazilian youth clubs take a slice of his fee. Rides inside the transfer cost for compliance purposes.
Sell-On Clause
A percentage of any future sale owed to a selling club. Manchester City reportedly held one on Liam Delap — trimming Ipswich's headline £30m. Ipswich will hold their own on departed academy products.
Senior Loan Quotas
Limits on loan signings: domestically, max 2 concurrent (4 per season) from English clubs and never two from the same club; internationally, max 6 senior loans with U21 and club-trained players exempt. Ipswich currently use zero.
Promotion Bonus Add-Back
The EFL's allowance letting clubs exclude one-off promotion bonuses from the P&S loss calculation — worth £15.6m to Ipswich in FY24 against £16.3m of bonuses paid. The reason a £39.3m headline loss caused no compliance problem.
Multi-Year Allowance (the 30%)
SCR's shock absorber: clubs may exceed 85% by up to 30 cumulative percentage points across seasons — but the buffer ratchets down as it's used and is earned back slowly through compliance. Designed for exactly the promoted-club scenario: one expensive transition year.
Equity Funding
Owners covering losses by buying new shares rather than lending. Gamechanger 20's US owners (ORG, Bright Path) have funded Ipswich this way since 2021 — the structure every current rulebook rewards, and the quiet reason the club's compliance record is spotless.
Headroom
The gap between current squad cost and the 85% line — the practical transfer budget. Ipswich's is now essentially zero on this tracker's estimates: the Florentino and Lukić deals spent what was left, so further buys need sales (whose profit raises the denominator) or the multi-year allowance.
UEFA rules (FER, 70% SCR, List A)
UEFA's Football Earnings Rule, 70% squad cost ratio and List A registration machinery apply only to clubs in European competition — not to Ipswich in 2026/27. They appear in this glossary because the League tab compares clubs across both tiers, and because qualifying for Europe would drop Ipswich's green line from 85% to 70% overnight: success has a compliance price.