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The Bean Counter
Liverpool · Financial Compliance · 2026/27

What do you think they're smoking over there at Emirates?

— John W. Henry · on Arsenal's £40,000,001 bid for Luis Suárez · X, July 2013. The bean counting was personal long before it was regulatory.
Liverpool official crest

The Bean Counter · Liverpool

2026/27 PRE-SEASON
You'll Never Walk Alone
Football has become a game of bean counting — so here's the abacus. PSR · UEFA Squad Cost Ratio · Football Earnings Rule · net spend · book values · the great wage unwind

State of Play

Liverpool's estimated squad cost ratio is 66.0% against the 70% limit that applies to clubs in UEFA competition, leaving roughly £31.5m/yr of cost headroom. The summer 2026 window stands at £26.9m banked from sales against £198.1m committed on signings — Bradley Barcola at £106m is the largest of them. Every figure here is this tracker's own estimate, built from published accounts and media reporting, as reported 3 Sept 2026.

Squad Cost Ratio · Estimated
/ 70%
70% wall · 100% red line
One 70% wall, enforced twice — UEFA on calendar 2026, the Premier League on season 2026/27.
Wages Off The Book
Salah + Konaté + Robertson — three of the biggest wages, all gone for FREE (est)
List A Churn
·
Title-era CL list → Iraola's first list: Jacquet & Muñoz bought, Tsimikas recalled, Leoni back from ACL, Ngumoha & Danns pushing up
UEFA + PL Fines
£0 EVER
Never charged under PSR, never fined by the CFCB — the cleanest sheet among England's big spenders

The Clock — What's Counting Down

DAYS TO SAUDI WINDOW CLOSE
6 SEP
DAYS TO LIST A DEADLINE
~2 SEP · UEFA
DAYS TO PL SCR CHECKPOINT
OCT 2026
DAYS TO UEFA RATIO FREEZE
31 DEC · CALENDAR 2026

The Six Regulations — Pass / Fail / Room Left

PL PSR
Passing
EST USAGE: ~£40m of the £105m 3-yr loss allowance (FY24 −£57.1m, FY25 +£15.2m, FY26 est loss) — before deductions for academy, infrastructure, community & women's football, which push the assessed number far lower.
ROOM: never charged in the rule's history · final-ever test Jan 2027, then the rule retires.
UEFA SCR
Compliant
NOW: vs the 70% limit on this tracker's estimates — a £703m revenue base absorbs even a £180m amortisation bill.
WATCH: the ratio is rising — the 2025 window's ~£75m/yr of new amortisation is permanent for five years, while the revenue side just lost the title-season prize money and a deep CL run.
ROOM: of cost/yr before the line · calendar-2026 test freezes 31 Dec 2026.
FER
Compliant
LIMIT: ~£52m (€60m) max loss over 3 years on UEFA's football-earnings basis. EST: FY25's +£15.2m profit and ~£175m of gross sales across FY26 (Díaz, Núñez, Quansah, Kelleher, Doak, Morton) keep the aggregate inside the line without asset-sale tricks.
ROOM: no settlement, no monitoring — the CFCB has never opened a file on Liverpool.
PL SCR
Not Yet Tested
PROJECTED: vs the 70% green line (red at 100%) that applies to clubs in Europe · season basis.
ROOM: of cost/yr · first checkpoint Oct 2026, assessment 1 Mar 2027. Amber only because it has never been run — and because a Barcola-sized deal would spend most of the margin.
List A Quotas
Comfortable
USED: ~23 of 25 A-spots projected for the CL league-phase list (due ~2 Sep) · homegrown minimums met via Bradley, Jones, Elliott, Gomez (club-trained) + Woodman and other association-trained names, with the youth on List B.
WATCH: three of the four club-trained names — Jones, Elliott, Gomez — are on the for-sale list. Selling all three would leave the quota resting on Bradley and the B-list kids.
Loan Quotas (In · Senior)
2 + 6 Left
DOMESTIC (English clubs): 2 of 2 concurrent remaining — no loanees in · season cap of 4 · never more than 1 from the same club · max 1 GK between PL clubs.
INTERNATIONAL (FIFA): 6 of 6 SENIOR remaining in · OUT: Ndukwe (work-permit refusal forces an immediate loan) and Nyoni are U21/club-trained, so exempt from the FIFA out-quota entirely.
ROOM: the full allowance — an option Iraola's thin CB corps (Van Dijk, Jacquet, a recovering Leoni, a Milan-bound Gomez) may yet need.

Quick Answers — Liverpool's Finances in Plain English

Are Liverpool in trouble with FFP in 2026?

No. Liverpool have never been charged under the Premier League's PSR and have never been fined or put in a settlement by UEFA. The pressure point is different: the £400m+ summer of 2025 locked roughly £75m a year of new amortisation into the books for five years, just as the team fell to fifth and the manager changed — so the squad cost ratio is rising towards the 70% lines rather than breaching them.

What is Liverpool's squad cost ratio right now?

Roughly 66% of football revenue on this tracker's estimates, against the 70% limit that applies to clubs in Europe — protected by the record £703m revenue base and by Salah, Konaté and Robertson's wages leaving the bill. UEFA tests calendar year 2026 (freezing 31 December); the Premier League tests the 2026/27 season with an October checkpoint.

Why did Salah, Konaté and Robertson all leave for free?

Contract management, not compliance. Konaté (now at Real Madrid) and Robertson (now at Spurs) ran their deals down to June 2026 with no extension agreed; Salah left by mutual agreement with a year remaining after the season turned sour around Christmas — and on 6 August signed a two-year deal at Trabzonspor, spurning the MLS suitors. Roughly £33m a year of estimated wages came off the books — for £0 of fee income. In squad-cost terms it is a windfall; in football terms it is the end of an era given away.

What have Liverpool spent this summer?

About £92m: Jeremy Jacquet from Rennes (£55m + £5m add-ons, agreed back in January), Víctor Muñoz's £34.5m release clause from Osasuna, and £2.6m for 18-year-old Ifeanyi Ndukwe — against £0 of sales, plus Ronald Araújo on a fee-free season loan whose whole cost is wages. The exodus's wage savings almost exactly fund the new arrivals' annual cost, which is why the net SCR swing is close to zero.

Can Liverpool afford Bradley Barcola?

Mechanically yes: a ~£105m fee on estimated £250k/week wages adds roughly £40m a year to the squad-cost numerator, and the model shows about that much headroom under the 70% line. But it would spend nearly all of the margin the free-transfer exodus created — with a centre-back and any January business still to fund. And the fee gap has widened, not closed: PSG rejected an improved ~£98.5m (€115m) Liverpool bid in the first week of August and now brief that only €150m-plus would do, while Liverpool are reported unwilling to go there — which is why talks have opened in parallel on PSG's 18-year-old Ibrahim Mbaye at roughly a third of the price. (The Wharton route stays quiet: no bid has ever been lodged and Palace are relaxed, as of 9 August.) Test it yourself in the Rumour Mill.

Did Liverpool pass the Premier League's PSR?

Comfortably. FY24's club-record £57.1m loss was followed by a £15.2m pre-tax profit in the £703m-revenue title season, and allowable deductions (academy, infrastructure, community, women's football) push the assessed three-year number well inside the £105m limit. The final-ever PSR assessment is January 2027, after which the squad cost and sustainability rules take over.

The whole thing in two sentences: Liverpool's books are clean — the risk is trajectory, not breach: 2025's £400m shopping bill amortises at ~£75m/yr for five years while fifth place shrinks the revenue it leans on. This window's answer was to let ~£47m/yr of veteran wages walk out free and buy young — and then, on the eve of deadline day, to spend £106m on Bradley Barcola anyway, which turns a net saving into a +£8.7m/yr net cost swing. This callout used to ask whether the margin would survive a Barcola-sized deal. It did not survive intact: the ratio read 65.2% before Barcola and 66.9% after him, with headroom falling from £37.5m to £24.5m. The academy loans out have since taken it to 66.0%, still inside the 70% limit but with a good deal less room than the veterans' exit had bought. Earlier in the window, before any of that completed — Salah signed a two-year Trabzonspor deal announced 6 August with no fee to Liverpool, PSG rejected an improved ~£98.5m Barcola bid and wanted €150m-plus, and the live new thread is their 18-year-old Ibrahim Mbaye, on whom talks have opened at a £34-43m ask.

Incomings & Outgoings

Summer 2026 window (opened 15 June, closes 1 September — delayed by the World Cup). Fees per media reports. A deal enters this table at a medical and not before: ADVANCED means terms agreed and the medical taken or booked, DONE means a club has announced it. Anything short of that is interest, however well sourced, and interest lives on the Rumours tab.

Summer 2026 — Out

PlayerToFee £mWage £k/wkCost freed £m/yrProfit £mStatus

Summer 2026 — In

PlayerFromFee £mWage £k/wkSCR cost £m/yrStatus
Fees Out (sales)
Confirmed + advanced permanent deals
Fees Committed (buys)
Confirmed + advanced permanent deals
Net Window Balance
No registration gate applies to Liverpool — context only
Annual Cost Freed (outs)
Wages + stopped amortisation leaving both SCR numerators
Annual Cost Added (ins)
Fee÷5 amortisation + wages + ~10% agent fee
Net SCR Swing
Change to the annual squad-cost numerator from this window
How the columns map to the rules: SCR cost / Cost freed hits the numerator of BOTH the UEFA 70% and PL 70% ratios (identical cost base, different clocks) · Profit feeds the FER earnings calculation AND both SCR denominators — £0 this window, because every senior exit was a free · Fee moves cash and net spend, not any registration gate. Wages are estimates.
The shape of the window: zero fee income, ~£33m/yr of wage relief. Salah, Konaté and Robertson leaving free books no profit — but it strips more annual cost out of the SCR numerator than the Jacquet, Muñoz and Ndukwe deals put back in. The bean counter's verdict: a break-even window in cost terms, a −£92m window in cash terms, and a £0 window in profit terms. All three statements are true at once.

2025/26 Season — In (Summer 25 + Jan 26)

PlayerFromFee £mWindow

2025/26 Season — Out

PlayerToFee £mWindow
The 2025/26 numbers are the whole story: a £400m+ gross spend — Wirtz, Isak and Ekitiké alone cost ~£320m — bankrolled partly by ~£175m of sales (Díaz, Núñez, Quansah, Doak, Kelleher, Morton) in the same summer. It bought a fifth-place finish, an Achilles rupture, an ACL, and Arne Slot's dismissal. The amortisation from that window (~£75m/yr est) is the fixed cost this page tracks for the next four years.

Spending Headroom

"Room" means two things for Liverpool — the UEFA 66% ratio (calendar year) and the PL SCR, which for clubs in Europe is ALSO capped at 70% (season basis, red threshold 100%). There is no registration gate and no settlement: unlike some rivals, Liverpool's only constraints are the ratios themselves. The model below is adjustable — the defaults are my estimates, so put your own numbers in.

The window in fees — where the money went

Sales banked
Every senior exit — Salah, Konaté, Robertson — left for FREE
Committed on signings
Jacquet £55m · Muñoz £34.5m · Ndukwe £2.6m
Net window balance
Cash-out window so far — funded from FY26's ~£175m of sales and the wage unwind, not new sales
Committed but deferred: the contingent add-ons are this window's quiet liability — up to £5m more on Jacquet (performance-related) and up to £16m still hanging on Wirtz's 2025 deal, plus 2025 add-on structures on Isak and Ekitiké. Add-ons capitalise into book value when triggered and amortise over the remaining contract — success literally raises the amortisation bill. Bean counters call this "buy now, count later."

The Fined Four — July 2026's CFCB Round (Liverpool Not Among Them)

Four English clubs were fined in UEFA's July 2026 decisions. Liverpool — despite a ~£500m five-year net spend, behind only United, Arsenal and Chelsea — were not on the list. The £703m denominator is why: the SCR punishes spending relative to income, and almost nobody earns like Anfield.

Club2026 FineSuspendedBreachSettlementExit Route
Aston Villa£19.4m£12.9mSCR 2025 ("significant") · 2nd straight4-yr to 2028/29 · £9.5m paid 2025 · trend formally ENDORSED£144m of player-sale profits including the British-record £117m Rogers deal
Chelsea£2.6mSCR · repeat4-yr · £26.7m paid, up to £51m conditionalAcademy sales (pure profit) + intra-group hotel sales the PL accepted
Newcastle£2.6m + £8.6mBOTH SCR and FER — the doubleObligations continue despite missing EuropeIsak to Liverpool for £125m — one sale to rule the FY25 accounts
Nottingham Forest£2.2mSCRAnderson to City for £116m weeks later — fine dwarfed 53:1 by one transfer
The pattern across all four: every exit route runs through selling players — and two of the four exit routes (Isak, and the Rogers money now funding Villa's rebuild) ran through or around Anfield. Liverpool's absence from this table is not virtue, it's arithmetic: spend ~£500m net over five years on a £700m revenue base and the ratio still clears 70%. The same spending at Villa's £378m base is a settlement.
Why there's no "hard gate" section on this page: registration gates (like Villa's positive-transfer-balance condition) only exist inside UEFA settlement agreements. Liverpool have never been in one, so nothing stops a registration except the List A quotas themselves. The constraint that actually binds is softer but constant: every deal moves the two 70% ratios below, and the settlementless clubs are simply the ones who manage that line before UEFA has to.

Annual constraint — squad cost ratio model

Squad cost = player & coach wages + transfer amortisation + agent fees. Denominator = football revenue + player-trading profit (3-yr average, per UEFA's smoothing). Edit any figure:

UEFA SCR · limit 70%
limit 70%
PL SCR (in Europe) · green 70% · red 100%
green 70%

What-if: add a signing

Added annual squad cost
amortisation (incl. 4% PL levy) + wages + est. agent fee
UEFA ratio after signing
vs 70% limit
Window net balance after fee
Cash context only — no gate applies to Liverpool
Rule of thumb: every £1m/yr of ratio headroom buys either ~£5m of transfer fee (5-yr amortisation) or ~£19k/week of wages. On the default assumptions the practical shape of the rest of the window is roughly . A £105m Barcola on £250k/week consumes ~£40m/yr of that in one deal — which is why the PSG stand-off is really a negotiation about whether any headroom survives to January: the improved ~£98.5m (€115m) bid was rejected in the first week of August and PSG now brief €150m-plus, a number Liverpool are reported unwilling to pay, hence the parallel talks over the 18-year-old Mbaye at a €40-50m ask. The midfield answer (Wharton) stays quiet without a bid; of the centre-back links, Konsa has firmed slightly (Villa's price at the £60m mark, no Liverpool bid) and Tomori has cooled. None of it is costed into anything above.
Caveats: revenue projection assumes CL league-phase money on top of FY25's £703m base, minus the title-season bonus effects — hence £690m. The wages figure is the SCR-relevant slice (players + head coach), not the £428m total staff bill, and reflects the Salah/Konaté/Robertson exits; the amortisation figure is my straight-line estimate off reported fees (the audited FY26 charge will differ, and includes players since sold). On agent fees: UEFA counts them as their own SCR category; our amortisation estimate is accounts-based and already contains the amortised slice of past capitalised agent fees, so pairing it with the separate £22m agents line double-counts a few £m — deliberately, as a conservative margin. UEFA's precise adjustments (which income lines qualify, FX, averaging mechanics) mean the true ratio will differ — treat this as a planning tool, not a compliance calculation.

Rumour Mill

The window shut at 11pm on 1 September 2026, and this tab is now mostly history. Nothing below can become an incoming transfer until January: a registration cannot be lodged outside the window, so every inbound link here is closed rather than pending, however well sourced it was. Three things the deadline does not close, which is why the cards are kept live rather than swept away. Free agents — a player already out of contract can be signed and registered outside the window. Outgoing moves abroad — several leagues closed later than England, so a player could still leave after English clubs had stopped buying: the Saudi Pro League runs to 6 September, the Süper Lig closed on 4 September and MLS on 2 September. Seven cards on this site point at one of those and are still live; every other card is now marked JANUARY and priced as a January deal rather than one that can happen today. Academy moves — an under-18 joining on training compensation is not moving a professional registration and is not bound by this deadline. Cards are left in place because a rumour that died at the deadline is a record of what was reported and what it was worth, and deleting them would quietly improve this site’s hit rate. The tick-box model still works: a JANUARY card prices what the deal would cost when the window reopens, which is the question actually worth asking about a link that survived the summer.

Everything on this tab is short of a medical. That is the line: a deal that has reached one sits in the Ins & Outs table, and everything below it — an offer, an agreement in principle, personal terms with no fee agreed, a bid lodged — is here, counting towards nothing until it moves. Tick any combination of live rumours (fees and wages are my estimates of reported figures) and the panel at the bottom recalculates the effect on every rule: window net balance, UEFA 70%, PL SCR (also 70% for clubs in Europe) and FER earnings. Uses the same base assumptions as the Headroom tab, so tweaks there flow through here. Updated 9 August: Ibrahim Mbaye joins the board — talks with PSG opened 6 August at a reported €40-50m ask, the genuine parallel track to a Barcola pursuit whose second bid (~£98.5m) has now been rejected. Konsa firms up slightly (Villa squad reported "resigned" to his exit, price at the £60m mark, still no Liverpool bid); Tomori cools (8 August reporting says he is not on his way to Anfield); Nyoni's loan is on hold after a standout US tour. Note the two big non-rumours: Chiesa has made a u-turn and stays after early talks with Iraola, and Isak — three goals in an injury-wrecked 2025/26 — is going nowhere, with Iraola publicly bullish after the Chicago camp.

Incoming rumours

Outgoing rumours

Window net balance
Δ annual squad cost
UEFA SCR
PL SCR
Profit booked (FER)
Tick the rumours above to model a scenario — and change any fee or wage to model your own number instead of this tracker’s.
The Milan problem, if both ends move: Milan hold an official offer for Joe Gomez, and Liverpool were reported on 5 August to have made initial contact with Milan about Fikayo Tomori — though 8 August reporting says he is not on his way to Anfield, which makes both legs less likely, not the mechanism less real. If those two concluded within 45 days on similar terms, UEFA’s Annex G.3.5 would treat them as a single exchange and value each leg at the LOWER of fee and residual book value. Gomez’s 2015 £3.5m fee is fully amortised — book value £0 — so an exchange finding would vaporise the entire ~£12m of profit the Gomez sale is modelled to book, while Tomori’s cost still landed in full on the numerator. Both legs are unagreed and this is a conditional, not a forecast; it is here because it is the sort of thing that only shows up once the deals are signed. (Neither leg is counted in any total on this page.)
How each lever maps to the rules: an incoming deal adds (fee + the PL’s 4% levy)÷5 + wages + ~10% agent fee to both SCR numerators, with zero benefit anywhere. An outgoing deal does the opposite three times over — fee into the window balance, wages + remaining amortisation out of the numerator, and the profit (fee − book value) into FER earnings and the SCR denominator. That's why one Mac Allister-sized sale funds most of a Barcola in compliance terms, whatever it costs in football terms — and why academy names (Jones, Elliott: £0 book value) are always the ones the spreadsheet nominates first.

Squad · Book Value & Amortisation

Senior squad after this summer's confirmed exits. Book value is computed live: straight-line amortisation of the reported fee from signing date to current contract end (extensions re-spread the remaining value — this is the standard treatment; the audited accounts also apply the 5-year cap and any impairments). Wages are third-party estimates (Capology/Spotrac-style databases, cross-checked Jul 2026) — not official. Tap a column to sort.

Player Pos Fee £m Signed Contract End Yrs Left Amort £m/yr Book Value £m Mkt Val £m Profit If Sold £m Est Wage £k/wk
💰 highlighted rows = est. profit if sold ≥£20m — where market value towers over book value. The academy trio are the extreme case: Curtis Jones, Harvey Elliott and Trey Nyoni carry ~£0 book value, so any sale is essentially 100% profit — which is exactly why the for-sale list is full of homegrown names. Mac Allister's 2023 £35m fee is more than half amortised (~£46m profit at a £60m fee); at the other extreme, selling a 2025 signing like Gakpo's opposite numbers would barely book anything. Market values are Transfermarkt-style estimates — except where live talks set a price per the Rumour Mill. Not listed individually (academy/low book value, out on loan, or not yet arrived): Ndukwe (immediate loan — no UK work permit), Mor Talla Ndiaye, Norris-era academy players, and Samuel Martínez (£0.75m from Atlético Nacional agreed 21 Jul, but a 2027 arrival under FIFA under-18 rules — excluded from this window's totals) — collectively immaterial to the amortisation picture but pure profit if ever sold. Free transfers & academy players carry £0 book value (that's why selling them is pure PSR/FER profit). Undisclosed fees estimated where flagged ~. Add-ons are treated differently on the two sides of the ledger, and this page says so rather than quietly netting it out: both an incoming and an outgoing fee are modelled at the guaranteed amount, with add-ons counted only when they trigger. This caption used to claim the opposite for incoming deals — that they were modelled all-in — and that was a description of a rule this site does not follow: every incoming row bar two was already on the guaranteed basis, and the two exceptions, Suzuki and Ruggeri, were brought into line on 2 September. Contingent money is not capitalised until it is owed, which is the conservative reading and the one the corrections here have consistently enforced. New-signing wages are estimates until the databases catch up with the window. Amortisation shown on remaining contract; UEFA and the PL both cap the amortisation schedule for new deals at 5 years even on longer contracts — so Muñoz's six-year deal amortises over five in the official books (slightly more per year than shown here).
Squad Book Value
Sum of estimated carrying values
Annual Amortisation
Current squad only, my straight-line estimate — the audited FY26 club-wide charge will be higher
Est. Squad Wages
Estimated senior squad only. Total club FY25 staff cost: £428m (incl. all staff, title bonuses)
The £105m injury ward — Ekitiké's Achilles, Leoni's ACL, and the SCR: injuries give no relief under the Squad Cost Ratio. (1) Ekitiké's wages (~£10m/yr est.) stay in the numerator in full while he rehabs towards a targeted Boxing Day return from the Achilles he ruptured against PSG in April. (2) His ~£15.8m/yr amortisation on the £79m fee keeps charging regardless — as does Leoni's ~£5m/yr on £26m while the teenager works back from his ACL. (3) Neither is saleable at anything near book value mid-recovery, so ~£105m of fees is temporarily illiquid at the moment the squad needs reshaping. (4) If either carrying value were judged impaired, the write-down lands in the SCR numerator too — impairments count as squad cost. And no offset applies: both were hurt in club matches, so FIFA's Club Protection Programme (which only covers international duty) pays nothing. The bean counter's summary of why Liverpool's ratio must carry a buffer: two players, ~£26m/yr of locked-in cost, zero minutes guaranteed.

Amortisation Runway — What's Already Committed

Transfer-fee amortisation locked into future seasons from today's contracts (straight-line on remaining book value), plus the contingent add-ons (~£21m on Wirtz + Jacquet) if triggered. This is spending that's already eaten before Liverpool buy anyone else — the long tail of the £400m summer of 2025.

Assumes current contracts run to term (sales remove their bars; extensions re-spread them). Amber = contingent add-ons (Wirtz up to £16m, Jacquet up to £5m) spread over remaining terms if earned — success costs money. A Barcola deal would add a ~£21m/yr bar on top of everything shown.

Premier League homegrown quota — 2026/27

Two ceilings, not one. A club may register 25 senior players, and no more than 17 of them may be non-homegrown. The familiar “eight homegrown” line is what falls out of those two numbers — but only if you fill all 25. A club with six qualifiers is not breaking any rule; it simply cannot name a squad bigger than 23. Under-21s sit outside the list altogether and play regardless: for 2026/27, born on or after 1 January 2005. Players out on loan are not registered.

Homegrown is a registration test, not a passport test. Three entire seasons, or 36 months, at any club affiliated to the FA or the FAW before the end of the season in which the player turns 21. That is why Jeremie Frimpong qualifies — Dutch, but nine years in the Manchester City academy — while Virgil van Dijk does not: Celtic is affiliated to the Scottish FA, and Southampton came at 24.

Where Liverpool actually stand, and it is not where the free places suggest. 22 of the 25 places are used, with three places unused — but only one of them can actually be filled. Liverpool have 5 homegrown and 17 non-homegrown, and five qualifiers caps the squad at 22, not 25: the seventeen non-homegrown ceiling binds long before the places run out. That is the case the paragraph above describes in the abstract, happening for real. Five more players are under 21 — Jacquet, Leoni, Nyoni, Ngumoha and Jayden Danns — and they play free of it entirely (Ifeanyi Ndukwe, the sixth teenager, is at Levante on loan and is not registered at all), which is the only reason a squad this size fits at all. The fix is not money. Another £100m forward does not raise the ceiling; only a homegrown signing, or an academy player crossing 21 with three English seasons behind him, moves it.

UEFA List A — 2026/27 Champions League

Liverpool qualified for the 2026/27 Champions League on the final day — fifth place, 57 points, three clear of Bournemouth. Below: last season's CL list (the title-defence campaign that ended in the April PSG tie and Slot's dismissal) transitioning into Iraola's first list, due ~2 September. 23 registered last season of a possible 25; players who have left, or are on the for-sale list, are flagged.

List A Transition · 2025/26 CL (Slot) → 2026/27 CL (Iraola)

Each position: who's gone off last season's list, who stays, and who fills the hole — with deal status. Three certainties left for free; the rest of the churn is Iraola's clear-out list, still mostly unresolved. Only completed deals are classed in/out — loose links stay dimmed or in the Rumour Mill.

Goalkeepers

Out · 0
Nobody
Retained · 3
AlissonFINAL YEAR — 2027 EXPIRY, NO TALKS
Giorgi MamardashviliSTAYS · THE 2030 SUCCESSION PLAN
Freddie WoodmanSTAYS · HOMEGROWN No.3
In · 0
Nobody
NET: unchanged — but Alisson entering the last of his years is the quiet story: 2026/27 is the season Mamardashvili either takes the gloves or the succession plan gets awkward.

Defenders

Out · 2 · both FREE
Ibrahima KonatéREAL MADRID · FREE · SIGNED 18 JUN, TO 2030
Andy RobertsonTOTTENHAM · FREE · OFFICIAL, REGISTERED 1 JUL
Retained · 5
Virgil van DijkCAPTAIN · FINAL YEAR (2027)
Joe GomezMILAN OFFICIAL OFFER · TALKS ONGOING
Conor BradleySTAYS · CLUB-TRAINED
Jeremie FrimpongSTAYS
Milos KerkezSTAYS · IRAOLA REUNION
In · 3
Jérémy JacquetSIGNED · £55m+£5m FROM RENNES · KONATÉ REPLACEMENT
Kostas TsimikasRECALLED FROM ROMA LOAN · ROBERTSON COVER
Giovanni LeoniRETURNS FROM ACL · EASED BACK
Ifeanyi NdukweNO UK WORK PERMIT — IMMEDIATE LOAN OUT
CB target: Konsa / TomoriKONSA LIVE AT ~£60m, NO LFC BID · TOMORI COOLING 8 AUG
NET: losing Konaté for £0 while paying £55m for Jacquet is the window's defining trade — the cost of letting a contract run down, priced. If Gomez's Milan move completes, Iraola starts the CL with three fit senior centre-backs — which is why the centre-back links persist: Konsa (Villa's price now reported at the £60m mark, their squad "resigned" to an exit, Liverpool monitoring but still bidless as of 9 August) and a cooling Tomori thread. Neither is a bid; both are in the Rumour Mill.

Midfielders — the unresolved block

Out · 1
Curtis JonesGONE · INTER · £25.6m
Nobody yet— BUT SEE THE AMBER COLUMN
Retained · 6
Florian WirtzSTAYS · THE £116m CENTREPIECE
Dominik SzoboszlaiSTAYS
Ryan GravenberchSTAYS
Alexis Mac AllisterAVAILABLE PER REPORTS · NO EXTENSION TALKS (2028)
Harvey ElliottIRAOLA AUDITIONING HIM IN PRE-SEASON
Wataru EndoEXIT TOUTED · FINAL YEAR
In · 1
Adam WhartonNO BID LODGED · PALACE RELAXED · FADING
Trey NyoniB-LIST · LOAN "NEXT STEP" LIKELY
NET: the window's biggest open question, and still no clearer by 9 August. Four midfielders in limbo, no arrivals, and the one named answer (Wharton at £100m) has still not attracted a Liverpool bid with barely three weeks left. Jones, Elliott and Bajcetic are also three of the club-trained quota names: selling them all has a registration cost as well as a football one.

Forwards — after Salah

Out · 1 · FREE
Mohamed SalahLEFT BY AGREEMENT, 1 YR EARLY · SIGNED FOR TRABZONSPOR 6 AUG
Retained · 4
Alexander IsakSTAYS · IRAOLA "MASSIVE" ON HIM POST-CHICAGO
Hugo EkitikéACHILLES — TARGETING BOXING DAY RETURN · NOT FOR SALE
Cody GakpoSPURS STEPPING UP · NO BID · ~£70m WOULD TEMPT, PER REPORTS
Federico ChiesaU-TURN — STAYS UNDER IRAOLA
In · 1 (+ B-list push + target)
Víctor MuñozSIGNED · £34.5m CLAUSE · SPAIN WINGER
Rio NgumohaB-LIST · THE ACADEMY'S HEADLINE ACT
Jayden DannsB-LIST · CLUB-TRAINED DEPTH
Bradley Barcola2ND BID ~£98.5m REJECTED · PSG NOW WANT €150m+
Ibrahim MbayeTALKS OPENED 6 AUG · PSG ASK €40-50m · NO FEE AGREED
Samuel Martínez£0.75m AGREED 21 JUL · ARRIVES SUMMER 2027 (FIFA U18 RULES)
NET: Salah's A-spot passes to Muñoz for now — but the plan is Barcola, and the plan now costs €150m-plus on PSG's latest briefing, which is why the cheaper Mbaye track opened on 6 August. Until Ekitiké's Achilles clears (~Boxing Day), Isak carries the CL line with a £34.5m winger and the B-list kids behind him. (Martínez, agreed in July for £0.75m, is a 2027 arrival — no part of this window's maths.)
List B (unlimited, U-22 + two uninterrupted years at the club since the 15th birthday) covers Ngumoha, Danns, Nyoni and the academy crop for 2026/27 — Ngumoha's Sep-2024 arrival from Chelsea means his two-year clock completes early in the season, a registration nuance worth watching for the league phase. Ndukwe cannot be registered at all until the work-permit position resolves, hence the immediate loan.
The quota that shapes the list: a CL List A allows 25 players of whom at least 8 must be "locally trained" — max 4 of those "association-trained", so effectively 4 club-trained players are needed for a full list. Liverpool's four: Bradley, Jones, Elliott, Gomez. Three of the four are on the for-sale list — sell them all and the shortfall shrinks the registrable list to ~22, not 25. No settlement gate applies to Liverpool (unlike Villa); the quotas are the only registration maths that bites.

Sanction Tracker — The Emptiest Tab

Liverpool have never been charged under PSR, never fined by UEFA's CFCB, never in a settlement. This tab exists because the absence is the story — and because "never sanctioned" is not the same as "never sanctionable". Below: the trajectory that keeps it empty, and the full (short) charge sheet.

The SCR Glidepath

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% UEFA LIMIT 90% 80% 70% CY2023CY2024CY2025CY2026 ~64% est ~63% est ~66% est · the spree lands ~63% est · wage unwind
Liverpool line is directional and estimated (UEFA does not publish exact club ratios). The limit stepped 90% → 80% → 70% as UEFA phased the rule in; Liverpool's estimated ratio has stayed under every step — the 2025 spree pushed it up, the 2026 wage unwind pulls it back. The gap between the amber line and the teal line is the whole difference between this page and Villa's.

The Complete Charge Sheet — Everything, Ever

April 2017

Academy recruitment sanction — the only Premier League punishment on record

Fined £100,000 and banned from signing academy players from other English clubs for two years (the second year suspended) after breaching rules on inducements to a schoolboy at Stoke's academy. Not a finance-rules case — but it belongs on an honest charge sheet, and the irony writes itself: the academy pipeline it briefly froze now produces the £0-book-value players (Jones, Elliott, Bradley, Ngumoha) that make the modern compliance maths work.

April–June 2021

The Super League bill

One of six English founder clubs of the collapsed European Super League. The exit price: a combined £22m goodwill payment from the six to the Premier League (plus a threatened £25m each and 30-point deduction for any repeat), and a collective ~€15m gesture with 5% of one season's UEFA competition revenue withheld from the founder clubs. The closest FSG's Liverpool have come to a genuine regulatory cliff — and it was constitutional, not financial.

2013 → 2026

PSR era: thirteen clean assessments

Since the Premier League's PSR began, Liverpool have never been charged, never needed deductions arithmetic, never sold an asset to themselves. The self-sustaining FSG model — transfers funded from revenue and player trading, stadium expansion funded by intercompany loans that sit outside the PSR loss calculation as infrastructure investment — has kept every three-year aggregate comfortably inside £105m. Worst moment of the era: FY24's club-record £57.1m loss, still absorbed with room to spare.

2022 → 2026

UEFA era: no file ever opened

Under the Financial Sustainability Regulations (FER + SCR, from 2022) the CFCB has fined Chelsea, Villa, Newcastle, Forest, Barcelona and half of Europe's aristocracy. Liverpool have never appeared in a single CFCB decision list — including July 2026's round, despite carrying one of the four biggest five-year net spends in England. The £703m denominator is the whole defence.

Now → the watch list

What could end the streak

Three honest risks, all slow-burning: (1) the 2025 window's ~£75m/yr amortisation is fixed until 2030 while fifth place trims CL revenue — the ratio maths tightens every season without a deep run; (2) a Barcola-scale buy plus a Wharton-scale buy in one cycle would push the numerator towards the line the model tracks on the Headroom tab; (3) the FY26 accounts (due ~spring 2027) will show the first big post-title loss — fine for PSR's last test, but the start of the three-year window the new rules will judge. None of it is a charge. All of it is why this page exists.

Last Accounts — FY2024/25 (y/e 31 May 2025)

The title season: Premier League champions under Slot, Champions League last-16 run, and the biggest revenue figure any English club has ever posted. Published February 2026 — the last accounts before everything changed.

Revenue (English record)
£703m
+£89m on FY24's £614m · highest in the division
Pre-tax result
+£15.2m
A £72.3m swing from FY24's club-record −£57.1m · £8m profit after tax
Staff costs
£428m
+£42m, incl. title bonuses — highest in the PL, ahead of City's £408m · ~61% of revenue
Player amortisation
~£110m EST
Pre-spree level — the 2025 window adds ~£75m/yr from FY26 (est)
External debt
Low
Stadium builds funded via FSG intercompany loans (~£130m est) — no leveraged-buyout debt on the club
Owner funding
Self-sustaining
FSG model: no equity injections needed, no asset sales to sister companies — ever

Revenue mix (FY25)

Commercial
~£323m
Media
£264m
Matchday
£115.6m
Where the £89m of growth came from: media +£60m (title prize money + the return to the Champions League), matchday to a club-record £115.6m (first full season of the expanded Anfield Road Stand — capacity ~61,000), commercial +£15m to ~£323m (the Adidas kit deal era beginning, ~£60m/yr reported). The bean-counter's point: commercial alone nearly matches Aston Villa's entire revenue. This is the denominator that lets Liverpool carry a £428m wage bill at a ratio Villa would be fined for.

How −£57.1m became +£15.2m (and what FY26 does next)

FY24 pre-tax result (no CL, cup-light)−£57.1m
Media uplift — title + CL return+£60m
Matchday uplift — Anfield Road full year+£13.6m
Commercial uplift+£15m
Staff cost growth (incl. title bonuses)−£42m
Other movements (net) est+£25.7m
FY25 pre-tax profit+£15.2m
The FY26 preview (y/e 31 May 2026, publishes ~spring 2027): the reckoning year. The £400m+ window loads ~£75m/yr of new amortisation, wages stay high, fifth place cuts the title bonus pool but the CL run pays — and ~£175m of gross sales (Díaz £65.5m, Núñez £46.3m, Quansah £30m, Doak £25m, Kelleher, Morton) books an estimated £120m+ of profit against mostly-amortised or academy book values. Net: expect a swing back to a loss, cushioned into the −£30m to −£60m range (my estimate, wide error bars). Comfortably absorbable under PSR's final test — but it is the first year of the three-year window the squad-cost era will judge, which is why the wage unwind mattered so much this summer.

Rules & Compliance Status

Every regime that applies to Liverpool, the limit in pounds, and where the club stands. "FFP" itself no longer exists as a single rule — it's the old umbrella name, now split into UEFA's FER + SCR and the Premier League's PSR (becoming SCR + SSR).

COMPLIANT CLOSE / UNDER SETTLEMENT NOT COMPLIANT

Compliance calendar

1 Sep 2026WINDOW CLOSES · 11PM
~2 Sep 2026CL LIST A DEADLINE
Oct 2026PL SCR MONITORING
31 Dec 2026UEFA SCR YEAR ENDS + PSR ACCOUNTS SUBMITTED
Jan 2027FINAL PL PSR ASSESSMENT
~Early Feb 2027CL KNOCKOUT LIST WINDOW
1 Mar 2027PL SCR ASSESSMENT
~Spring 2027FY26 ACCOUNTS PUBLISHED
7 Jul 2027SSR TESTS
Premier League · to end of 2025/26
Compliant — never charged

PSR — Profitability & Sustainability

LIMIT: £105m max pre-tax loss over rolling 3 years (£15m if not equity-funded)
BasisClub financial years (Liverpool's y/e 31 May) — aggregate of FY24 + FY25 + FY26.
What countsAggregate 3-yr pre-tax result, with deductions for infrastructure, academy, community & women's football costs. Intra-group asset sales at fair value ARE allowed — Liverpool have never needed one.
LiverpoolEst. raw aggregate: −£57.1m (FY24) + £15.2m (FY25) + an FY26 loss estimated in the −£30m to −£60m range ≈ −£70m to −£100m before deductions — and the deductions (academy, Anfield Road/AXA infrastructure depreciation, community, LFC Women) claw the assessed figure back well inside the line. Thirteen PSR cycles, zero charges.
DeadlineAccounts submitted by 31 Dec 2026 → final-ever PSR assessment January 2027. After that the rule is retired.
UEFA · the one to watch
Compliant

SCR — Squad Cost Ratio (UEFA)

LIMIT: squad cost ≤ 70% of adjusted revenue + net player-sale profit (phased 90% → 80% → 70%)
BasisCalendar year — the current test period is 1 Jan – 31 Dec 2026. This is why the June frees help twice: Salah, Konaté and Robertson's wages vanish from H2 of the measurement year, exactly when the 2025 spree's amortisation is at full charge.
What countsPlayer + head-coach wages — including wages of any loaned-in players — plus loan fees, transfer amortisation/impairment and agent fees. The PL’s 4% transfer levy and FIFA’s 5% solidarity contribution capitalise into registration cost and ride along inside the amortisation. On a sale it works the other way and is now modelled: the 5% is deducted from the fee, so a club selling abroad banks 95% and books its profit on that. Domestic sales are untouched. Amortisation capped at 5 years for new deals (so Muñoz's six-year contract amortises over five).
LiverpoolNever fined, never in a decision list. Estimated ~63% for 2026 on this tracker's model: a ~£480-500m squad cost carried by ~£690m of revenue plus ~£95m of averaged player-trading profit. The margin is real but shrinking — the 2025 amortisation is fixed to 2030, and each Barcola-sized addition is ~5 points of ratio.
DeadlineCalendar-2026 numbers freeze 31 December 2026; clubs report in spring and CFCB verdicts land summer 2027.
UEFA · "FER" — yes, that's the one
Compliant

FER — Football Earnings Rule

LIMIT: ~£52m (€60m) max loss over 3 years · +~£8.6m/yr more if in "good financial health"
BasisFinancial years — the 3-year aggregate of the club's own accounting periods (Liverpool's y/e 31 May), assessed annually by the CFCB.
What countsUEFA's PSR equivalent — but it EXCLUDES profits on asset sales to related parties, player swaps (see the Swap-Deal rule card) and related-party transfers. Liverpool's compliance has never leaned on any of those, so the PL and UEFA numbers barely diverge — the structural difference between this page and Villa's.
LiverpoolFY25's +£15.2m profit and the ~£120m+ of estimated FY26 player-sale profits (Díaz, Núñez, Quansah, Kelleher, Doak, Morton — all real third-party sales, all countable) keep the rolling aggregate inside ~£52m without adjustment gymnastics. "Good financial health" add-ons likely available if ever needed.
DeadlineAssessed annually alongside the SCR; FY26 accounts feed the summer 2027 review.
Premier League · live from 2026/27
Could be close

SCR — Squad Cost Ratio (PL)

CLUBS IN EUROPE (incl. Liverpool): green 70% · red 100% — CLUBS NOT IN EUROPE: green 85% · red 115% · +£33m/3yr equity top-up (max £15m/season)
BasisSeason / financial year (2026/27, i.e. y/e 31 May 2027) — unlike UEFA's calendar-year clock. A January signing therefore hits the PL calculation for this season but splits across two UEFA years.
What countsSame cost base as UEFA's version, and the denominator explicitly includes net profit/loss on player sales. Two-tier enforcement: over green but under red = fine (levies only payable for breaches from 2027/28); over red = risk of sporting sanctions. The intra-group asset-sale loophole that survived under PSR is explicitly closed.
LiverpoolAs a Champions League club, Liverpool's domestic green threshold is 70% — among the nine capped European qualifiers — so the same 70% bar applies at home and in Europe, just on different clocks. The 2026/27 projection (~63% on the model defaults) sits inside it with several points of margin — amber only because the rule has never actually been run, and because the margin is one big signing wide. Breaching green but staying under 100% means a levy, not points; the buffer also RATCHETS: use it one season and next season's red threshold drops by the same amount, earned back at 10%/season of full compliance.
DeadlineMonitoring checkpoint October 2026; formal assessment 1 March 2027, after the January window. Levies for breaches only bite from 2027/28 — 2026/27 is a transition year.
Premier League · live from 2026/27
Expected pass

SSR — Sustainability & Systemic Resilience

TESTS: liquidity headroom ≥ £0 after an £85m stress test · positive equity ratio ≤90% (26/27) → 85% (27/28) → 80% (28/29+)
BasisTested 7 July each year (newly promoted clubs: 31 October), covering the current and following season.
What countsNot a spending cap — solvency tests. The liquidity calculation counts 40% of squad market value as a liquid asset; the £85m stress test models relegation or missing Europe. Owner equity injections count in a club's favour.
LiverpoolThe easiest test on the page: a £703m revenue machine, a squad whose 40%-of-market-value liquidity credit alone approaches the stress test, external debt limited to FSG intercompany stadium loans, and a going-concern statement that has never needed owner-support caveats. No indication of an issue.
DeadlineFirst full tests 7 July 2027 for 2026/27, with in-season submissions from the start of the season.
UEFA registration rules
Comfortable

List A & homegrown quotas

LIMITS: 25-player List A · min 8 locally trained (max 4 association-trained → effectively 4 club-trained needed for a full list) · List B unlimited (U-22 + 2 yrs at club)
BasisRegistration quotas, not finance — but they interact with the finances constantly, because homegrown players are both quota-fillers AND the £0-book-value sale candidates every compliance model loves.
Liverpool~23 A-spots projected in use, so a little room to spare. Club-trained four: Bradley, Jones, Elliott, Gomez — of whom Jones (Inter), Elliott (audition) and Gomez (Milan) are all live exit stories. Sell all three and the club-trained shortfall caps the list at ~22. List B carries Ngumoha, Danns and Nyoni; Ndukwe is unregistrable pending a work permit. No settlement gate of any kind applies — Liverpool's registrations are constrained only by these standard quotas.
DeadlineCL league-phase List A due ~2 September 2026 (day after the window shuts); up to three additions permitted in the knockout registration window closing early February 2027.
UEFA Annex G.3.5 + PL FMV protocols
Clean

Swap-Deal / Player-Exchange Rule

TEST: opposite-direction transfers between the same two clubs = an EXCHANGE if (a) concluded within 45 DAYS of each other AND (b) with the same/similar payment obligations, deadlines or dates · recognised value = the LOWER of the fee and residual book value
What countsSubstance over form, not a fixed day-count — deals weeks apart can be linked (Newcastle's Anderson sale was tied to the Vlachodimos purchase, wiping £30m+ off their UEFA trading profit). For academy players the book value is £0, so an exchange kills the profit entirely; under IAS 38, if fair value can't be measured, NO profit can be recognised. The PL runs its own fair-market-value assessment protocols for player registrations (Handbook, App 19).
LiverpoolNo swap in the books and none needed — every FY26 sale (Díaz to Bayern, Núñez to Al-Hilal, Quansah to Leverkusen) was a clean, one-direction, third-party deal. Worth knowing anyway: UEFA has reportedly issued formal warnings elsewhere in the league over inflated swaps this month, with heavier fines and a potential European ban on the table for repeats. The era of the casual academy swap is over.
ConsequenceThe rule quietly shapes deals Liverpool COULD do: any Barcola negotiation that included a makeweight going to Paris, or a Wharton deal with a player-plus-cash structure, would need pricing at arm's length and outside the 45-day linkage — because with academy players like Jones or Elliott as makeweights (£0 book value), an exchange finding would vaporise the recognised profit entirely.
Terminology · where "FFP" went

FFP → what it means now

"Financial Fair Play" (2010) was rebranded by UEFA in 2022 as Financial Sustainability Regulations: solvency (no overdue payables) + stability (FER) + cost control (SCR). Domestically, the PL's version was PSR (2013), now being replaced by SCR + SSR from 2026/27. So when pundits ask whether Liverpool have an "FFP problem", the precise answer is: no rule has ever been breached — the question is only whether the 2025 spree's fixed costs stay under the twin 70% lines as the rules change over.
Accounting mechanics

Amortisation & "pure profit"

Fees spread over the contract (max 5 years); sale profit = fee received − remaining book value − any sell-on shares owed, booked instantly. Academy products (Jones, Elliott, Nyoni, Ngumoha) are ~100% profit if sold; Díaz's £65.5m against a mostly-amortised 2022 fee booked ~£50m+. Buying works the other way: Wirtz at £100m guaranteed adds only ~£20m/yr of cost. And letting contracts expire is the anti-trade: Konaté's remaining value was £0 in the books, so his exit booked nothing and cost nothing — the fee Liverpool never received simply became Real Madrid's saving. That asymmetry, in both directions, is the entire logic of Liverpool's summer.

The Whole League — Bean Counted

All 20 clubs for 2026/27: which SCR tier they're in, their latest published accounts (FY2024/25, y/e mid-2025), and their compliance baggage. Nine clubs in Europe carry the 70% green / 100% red caps; the other eleven get 85% / 115%. Notes updated 27 Jul — officially announced deals and appointments only; pursuits and links stay in the Rumour Mill. Figures marked ~ are estimates from league-wide analyses rather than confirmed line items — FY25 league totals: £6.8bn revenue, £4.4bn wages, £2.0bn amortisation, £948m aggregate pre-tax losses.

ClubEurope 26/27Green capRev £mWages £mW/RCompliance notes
ArsenalCL · CHAMPIONS70%~617~328~53%Comfortable on both ratios; CL runners-up 25/26. Amortisation £170m+ the main cost line.
Manchester CityCL70%~715408~57%New era: Maresca replaces Guardiola. Broke the British record for Forest’s Anderson (£116m, fixed fee) — absorbed inside 70% by a £715m revenue base.
Manchester UnitedCL70%~666~313~47%Carrick made permanent manager; ~£85m midfield rebuild (Santos £50m, Tielemans £35m from Villa). £196m amortisation, but a £666m denominator makes 70% easy.
Aston VillaCL · EL HOLDERS70%37827372%Mid-UEFA-settlement, fined twice (£19.4m Jul 2026, 2/3 suspended, trend endorsed) — the British-record £117m Rogers sale to Chelsea is the exit route.
LIVERPOOLCL70%70342861%The subject of this tracker: record £703m revenue, record £428m wages, never sanctioned — and a £400m spree amortising through the new rules era. Iraola in (4 Jun, 2-yr deal) after Slot's dismissal a year on from the title. See every other tab.
BournemouthEUROPA70%~175~140~80%Flagged spending near capacity in FY25 — and first-ever Europe now drags them from 85% to the 70% cap just as Iraola officially left for Liverpool. The squeeze case, squeezed further.
SunderlandEUROPA70%~180*~95*~53%*FY25 = first PL season back. Europe two seasons after League One — the 70% cap lands on a still-growing revenue base.
Crystal PalaceEUROPA · CONF WINNERS70%~190~135~71%Conference League winners — then Glasner officially departed for Forest. Second straight European season keeps them on the 70% cap, right on the line like Villa.
BrightonCONFERENCE70%~222~165~74%FY25 costs rose sharply on amortisation; historically balanced by elite player trading profits.
Chelsea85%~541~360~67%Xabi Alonso era. UEFA settlement (£26.7m paid, up to £51m conditional), fined again Jul 2026 — then broke their record for Rogers (£117m) days after loaning Garnacho to Villa, walking the swap-rule tightrope. League-high £212m amortisation; missing Europe eases the cap to 85%.
Newcastle85%~350~220~63%Fined Jul 2026 for BOTH SCR and FER breaches; FY25 leaned on selling Isak to Liverpool for £125m. Settlement obligations continue despite missing Europe.
Tottenham85%~526~222~42%Lowest wage ratio among the big-revenue clubs — the league's most comfortable bean-counting position.
Nottingham Forest85%~190~155~82%Fined £2.2m in Jul 2026 — then banked £116m selling Anderson to City, transforming the FER/PSR picture overnight. Glasner confirmed as head coach 6 Jul (reported club-record ~£13m/yr salary) — their FIFTH boss in 12 months.
Everton85%~187~160~86%Two PSR deductions in 23/24; new stadium revenue is the plan for growing under the 85% cap.
Fulham85%~180~145~81%Small-revenue cohort where 85% barely funds a competitive XI — the other side of the SCR squeeze.
Brentford85%~195~125~64%The sustainability model club — comfortable margin on every metric.
Leeds85%~150*~110*~73%*FY25 = promotion season. Second PL season consolidating.
CoventryPROMOTED · CHAMPIONS85%~45*~35*~78%*Championship-era accounts. PL broadcast money transforms the denominator overnight — big headroom if they spend sensibly.
IpswichPROMOTED85%~145*~115*~79%*FY25 reflects their last PL season. Straight back up at the first attempt.
HullPROMOTED · PLAY-OFFS85%~30*~28*~93%*Championship accounts. The biggest financial step-up in the division — SSR liquidity tests bite hardest here. In: Butland, ex-Villa Targett, Zambrano & Morita.
The tier divide is the story of 2026/27: nine clubs in Europe live at 70/100 while eleven live at 85/115 — meaning Chelsea, Newcastle, Spurs and Forest all get 15 points MORE domestic spending headroom than Liverpool precisely because they failed to qualify. For Liverpool the 70% cap is comfortable anyway — 70% of £703m is a bigger allowance than 85% of anyone else's revenue except City's. UEFA settlement obligations (Chelsea, Newcastle, Villa) travel with those clubs regardless; Liverpool carry none. And note the squeeze cases at both ends: Bournemouth and Palace dragged down to 70% by success, Fulham and the promoted clubs for whom even 85% of a small revenue is a hard ceiling.
Sources: Deloitte Annual Review (league totals), club accounts via Swiss Ramble/Maguire analyses, club statements, UEFA CFCB decision lists. ~ figures are estimates; * marks accounts from a different division. Want the full treatment (transfers, book values, A-list, headroom) for another club?

Who's Selling to Survive — Net Transfer Balance

Sorted by net balance — the top of this table is where the selling pressure lives, the bottom is where the money goes.

THIS WINDOW: disclosed fees on officially completed 2026 deals only; undisclosed counted £0, loans & frees excluded — which is exactly why Liverpool's row reads the way it does: £92.1m out, £0 in, because Salah, Konaté and Robertson's exits were all FREES. The biggest wage book in England shed its three most iconic contracts for no fee income at all. LAST 5 YEARS: net spend 2021/22–2025/26, Transfermarkt basis (€ converted), ~ = estimated. The two views tell one story: Liverpool sit near the bottom of the five-year table (−£500m, £241m of it on Isak & Wirtz in one summer) yet still avoided every fine on this page — net spend measures ambition, but the ratios measure spending against income, and almost nobody earns like Anfield.

The View From Inside the Citadel

The challengers' question — can anyone still catch the Big Six? — has a mirror image at Anfield: what does the squad-cost era mean for a club already inside the walls?

Why the rules protect Liverpool — mostly

The 70% rule is a percentage of revenue — it doesn't cap spending, it caps spending relative to income. Liverpool's 70% of ~£700m buys a ~£490m squad; Villa's 70% of ~£510m buys ~£357m. That gap is locked in by design, and the FER kills the only ladder anyone ever actually climbed (spending ahead of revenue — the Abramovich/early-City route is now illegal). The compliance machinery even transfers talent toward big earners: Newcastle's exit route from their fines was selling Isak to... Liverpool. Revenue is the moat, and Anfield's is among the deepest in the sport.

Why the citadel can still fall

1 · Mistakes are finally permanent. Under PSR-era rules, a bad £400m window was survivable — just spend again. Under squad-cost rules, the 2025 spree's ~£75m/yr amortisation consumes finite headroom until 2030 whether Isak scores or not. United's £650m-for-one-top-four-finish is the cautionary tale, and Liverpool just had their most United-shaped season in a decade. 2 · The denominator is not guaranteed. Fifth place still pays CL money; eighth doesn't. A single season outside Europe cuts the revenue base ~£100m while the cost side barely moves — the ratio can deteriorate 8-10 points on results alone. 3 · The wage unwind was one-off. Salah, Konaté and Robertson's £33m/yr walks out once. The next contract renewals (Van Dijk and Alisson's 2027 expiries, Mac Allister's stalled talks) all add cost back. 4 · Efficiency still wins. The five-year table shows Brighton in profit and Bournemouth near break-even while finishing within touching distance — the model Iraola was hired FROM. The citadel's new defence is the same as the challengers' new weapon: buying well.

The bean counter's verdict: the squad-cost era rewards exactly two things — earning more and wasting less. Liverpool enter it with the biggest revenue in England, a clean charge sheet, and the most expensive unproven bet in football history sitting in the amortisation column. If Wirtz and Isak come good under Iraola, the 2025 window becomes a masterstroke financed at 70% of the deepest denominator in the league. If they don't, Liverpool will discover what United learned: under these rules, you can no longer buy your way out of having bought badly. Either way, the books will say so first — which is what this page is for.

Changelog

Every update to the Bean Counter's data, newest first. Maintained manually with each rebuild.

3 Sept 2026

Twenty-six sold players were sitting in “Retained” columns across fifteen clubs SITE-WIDE CORRECTION

Villa’s board was not the exception. It was the one somebody happened to be looking at. After Emiliano Martínez was found under “Retained” four days after his sale to Chelsea, the same pattern was checked across the other nineteen pages. Every club page carries these position boards — three columns each, who left, who stayed, who arrived — and at roughly forty-five chips a page that is about nine hundred hand-written claims, none of which any gate on this site could read, because they name players in free HTML rather than through a data array.

Twenty-six of them said a player had stayed when the club’s own deal table said he had been sold. The list is not marginal. Rodri sat under Manchester City’s “Retained · 6” tagged “REAL MADRID TALKS”; he had gone to Barcelona for £51m. Tijjani Reijnders (£52m, Al Qadsiah) and Nico González (£50m, Newcastle) were beside him. Carlos Baleba was retained at Brighton after a £65m move to Manchester United. Liam Delap was retained at Chelsea after £45m to Forest. Everton had five in one page — Ndiaye, McNeil, Beto, Iroegbunam and Patterson. Arsenal had Gabriel Jesus, Ipswich three, Hull two, Palace two, and so on across fifteen clubs.

Each one is now in the column it belongs in, with the destination and fee taken from the deal table rather than retyped. Column counts were recomputed from the chips actually present, so the headings match their own contents for the first time in a while. “Out · 0 — Nobody” placeholders were removed where a real departure now fills the column.

Worth recording how nearly this went wrong, because it is the second time today. The first script moved the chips and reported twenty-two successes. It had in fact deleted all twenty-two players: the insertion point never matched, the removal did, and the counts were recomputed afterwards so every column looked internally consistent. Nothing in the output said anything was missing. It was caught by reading one board back rather than by trusting the tally, and reverted. The rewrite asserts the set of names in a board before and after the edit and refuses to write when they differ — which then immediately caught a second, smaller error, and later a third: the pattern used to find a column was swallowing the last chip’s closing tag, so the final name in every column was invisible, which is why four clubs looked clean on the first pass and were not.

And a gate, the twenty-fifth. tools/check-flowboards.js asserts two things about every chip on every board: a name in a retained column must not be a completed permanent sale in that page’s OUT26, and a name in a retained column must exist in that page’s data at all. It says nothing about incoming or outgoing columns, where naming a target from another club is correct, and it exempts chips whose own tag places them outside the squad table — a third-choice keeper in contract talks, a U21 needing no registration. Its first run reported seventy-one problems, of which twenty-four were its own fault: typographic apostrophes it could not match to straight ones, and editorial labels like “Third keeper slot” that are not players. Tested against the pre-fix pages, where it finds exactly twenty-six.

The reason this sat unseen is worth stating plainly. The deal arrays are gated. The ratio inputs are gated. The squad table is gated. The answer block, the league tables and the share cards are all derived. These boards were the one substantial thing on every club page that was neither derived nor checked — prose in the shape of a table, in a heavily-read tab — and they had been drifting for as long as they have existed. It took a reader with the live page open to find the first one.

3 Sept 2026

Ten academy loans were missing, and the loan column was the blind spot OFFICIAL

This page had three of Liverpool’s thirteen outgoing loans. Now recorded: Calvin Ramsay (St Mirren), Calum Scanlon (Cardiff City), Amara Nallo (HJK Helsinki), Armin Pécsi (TSV Hartberg), Keyrol Figueroa (Port Vale), Emmanuel Airoboma (Burnley), DJ Bernard (Middlesbrough), Lucca Brughmans (KRC Genk), Kyle Kelly (Forest Green Rovers) and Kornel Misciur (Leek Town). Ifeanyi Ndukwe’s row said “destination TBC” while his own squad row two hundred lines away said Levante; it now says Levante too.

Why the gap existed, and it is structural rather than careless. Every gate on this site is built around deals with fees: guaranteed-fee checks, counterpart-fee checks, solidarity classification, book values. A fee-less academy loan trips none of them, so a page can be missing ten of them and read green. Nothing here was wrong. Things here were absent, and absence is the harder failure to see.

They are not nothing financially. Ten loans at an estimated £5–15k/wk is roughly £5m of basic pay leaving the wage bridge, which moved the input £319m → £312m and the ratio to 66.0%. Every wage here is an estimate and flagged as one, and no relief is assumed on any of them: no club publishes what share of an academy loanee’s salary the borrowing club carries, and where a loan goes down the pyramid the parent usually keeps paying most of it. That understates the benefit rather than overstating it, which is the right direction to be wrong in.

Kornel Misciur is at Leek Town, in non-league, and he is in the table. He is there because a page that lists only the loans it finds interesting is not a record of a window, it is a summary of one.

2 Sept 2026

The Saudi deadline was five weeks out, and it is four days CORRECTION

This morning’s work put the Saudi Pro League window at 12 October and built a countdown, a gate and seven card tags on it. A reader said that sounded wrong — they had read it was days away. They were right.

The sources disagree. Wikipedia and Goal put the registration period at 22 July to 6 September; one tracker says 11 September; Sports Mole and AgentFlow say 12 October. The tell is arithmetic: 22 July to 12 October is 11.7 weeks, essentially FIFA’s twelve-week maximum for a registration period. That reads like somebody published the longest period permissible rather than the date actually announced. 6 September is 6.6 weeks, an ordinary window.

It is now carried at 6 September — the earliest credible date, chosen deliberately. The conservative error here is the early one: saying a shut window is open invents deals, which is the exact failure the window gate was written this morning to prevent. The countdown now reads four days rather than forty.

What is still unresolved: no source reachable from here separates Saudi domestic registration from international, so no such split is modelled. If one exists it is the international deadline that governs a sale out of England, and 12 October may well be a domestic-only extension rather than simply wrong. The date is flagged as contested on the deadline page rather than asserted.

Worth naming the pattern: the 12 October figure came from a single search result, and the source family it came from has now been wrong four times in this project — Hincapié’s fee, Trafford’s club, Fofana’s club, and this. A date that anchors a gate deserved a second source before it was written into twenty-one pages.

2 Sept 2026

The window is shut, and the site now says so — except where it isn’t CORRECTION

The Premier League window closed at 11pm on 1 September, so from the 2nd no rumour card here can describe a signing as something still pending: a registration cannot be lodged outside the window, however well sourced the link was. 139 cards are now marked JANUARY and priced as January deals rather than deals that can be done today.

But “the window” is not one thing, and flattening it would be the opposite error. A club that cannot buy can still sell: the Saudi Pro League runs to 6 September and the Süper Lig to the 4th; MLS closed on the 2nd. Bundesliga clubs finished earliest, on 31 August; Serie A, LaLiga and the Premier League all shut on the 1st. Six cards survive because they point at a league that outlasted England’s, and each has had its destination narrowed to the club that can actually still act. The seventh has already gone. Leon Bailey, whose card read “Al Diriyah” after Sevilla and Hull ran out of time, signed for Olympiacos on 2 September for £3.4m — which is the point of this section in one transfer. The English window shutting does not stop an English club selling, and it did not stop this one. It also proves a window this table does not list: Greece was still open on 2 September, and no closing date for it could be sourced, so none is stored rather than guessed.

The first countdown clock had been reading DONE against a label saying “days to window close”. It now counts to the Saudi deadline on 6 September — the one transfer deadline that still constrains these clubs, because they can still sell into it.

tools/check-window-state.js holds it: a card with no jan flag is asserting the deal can happen now, so its destination must sit in a window open today. It is date-driven rather than a one-off sweep — on 5 September the Türkiye cards stop being live and the gate says so without anyone remembering. It found six on Fulham that the first pass missed, because those rows are written with double quotes where the rest of the site uses single.

The countdown gate had a matching blind spot: it skipped any page without a club nav and only knew one label shape, so deadline/ was invisible to it — and was still counting to 1am on 1 October, the exact GMT-versus-BST bug that gate was written for, fixed on twenty pages and left on the twenty-first. It now reads both shapes, both const and var, and every page that carries a clock.

2 Sept 2026

An eighteenth gate: no transfer recorded on only one page METHOD

The two worst misses of this window were both one-sided. Liam Delap’s £45m move from Chelsea to Nottingham Forest was on neither club’s page, and Daniel Muñoz’s £20m move from Crystal Palace to Forest was absent from both too. Between them that is £65m of Forest’s spending, and their absence had Forest reading as comfortably compliant when the club is in fact over the 85% limit.

Nothing on this site could see either. The counterpart check compares fees for a player who appears on both pages — a different question, and one that is silent when a row is simply missing. There is no contradiction to detect in an absence, only the absence itself, which is the same reason a completed deal can sit undisturbed in the Rumour Mill.

The new check asks the absence question directly: for every completed Premier League to Premier League deal, is there a matching row on the other club’s page? Loans are excluded, because the borrowing club may carry one as a squad row rather than an incoming deal, and academy moves are excluded, because a selling club has no book value in a youth player to record.

It found one live defect immediately. Robertson was “Andy” on Liverpool’s page and “Andrew” on Tottenham’s, and a name mismatch defeats the fee check exactly as it defeats this one — both gates were blind to him. The names are now standardised. Verified by deleting the Delap row and watching the gate name it, and both check.sh and CI run all eighteen.

2 Sept 2026

Barcola signed for £106m on 31 August and this page had him as a rumour MAJOR CORRECTION

The biggest miss this site has had. Liverpool announced Bradley Barcola on the eve of deadline day — £106m guaranteed plus £17m in add-ons, a five-year deal, the number 29 — and this page carried him on the Rumour Mill, tagged NOT AGREED, with the clubs £45m apart. Not a wrong number. An absent one, on the second-most expensive signing in the club’s history.

The page had even written down what to watch for. The overview callout asked whether the margin would “survive a Barcola-sized deal”, and then never went back when the deal happened. A question posed in prose is not a check; nothing on this site fails when the answer arrives and nobody records it.

What it does. Carried at the guaranteed £106m rather than the £123m package, the same rule every other add-on deal here is held to. That is £22.1m/yr of amortisation over the five-year cap with the levy, £10.6m of agent fee and about £16.1m of grossed wage — roughly £40m/yr, the largest single line on the page. The ratio goes 65.2% → 66.9% and headroom £37.5m → £24.5m, still inside the 70% limit. The window swing flips from a −£17.2m/yr saving to a +£16.6m/yr cost: the veterans leaving free no longer pays for the window. Committed spend goes £92.1m → £198.1m.

Two more were missing, found in the same sweep. Stefan Bajcetic joined Celta Vigo permanently for €1.5m (~£1.3m) plus add-ons with a buy-back retained — a small fee, but he was still in the squad table being counted for wages and amortisation he no longer costs. And Harvey Elliott went to Valencia on a season loan with no purchase option, while this page had him as an ongoing audition.

The squad-list consequence is the sharpest of them. Barcola takes the non-homegrown count from 16 to 17, which is the ceiling exactly, and the homegrown group from 6 to 5 with Elliott away and Jones sold. Five qualifiers caps the registerable squad at 22, not 25. Liverpool cannot now register another non-homegrown senior without one leaving.

The wage is the softest figure here and is flagged as such: no salary has been reported, and the £200k/wk estimate is set from Liverpool’s front-line band and from what PSG were offering him to stay. It is worth about a point of ratio either way.

31 Aug 2026

Three pages had the window shutting four hours early CORRECTION

Hull, Coventry and Newcastle counted down to 7pm on 1 September. The window shuts at 11pm, which is what the other seventeen pages said and what their clocks ran to. On the eve of deadline day, three club pages were telling readers they had four hours less than they did.

Both halves were wrong together, which is why nothing looked odd on those pages: the label said 7PM and the clock counted to 19:00, so they agreed with each other and disagreed with the rest of the site. The first fix here only corrected the labels, and the new gate immediately failed for the right reason, catching a symptom fixed without its cause.

Also tidied: a squad-list deadline written as “after the window closes (~2 September)”, where the date belongs to the list and the parenthetical made it read as hedging on the window itself. And the Premier League checkpoint countdown was set to midnight UTC on 1 October, which is one o’clock in the morning here, because it was stored as though Britain were on GMT in October rather than BST.

tools/check-countdowns.js now renders each stored target through Europe/London and compares it to the label written beside it. Timezone is the whole difficulty: 22:00 UTC is 11pm in September and would not be in December, so the two can only be compared after conversion. Broken on purpose in both directions before being trusted, once with a wrong label against a right clock and once the other way about.

This was found because a reader corrected something said in conversation, not by anything that runs. Sixteen gates check this site and none of them read a clock.

31 Aug 2026

The bolding was doing too much work — 2,316 signposts dropped EDITORIAL

A reader said the site reads as though a machine wrote it. That is worth measuring rather than arguing with, so it was measured.

The design came out fine. Claret and blue are the club’s own rather than the cream-and-terracotta that generated pages default to, the display face is Barlow Condensed rather than Inter, corners are three or four pixels rather than fully rounded, and there are five emoji on a 530KB page. Nothing there needed changing.

The prose was the problem, and one habit dominated: a bolded editorial sentence opening almost every paragraph. There were 2,612 of them, roughly one bold span every 62 words across half a million words of text. Bold is for things a reader scans for — a fee, a name, a date, a verdict. Used on the thesis of every paragraph it stops marking anything at all, and it is one of the most recognisable tells there is.

2,316 of those have gone. Figures, names, labels and short verdicts keep theirs. No wording changed anywhere, only tags, so nothing about the analysis moved and the whole pass reverts with one command. Density goes from one bold every 62 words to one every 85.

Two things this does not fix, stated plainly because the difference matters. The em-dash rate is 17.3 per thousand words against one to three in edited prose, and that needs a slower pass: a blanket substitution produces comma splices. And underneath both is a rhetorical habit no script reaches — signpost, then aphorism, then antithesis, three times a paragraph. That is the thing the reader actually noticed, and it has to be rewritten by hand.

One note on method: the first attempt stripped the bold from the two sentences that state the medical rule, which tools/check-deal-stage.js holds byte-identical across all twenty pages. The gate failed and the sentences are excluded now. It was written to guard a transfer convention and it caught a typography change, which is the argument for gating wording as well as arithmetic.

31 Aug 2026

Agent fees to 10%, the wage gross-up to 1.55x — both were too low, and the FA publishes the proof MODEL CHANGE

Two constants underneath every figure on this site have moved, at a reader’s prompting. The agent fee charged on a signing goes from 5% of the transfer fee to 10%, and the wage gross-up from 1.45x to 1.55x. Both were estimates that had never been checked against a published source. Both now have one.

The agent rate was checkable all along. The FA publishes what every club pays intermediaries. Between 4 February 2025 and 2 February 2026, Premier League clubs paid £460.3m — against the £3,137m of incoming fees this site records for that window, an implied rate of 14.7%, nearly three times the 5% being charged. Chelsea alone paid £65.1m, Aston Villa £38.4m. 10% is the figure taken, deliberately below the implied ceiling: the FA total also covers sales, loans and contract renewals, and only the buy-side portion is capitalised into a transfer’s cost. It is a floor with evidence under it rather than a rule of thumb.

The gross-up was missing a whole category of pay. It covered employer NI, bonuses and image rights — but not signing-on fees, and UEFA is explicit that they count. Annex G.3 of the Club Licensing and Financial Sustainability Regulations: all forms of consideration to and/or benefit of players, such as sign-on fees, must be treated as employee benefit expenses and not costs of a player’s registration. So they belong in the numerator, they sit with the wage rather than the amortisation, and they spread across the contract as a prepayment for services. Employer NI alone is 15%, so of the old 45% only about 30 points were doing the work of bonuses, image rights and signing-on fees together. 55% gives that last item somewhere to live.

What actually moved. League-wide, the annual cost this window adds rises from £1,257m to £1,330m. Twelve clubs’ wage inputs were re-derived by the bridge and reset to it; no club crossed a limit, and headline ratios moved by at most 0.9 of a point — mostly downwards, which is worth understanding rather than glossing: the gross-up applies to the net wage movement, and most clubs sold more wage than they bought, so a bigger multiplier makes a negative movement more negative. Every projection built on an old baseline was recomputed too, not just the baselines.

One piece of tidying that mattered more than it looks. The gross-up existed as a named constant and then as five hard-coded copies of 1.45 in the same file, on all twenty pages. They all now read the constant. A number duplicated a hundred times across a site is not a convention, it is a hundred chances to change ninety-nine of them.

30 Aug 2026

Nothing below a medical belongs in the Ins & Outs tables RULE CHANGE

Bradley Barcola leaves the Ins table — two bids rejected, PSG briefing that only €150m-plus would do, Sky calling it difficult to complete. Trey Nyoni leaves the Outs table, where a loan with no agreed destination had no business being; his new card models it as what it is, a wage leaving and nothing else, since an academy player carries no book value to write off.

The status ladder ran done → advanced → in talks → offer, and all four rungs were rendered as rows in the deal tables. The bottom two contributed nothing to any figure — every total on this site filters to done and advanced — which made them arithmetically harmless and editorially loud. A reader scanning the Ins table saw rows the club had never agreed to, in the same table, in the same shape, as business that is done. Being excluded from the totals is not visible; being in the table is.

The threshold is now a medical. A deal enters at advanced — terms agreed and the medical taken or booked, awaiting only an announcement — and moves to done when a club announces it. A loan row is an agreed loan. Everything short of that is interest, however well sourced, and interest lives in the Rumour Mill, where it can still be ticked and modelled against the ratio. Nothing has been deleted. A row that counted towards nothing still counts towards nothing; it is just no longer sitting where settled business sits.

Four figures did move, and they moved because they had been wrong. The headline ratios, the swing and the window balance all filter to done and advanced and were untouched. But the amortisation column added to the deal tables sums every row in the table with no filter at all, and writes its total into a footer labelled “TOTALS IN (confirmed/advanced)” — a total that named a filter it did not apply. The same total feeds the “Added by this window’s deals” and “Net change” lines under the run-off chart. So unagreed deals were being amortised into figures that said they excluded them:

  • Crystal Palace — added by this window’s deals +£12.4m/yr → +£6.6m/yr, nearly halved, because Le Guen (£12m) and Njie (£16m) were being amortised though neither fee exists; freed −£18.3m/yr → −£12.3m/yr; net −£5.9m → −£5.7m/yr.
  • Sunderland — added +£11.2m/yr → +£6.7m/yr and net change +£9.2m → +£4.8m/yr, on an asking price for Poku that no one had agreed to pay.
  • Brentford — added +£16.9m/yr → +£16.1m/yr, net +£16.5m → +£15.6m/yr.
  • Liverpool — totals out, wage ~£735k/wk → ~£725k/wk and cost freed £61m → £60.2m/yr, for a loan with no agreed destination.

The amortisation code has deliberately not been changed. Its filter is now the whole table, because the whole table is now business at a medical or beyond — and the fix belongs at the input, in one gate, rather than as a twenty-first copy of the same rule pasted into twenty pages of inline script. That is also the answer to why this survived: nothing compared a table’s footer against the label printed on it, and the rows doing the damage were invisible in every figure a reader would have checked.

Twelve rows moved across eight clubs, and the wording moved on all twenty. The ledes described the threshold nine different ways — “medical/verbal”, “option/verbal”, “talks/verbal”, “medical or negotiating” — and three of those promised a table that now excludes what they promised. One sentence states the rule on the Ins & Outs tab and its counterpart on the Rumours tab, identical on every page, and tools/check-deal-stage.js holds both to the letter as well as failing any deal row below the threshold. The gate was broken on purpose twice before being trusted: once by dropping a row’s stage entirely, which is the obvious way round a stage check, and once by adding a season array no hard-coded list would have known about.

30 Aug 2026

The Ins & Outs tab scrolled sideways on a phone, and so did every other tab CORRECTION

One table on this site sat outside a scroll container. The amortisation runoff — Season, Already here, This window, Combined — is 560px wide and had nothing but a margin on its wrapper, while every other table on the page sits inside .twrap with overflow-x:auto. At phone width it stretched the whole document about 200px past the viewport, and because it was the document scrolling rather than a box inside it, every tab slid sideways, not just the one containing the table. All twenty club pages, identically.

It is not new and it was not the Read more button. The version of this page from before that change overflows by exactly the same 597 pixels against a 390-pixel viewport, which is worth stating plainly rather than letting the newest change take the blame for the oldest bug.

Why it went unseen is the more useful part. The browser check that runs against every page loaded it at desktop width and never clicked a tab, so it could not have seen either half of this: not the narrow viewport, and not the tab the table lives on. It now runs at 390px and walks all twelve tabs on all twenty pages, failing on any page whose document scrolls horizontally. That costs real time on each run, which is the honest price of catching a class of fault that only exists on the device most readers use.

30 Aug 2026

The deal notes now fold away behind a button LAYOUT

The note under a player’s name is where the reasoning for a deal lives, and on the busiest rows it runs to several hundred words. Read end to end that is the point of the table; scrolled past on a phone it buries the row underneath and everything after it. Long notes now clamp to two lines with a Read more button, and short ones are left exactly as they were — a note that fits gets no furniture around it. The full text stays in the page whether or not it is open, so it is still searchable, copyable and printable.

It did not work the first time, and the reason is worth writing down. The clamp was styled on a single class, and the table already carried a td .glide-cap rule setting the notes to display as blocks — a more specific selector, so it won. The result was a button that toggled its own label and changed nothing else: the line-clamp property applied, the display property it depends on did not, and the note stayed full height. Checked in a browser at phone width rather than by reading the stylesheet, which is the only way that particular failure shows up.

30 Aug 2026

A sell-on reduces the profit, not just the cash — and the gate that should have said so was reading a different page CORRECTION

Asked whether everything a transfer actually contains was applied to the deals on this site, and one thing was not. A sell-on owed to a former club is a cost of the disposal: it comes off the profit booked, not only off the cash banked. This site deducted it from the window balance and the List A test and then left it out of profit entirely — and profit is what feeds the squad-cost denominator through the three-year average. It now comes off booked profit, so the only quantified clause on the site, Villa’s £15m to Middlesbrough on the £117m Rogers fee, is handled by the model rather than by hand.

The gate was passing green on a £15m disagreement, and the reason is worth recording. The trading bridge’s check pulls the profit function out of the page and runs it — but that function reaches outside its own block for the sell-on data, which the extract did not include. Undefined dependency, guard returns zero, and the checker quietly computed a different profit from the one the page computes. A checker that does not mirror the page is not checking the page. It now pulls its dependencies across too, and it failed immediately when it did.

No figure moves today. The £15m had already been taken off this club’s denominator by hand when the sell-on was first noticed; the anchor gives that third back so the arithmetic lands in the same place, and from here it flows automatically. The three other clauses on the site — Baleba, Reijnders and Chérif — are recorded as unquantified and still contribute nothing, which is honest rather than convenient: the exposure is real and the percentage has never been reported.

30 Aug 2026

Six homegrown players, so the squad caps at 23 — and no amount of money moves it NEW

The domestic quota arrives on this page, and it changes the reading of the squad. Liverpool have 22 of the 25 places used with three unused — but only one of them can actually be filled. 5 homegrown and 17 non-homegrown means the seventeen non-homegrown ceiling is now reached exactly, and it runs out before the twenty-five does, capping the squad at 23. That is the case the rule’s own explanation gives as a hypothetical, happening here for real.

It is not a spending problem and cannot be spent away. Another forward takes a non-homegrown slot; only a homegrown signing, or an academy player crossing 21 with three English seasons behind him, lifts the ceiling. Five players are under 21 — Jacquet, Leoni, Nyoni, Ngumoha and Danns — and play free of the list entirely, which is the only reason a squad this size fits at all. Ifeanyi Ndukwe, the sixth teenager, is at Levante and not registered.

Both directions of the rule are on show. Jeremie Frimpong is Dutch and qualifies — nine years in the Manchester City academy from the age of 9. Virgil van Dijk does not: Celtic is affiliated to the Scottish FA, which the test does not recognise, and Southampton came at 24. Milos Kerkez misses by a year, with two Bournemouth seasons where three were needed.

Why it was missing until now. This page has always carried UEFA’s List A and never the domestic quota — a different rule with different arithmetic. It was built for one club eleven months ago and the commit that shipped it said the other nineteen would follow. They did not, because a missing feature breaks no gate and nothing was watching for absence. Every player now carries a date of birth and a stated qualifying basis, so the counts derive from the squad table and the same headcount gate that holds every other page holds this one.

30 Aug 2026

The sale-profit input now derives itself, like the wage input above it METHOD

in-psp is the three-year average player-trading profit in the squad-cost denominator, and it was hand-set on all twenty pages. The failure mode is the one the wage bridge was built to stop, one input along: a sale completes, its profit is booked in the table, and the figure meant to carry a third of it stays where somebody last typed it. It only ever moved when whoever booked the deal remembered — which is the definition of a number that will eventually be wrong.

The page now shows its working beside the input: the earlier years’ contribution, plus this window’s booked profit divided by three, because UEFA smooths player-trading profit over three years so one window enters at roughly a third. Booked means done and not a loan — an advanced deal has not completed and its profit is not in the accounts, which is also the convention this page was already kept on. The profit is net of the FIFA solidarity taken out of a foreign sale.

One thing about the anchor is worth stating rather than glossing. The earlier years’ figure is carried forward from the number this page already used, not sourced from published accounts, so the bridge agrees with today’s input by construction. It earns its keep from here on, by moving when a deal lands. Tested by planting a completed sale into the tables and leaving the input alone: the gate said the denominator was £20m short, which is exactly the silence it exists to break.

30 Aug 2026

A sale can lose money once FIFA has taken its 5%, and the formatter could not write it down CORRECTION

Modelling solidarity produced the site’s first negative profit on a completed sale. Villa banked ~£8.08m of Lucas Digne’s £8.5m fee against a book value of £8.5m, so that deal is a small loss rather than a break-even — which is the correct answer, and one the gross-fee basis could never produce.

The money formatter could not render it. It put the pound sign first and the minus wherever the number happened to start, so the cell read “£-0.4m” against a site that writes −£0.4m everywhere else. Nineteen pages had that version. Bournemouth had the correct one, negative-aware, written when its own trading profit went below zero — so the fix was to adopt the version already in the codebase rather than invent a twentieth. All twenty now share one formatter.

Checked in a browser rather than by inspection, because the failure this could introduce is a doubled sign where a caller already prepends its own minus: no malformed negative on any of the twenty, and no JavaScript error.

30 Aug 2026

FIFA takes 5% of every fee sold abroad, and this site had been booking 100% of it CORRECTION

Asked what else is inside a completed deal that these numbers miss, and the answer was the solidarity contribution. 5% of any international transfer fee is deducted from the fee and shared among the clubs that trained the player between 12 and 23. The mechanics decide who pays: the buying club hands over the headline number and distributes the 5% out of it, so a purchase costs exactly the fee already capitalised here — nothing was wrong on that side. The selling club banks 95%. Every profit booked on a sale abroad was therefore 5% too high, across all twenty pages, from launch. Around £28m league-wide.

On this page it is £1.28m, from the foreign sales of Curtis Jones. That comes off booked profit, and a third of it off the denominator, because sale profit feeds the squad-cost ratio through a three-year average.

The glossary had been claiming this was modelled the whole time. It said the 4% Premier League levy and FIFA’s 5% solidarity contribution both capitalise into registration cost — true of the levy, true of solidarity for a buyer, and quietly untrue of the thing that actually matters, which is what a seller keeps. Documentation that describes a calculation the code does not perform is worse than no documentation, because it stops anyone looking.

It is derived, not typed. The deduction comes from where the player went, which puts all the weight on classifying a destination — and getting that wrong is silent: an English club missing from the list costs its seller 5% of a fee it actually keeps, and no total looks odd. So tools/check-solidarity.js refuses to classify by default. Every fee-carrying destination must be a club one of the two lists already knows; a name in neither fails until a human decides which it is. The gate also holds the twenty inline copies of the classifier to being identical, for the same reason the wage gross-up is a single constant.

One assumption is recorded rather than hidden: Cardiff, Newport, Swansea and Wrexham are Welsh clubs inside the English pyramid, and are treated here as domestic because their registrations run through the English system.

Also documented, deliberately not changed: add-ons are modelled all-in on a purchase and guaranteed-only on a sale. That asymmetry makes the buy column a best case and the sell column a conservative one, and it now says so on the page instead of being visible only to whoever recomputes the fees.

30 Aug 2026

Wages in the deal tables were understated by 45%, and the sentence describing the fix was wrong on nine other pages CORRECTION

The site grosses wages by 1.45 to cover employer NI, bonuses and image rights — everywhere except the two columns readers actually look at. The cost of an arrival and the relief from a departure in the Incomings and Outgoings tables were built from raw weekly wages, so every one of them understated the real charge. Both columns are now grossed through a single GROSS constant, so they cannot come apart again. The headline ratio does not move: it is computed from the wage, amortisation and agent inputs, which were already on the grossed basis. What moves is the Net SCR Swing card and the two columns feeding it.

Which is where the second problem was. The swing is derived from the deal arrays and was therefore right the moment the gross-up landed — but the same figure is also typed into the overview callout, and typed figures do not move. The cost swing in the overview read ≈£0m/yr against a computed −£16m/yr. Palace’s was the clearest case: it read “still negative” where the page computed a positive swing, so the sentence was not stale but inverted.

Nothing showed this in a browser. A small script copies the derived card into the overview span at load, so the screen self-healed while the file stayed wrong — the same failure as the share card that displayed correctly and shipped a stale number to anyone who read the source. tools/check-overview-figures.js now runs the page’s own formulas against the page’s own arrays and fails on any stated swing or profit that disagrees, in the callout or in prose. The changelog is excluded, because a dated entry is a record.

Two more holes closed while the gate was being written. The baseline gate knew five ways of phrasing a ratio and not the one in the most-read sentence on every page, which is how City carried “~65% ratio vs the 70% wall” against a computed 57.1%; it now reads that shape too. And tools/check-parity.js checks that CI runs every gate the local suite runs — twice a gate had been wired into one and not the other, and both times it was caught by eye rather than by anything.

30 Aug 2026

Ten answer blocks disagreed with their own pages — and the rule that lets that happen is now written down CORRECTION

The answer block is the first paragraph on every club page and the one a search engine quotes. It states four things that are all derivable — the ratio, the headroom or overshoot, what the club has banked from sales, what it has committed on signings — and only the ratio had a gate. Ten of the twenty disagreed with their own data. Brighton said £91.9m banked against £156.9m of completed sales; Manchester United £89m committed against £154m; Sunderland £0m against £32.6m; Forest was wrong on all three. Every answer block is now written from the deal tables and the ratio inputs rather than typed, and a gate holds them there.

One of the ten was two days old and mine. Manchester City’s said “£338m banked from sales”, which came from reading a total that includes advanced deals into a sentence that says banked. It is £288m. Advanced business is committed, not banked, and the gate now applies that distinction rather than trusting whoever writes the sentence to remember it.

Chelsea, Fulham and Ipswich stated no headroom at all, because they are over their line and the sentence had been written for clubs that are under it. They now say by how much: −£23.3m, −£19.2m and −£17.7m per year.

And the underlying rule is now recorded in the repo rather than relied on. A club page is twelve sections plus the head, the same quantity is stated in several of them, and every significant error here has had one shape: a figure corrected where somebody noticed it and left standing everywhere else. tools/echoes.js reports which sections state a given figure before it is edited, and the gates that exist because of this rule are listed alongside it. Anything derivable gets derived; anything typed gets a gate.

30 Aug 2026

No gate had ever read a headcount CORRECTION

Ten gates run on every build and not one of them counted players. They read percentages, deal statuses, transfer rows, bar widths and card images — so a sentence saying “nineteen senior players, six places unused” could sit beside a card correctly showing 22 and 3, indefinitely, with everything green.

There is now a gate that recounts from the squad table, using the page’s own registration rule rather than a second copy of it: a player is on the list unless he is loaned out or under 21 on the season’s cut-off, and the cut-off is read from the page rather than assumed. It checks the registered total, the homegrown and non-homegrown split, the free places and the under-21 count, in both digits and words.

It missed one of its own test cases on the first run. “Six more players are under 21” begins a sentence, so the word is capitalised, and a lowercase-only pattern walked straight past it — found only by planting each stale figure back and checking the build failed. Four claim types, four confirmed failures, then green. A check you have not watched fail is a guess about what it catches.

30 Aug 2026

The hero stat cards were three-across on a phone, and four of them left an orphan LAYOUT

Reported on Villa: three columns on a 430px screen squeezed the longest card into a ribbon, and because that page carries four cards rather than three, the fourth dropped alone onto a second row beside two empty cells. Below 760px the grid is now two columns, which gives Villa a clean 2×2.

The other nineteen pages carry three cards, so two columns would have left an orphan there instead. A lone last card now spans the full row rather than sitting beside a hole — so three reads as two-then-one and four reads as two-and-two, without a special case for either.

Desktop had the same orphan and nobody had mentioned it. Four cards in a fixed three-column grid is unbalanced at every width, not just on a phone. The grid fits its own content now, so Villa gets four across on a wide screen and the three-card pages are unchanged. Measured at 390, 430 and 1400px rather than eyeballed.

And the card that caused it got shorter. Villa’s List A churn description had just been lengthened to fix an arrival count, which is what made it tower over its neighbour. The names moved out — they are on the Ins & Outs tab — and every figure in it stayed.

30 Aug 2026

A stale ratio phrased one way slipped a gate built for another CORRECTION

The prose-baseline gate catches “roughly N% of football revenue”. It did not catch “sit at roughly N%”, which is how the glossary phrases the same claim — so a stale ratio could sit in a definition indefinitely while the identical statement in the FAQ was checked on every build. Found on Villa, where the glossary was two revisions behind the page.

Extending the rule found the same fault on three more pages nobody had asked about. Arsenal’s glossary said 64% against 66.1% computed; Fulham’s said 90% against 94.0%; Ipswich’s said the ratio “sits at roughly 85% — on the line” when it is 94.6%, about ten points over. Ipswich’s sentence also quoted a “~£106m gross window” that the deal table puts at ~£147m. That one was wrong twice and read as reassurance both times.

A gate that matches one phrasing of a claim is a gate against that phrasing, not against the claim. Both forms are checked now, and the extension was tested by planting the old figure back and confirming the build fails.

30 Aug 2026

Both loan bars read as full when only one quota was used CORRECTION

Reported by a reader looking at Villa on a phone, and right. The card showed two full amber bars, so both ceilings looked hit — when the line under the second one said 6 of 6 international slots still free. Only the domestic quota was used. The bar was hard-coded to 100% and had nothing to do with the sentence beneath it.

Every one of these bars was a literal width typed in beside the text it was meant to summarise. That is the same fault as the headline reading “1 + 6 Left” above a body saying none left, which already had a gate; the bar had simply never been looked at. They are derived now — “N of M remaining” means M−N used, and the width and the colour come from that, so the picture and the sentence cannot disagree. Amber only when nothing is left, which is the point at which a quota starts deciding what a club can do.

Writing the check found four more pages the report had not mentioned. Fulham, Ipswich, Tottenham and Coventry each had a quota line with no bar above it at all, so the international ceiling was invisible on those cards. And Chelsea’s international bar sat at 33% beside a sentence that stated no count whatsoever — nothing could have derived it and nobody could have checked it. That line now says 5 of 6 senior slots remaining and shows its working: Badiashile at Napoli is the one senior non-club-trained loan abroad, with Antwi and Murray-Campbell treated as academy and therefore exempt. Disagree with that classification if you like — the point is that it is now possible to.

The gate checks the source, not just the screen. Villa’s rendered card was fixed by the derivation the moment it was added, while the hard-coded 100% was still sitting in the file — correct in the browser, wrong in the thing a checker reads and the thing that renders before any script runs. Both are right now, and the gate compares the typed width against the stated numbers so a hand edit cannot quietly reintroduce it.

30 Aug 2026

Deep audit of the rules and the inputs: the wage figure had drifted from its own derivation on five clubs CORRECTION

The rule constants are unanimous across all twenty pages and all correct — the £105m PSR cap, the €60m earnings limit, the five-year amortisation cap and its 1 July 2023 start, the 4% Premier League levy, the 1 January 2005 under-21 cut-off, 17 non-homegrown of 25, two concurrent domestic loans and six international. Thirty-nine separate statements of the five-year cap; not one disagreed with another. That is the half of this audit with nothing to report, and it is worth reporting that it has nothing to report.

Every club’s cap now agrees with its European status. In Europe the UEFA line is 70%, outside it the Premier League’s is 85% — fifteen points of headroom turning on a single yes/no, asserted in three places at once and checked in none. All twenty agree: nine in Europe at 70%, eleven outside at 85%. A gate now enforces it, because a club’s European status is exactly what changes between seasons.

The real finding is the wage input. This site’s stated convention is that the wage figure IS the wage bridge’s own derivation on every accounts-basis club — that is what makes the league table comparable, and what makes the input track the window instead of sitting at a pre-window figure nobody updates. It had decayed on five clubs, because deals get booked by hand and the input gets nudged by hand with them, and a nudge drifts from the derivation the moment the arithmetic differs by a rounding. Tottenham were £22m adrift. All five are now set to the derivation and a gate holds them there. Promoted clubs are correctly exempt and the bridge explains why in its own text: a wage bill roughly doubles on going up, so last season’s accounts are the wrong anchor in both directions at once.

One club changes compliance status as a result. Bournemouth go from 69.8% to 71.2% — from just inside the 70% cap to about £3.4m/yr over it, in their first European season, on the tighter cap that European qualification brings. Tottenham move 64.6% to 68.3%, Forest 81.9% to 82.7%, Manchester City 57.7% to 57.1%, Villa 64.0% to 63.8%.

And two more pages were flooring their headroom at zero. Ipswich read “£0m of room” while sitting £17.8m/yr over the 85% line; Bournemouth would have done the same on crossing it. The same defect was fixed on Palace four days ago and not looked for elsewhere — which is the lesson, not the bug. Both now state the overshoot.

What the audit could not do. Every football site and reference database is blocked from this environment, so the transfer tables were reconciled internally — squad rows against deal rows, amortisation floors against inputs, both sides of every intra-league move — and checked externally only as far as search summaries allow. Internally they reconcile on all twenty clubs. That is a real guarantee about consistency and not a guarantee about completeness, and the £50m signing found missing yesterday is what the difference looks like.

30 Aug 2026

The share card is now checked like everything else — and two gates had never run in CI at all CORRECTION

Rebuilding the cards fixed today’s figures and fixed nothing about tomorrow’s. A generator someone has to remember to run is exactly what produced a card reading 60.2% four days out of date, so the question is not whether the cards are right now but whether they can go wrong again quietly. A gate now recomputes the card’s figures from the page and compares them against the token the builder stamped into the meta tag. Move any input — a wage, a fee, a sale — and the build fails until the card is rebuilt. It was tested by nudging Villa’s wage input and confirming the failure, and by stripping the token to confirm that fails too.

The builder and the gate read the figures through one shared module. Two copies of the same calculation drifting apart is the failure this site has hit more than any other, and it would be absurd to reintroduce it in the check designed to prevent it.

And checking the CI list against the local one turned up a real gap. Two gates — the one that catches stale ratio figures in prose, and the loan-quota headline check — existed, worked, and had never run in CI. They only ran when someone ran the full suite by hand, which means a direct push could have deployed stale numbers with a green tick. Both now run on every push, and the two lists are asserted to match. The prose-baseline gate is the one that has caught the most this week, and it was the one running least often.

30 Aug 2026

The share cards were showing a ratio four days and six deals out of date CORRECTION

The squad cost ratio is printed into the card image itself, which is fine until the ratio moves. Villa’s card said 60.2% against a page saying 64.0% — the figure from before the Goretzka wage correction, and before Jackson, Martínez, Suzuki, Ruggeri and the rest. Anyone sharing the link was posting a number this site had stopped believing on 27 August. Chelsea’s said 83% against 88.7%; Manchester City’s said ~65% against 57.7%.

There was no generator. The cards were made once, by hand, on 26 August and left, so nothing could have kept them current. There is one now: tools/build-og-cards.js reads every figure from the page it belongs to and rebuilds all twenty, and it runs like any other build step.

Cache-busting is the part that actually matters for sharing. X and Facebook cache a card image against its URL for days, so replacing the file in place does nothing for a link anyone has already posted. Each card’s meta tag now carries a version token derived from the figures on it, so the URL changes exactly when the picture changes and not otherwise.

The number is now coloured the way the page colours it — green three points clear of the limit, amber up to it, red past it. A card showing Ipswich at 94.6% against an 85% line in the same neutral cream as one showing Manchester United at 56.9% throws away the only thing a reader takes from a shared image.

And a gate now checks the alt text against the computed ratio, because that was stale too and in a way nobody would ever notice: six pages carried figures in the card’s alt attribute that no longer matched, including one that had never matched any published base. It was tested by planting the old 60.2% and confirming the build fails.

30 Aug 2026

Full pre-deadline audit of all 20 clubs — one £50m transfer was missing entirely SWEEP

Nico González, Manchester City to Newcastle, ~£50m, completed and announced. Medical taken, presented to supporters before the West Brom cup tie, No.6 shirt issued — and absent from both pages. It is the largest single omission this site has had to correct, and it moved two ratios materially: City 60.4% → 57.7% with headroom out to £100.2m, Newcastle 70.8% → 74.7% with headroom down to £46.8m against their 85% line. The fee is reported as reaching £50m after add-ons, so the guaranteed portion is lower and unpublished; £50m is carried on both sides because a counterpart has to agree, and it is flagged. The same number cannot be conservative for both clubs at once — it flatters City’s profit while overstating Newcastle’s charge — and that is stated rather than smoothed over.

Everything else checked out, which is the more useful result. Forty-odd names drawn from external reporting were tested against the pages one by one and every single one was already there. Where the reporting and this site disagreed, this site was right: one summary placed Detourbet, Monga and Rulli at Nottingham Forest when all three are Manchester City signings, and another had Bouaddi at Forest when City announced him.

Two numeric errors found by audit rather than by reading. Manchester City’s Kalvin Phillips loan credited £11.3m of relief when a loan frees the wage and none of the amortisation — the registration stays, and so does the charge. Corrected to £7.8m. Nottingham Forest’s Gustavo Sá loan freed nothing at all when Olympiacos pay his wages; corrected to £1.8m. Two more outgoing loans, at Leeds and Liverpool, carried no loan flag, so the amortisation book and the List A gate were treating them as permanent sales.

Eight new checks, and they were run against real data before being trusted. A completed permanent signing must have a squad row; a sold player must not still be in one; a destination reading “loan” must carry a loan flag; no duplicate squad rows; no fee without contract dates; no end date before the signing date; no signing dated in the future; no expired contract still in the squad. All eight are clean across all twenty clubs, and two were deliberately broken to confirm they fail. Three earlier checks this week passed on their first run because they were wrong, not because the data was right, so nothing goes in now without being made to fail first.

What this sweep cannot claim. Every football site, news aggregator and reference database is blocked from this environment, so external checking is search summaries only — and those summaries mixed up clubs twice in this pass alone. The internal consistency of these pages is now verified exhaustively and mechanically. Their completeness against the real world is verified as far as search allows, which is not the same thing, and the González miss is what that gap looks like.

30 Aug 2026

The stale-rumour gate could only see half the market — two more boards were selling players who had left CORRECTION

Yesterday’s gate checked live rumours against completed incomings at other clubs. That catches a player who moved between Premier League clubs and nothing else. Two whole classes of exit were invisible to it, and both had live cards sitting on boards.

A player sold abroad appears in no incoming table anywhere. Spurs sold Cristian Romero to Atlético Madrid and announced it on 15 August; Arsenal’s board went on offering him to the scenario modeller for a fortnight. The gate now reads completed outgoing rows as well, taking the destination from the row itself — which is derivable, and should have been there first time.

And a move between two non-Premier-League clubs is recorded on no page at all. Bayern sold João Palhinha to Benfica on 26 August — €14m plus up to €5m, contract to 2030 — and Newcastle’s card still read “door ajar again”. Nothing structural could ever have caught that, so there is now a small list at tools/gone.json for exactly this case, and the gate fails against it. Two names so far: Palhinha, and Leão to Galatasaray.

One false positive, worth recording because it nearly shipped. The first version read Jadon Sancho’s outgoing row — destination “Free agent” — as him having joined a club called Free agent, and would have killed two perfectly live cards. A released player has left a club and joined nobody: he is more signable, not less. Release destinations are now excluded, while a row naming an onward club after an arrow still counts. All three arms were then tested by un-flagging a closed card and checking the gate fired, because a check nobody has seen fail is not yet a check.

Cards closed: Romero (Arsenal), Palhinha (Newcastle), Cho (Hull, where Hull themselves ended the talks on 10 August). Each keeps its note as the record and leaves the modeller.

30 Aug 2026

The Mbaye card is all but gone — Villa agreed with PSG and he has had the medical DEMOTED

Aston Villa reached agreement with PSG around €55m and Mbaye took a medical on 29 August. The card is demoted to reflect it and left on the board. It is not marked dead, because no club has announced him and a medical is not a signature — the same standard this site applied to Jackson, Savinho and Baleba. If Villa announce, a gate will fail this card as a live rumour for a player who has gone, and it will be closed then.

30 Aug 2026

Dead rumours were still tickable — three players could be “signed” on boards they had already left CORRECTION

The scenario modeller priced any card you ticked, including cards whose own tag said the player was gone. Newcastle’s board offered Nicolas Jackson after he had joined Villa; the tag read “DEAD — JOINED ASTON VILLA” and ticking it still moved the ratio. Liverpool’s offered Ezri Konsa, an Arsenal player since 20 August. Chelsea’s offered Ousmane Diomande, who is at Forest. This site has named that exact contradiction in its own changelog — “a completed deal and a live rumour for the same player” — and then kept shipping it, because nothing was looking for it.

Now something looks. A gate fails any live incoming rumour naming a player who has completed a move to another club, which is derivable from the transfer tables rather than from a tag somebody remembered to type. Only incoming cards are checked: an outgoing rumour naming a player another club has signed is the same move seen from the selling side, and that is correct. It found all three on its first run.

Dead cards now stay on the board and leave the model. They keep their note as the record of what a club looked at, greyed, with the tick removed and the impact line replaced by “no longer available”. Deleting them would lose the history; leaving them live was worse.

30 Aug 2026

Deadline-week sweep: four announced deals the tables had missed, and a gate that was crying wolf SWEEP

Four deals were sitting at “advanced” after their clubs had announced them. Bouaddi to Manchester City — announced on the club’s own site on 26 August, and carried here as unannounced for four days, with the prose quoting “~£95m/€110m… agreed in principle” when the real deal is £81.3m fixed plus £4.3m of add-ons on a contract to 2031. Badiashile to Napoli, announced 22 August. Disasi to Crystal Palace, announced 26 August by both clubs. And Emi Martínez to Chelsea, announced by Villa on 30 August. All four are now booked, with the ratios on five pages moving as a result.

The Disasi loan is the one with a consequence nobody was watching. Palace were sitting a whisker inside the 70% cap that their European qualification imposes. Taking a £120k/wk centre-back on loan added ~£9.0m/yr of grossed wages and put them over it — a loan, with no fee, no amortisation and no transfer to report, moving a compliance position that a £30m signing would have been scrutinised for. This page has argued all summer that loans are treated as free when they are not; this is the arithmetic saying it.

And the prose-baseline gate was flagging a correct sentence. It reads any “roughly N% of football revenue” as a claim about the club’s own ratio — but “capped at roughly 70% of football revenue” describes the LIMIT, and Palace’s page says exactly that, twice. A gate that fails on correct text is worse than one that stays quiet, because the next person learns to skim past it. It now ignores the phrase when cap or limit wording precedes it, and it still fails on a genuinely stale figure — checked by planting one before shipping.

28 Aug 2026

The league window table was wrong on 19 of its 20 rows — and an edit ate two deal rows without a single gate noticing CORRECTION

The “Who’s Selling to Survive” table is a derivation and had stopped being one. Its own caption defines it exactly — disclosed fees on officially completed 2026 deals, loans and frees excluded — so every figure in it can be recomputed from the transfer tables it summarises. Nineteen of the twenty rows disagreed with those tables. Six clubs were shown as having spent nothing at all, including Newcastle at £0 against £174.9m of completed incomings and Manchester City at £0 of sales against £238m. The rows were hand-maintained, the pages moved on, and nothing compared the two. All twenty are now derived from the pages, with the hand-written notes kept, and a gate recomputes them so the table cannot drift from the deals again.

The second fault is worse, because it was self-inflicted and invisible. Promoting Jackson spliced his row out of one array and into another by matching the next }, — and deal rows share source lines, so the edit swallowed whatever followed on the same line. Goretzka’s incoming row vanished from Villa and Kellyman’s outgoing row from Chelsea. All eight gates passed. A missing row breaks no parse, satisfies every invariant, and simply makes the totals smaller — and nothing on the page knew what they should have been.

Two things now catch it. A squad player signed inside the window must also appear in the incoming table, which is a real structural invariant: the squad row survives when the deal row dies, so it is the witness. That check found a third case immediately, one nobody had touched today — Forest’s Gustavo Sá has had a squad row since July, with a book value and an amortisation charge, and his incoming row was never written. A changelog entry from that sweep claims he was added “both halves of him”. One half was missing. And for outgoing rows, which leave no trace on the page once the player has gone, there is now tools/diff-rows.js: it reports every deal row added or removed against a git ref, to be read before committing rather than after.

20 Aug 2026

Two method changes: the five-year cap, and the wage input becomes the derivation METHOD

The ratio moves from 64.1% to 66.2% (wages 301→318).

The five-year cap, finally applied. This site's glossary has always described the rule that fees must be amortised over a maximum of five years however long the contract — and the code did not do it, spreading every fee across the whole contract instead. An eight-year deal was therefore charged at five-eighths of its true annual cost. The cap now applies to contracts signed from 1 July 2023, when it took effect; earlier deals are left alone, which correctly grandfathers the January 2023 contracts that prompted the rule and avoids capping long spans that are really a record of extensions rather than of one contract.

And the wage input is now the derivation. The wage bridge has been showing a derived figure beside a hand-set input since it was built, and on most pages the two disagreed. The hand-set number was anchored to a pre-window figure and never tracked the window, which is why the inputs sat high at clubs that sold heavily and low at clubs that bought. The input is now the derivation on all fourteen accounts-basis clubs, so it updates itself as deals land and the same method produces every club's number. That is what makes the league table comparable, which was the point of building the bridge.

What has not changed is how good the number is. It still rests on two assumptions — 80% of staff cost being players and coaches, and a 1.45x gross-up — and the bridge still shows both. Agreement between input and derivation means they are consistent, not that they are right.

27 Aug 2026

A free transfer was costing the window totals nothing at all — £35.7m/yr across six pages CORRECTION

The cost-per-arrival calculation returned zero for any signing without a fee unless the row also carried a loan flag. So a free signing’s wages vanished from “cost added by this window” entirely. Goretzka was showing as costing Villa £0.0m. On the very page whose card argues that “the free one is the expensive one — a fee buys an asset that amortises and can be sold, a wage buys nothing and recurs”. The card was right and the arithmetic underneath it dropped the wage.

£35.7m/yr was missing across six pages: Villa £13.6m (Goretzka, Özcan, Guessand), Palace £8.1m (McNeil, Guessand), Liverpool £7.8m (Araújo), Everton £4.9m (Johnson), Coventry £1.1m, Fulham £0.2m. Villa’s window swing moves from +£12.4m/yr to +£26.0m/yr.

There were seven different versions of that one line across twenty pages, each special-casing frees and loans slightly differently, and the differences were exactly what caused this. They are now one formula — the one Hull already used: amortisation and the agent fee when there is a fee, and the wage on every arrival, fee or not.

And it exposes something this card cannot fix by itself. The List A gate carried a hand-typed margin of “Villa pass by ~£3.5m/yr” on the cost-based test. The page’s own sums now put the window at adding ~£26m/yr. That figure predates Jackson and Watkins, and the window totals count wages ungrossed while the ratio grosses them, so the two were never on one basis. The cost-based margin is now marked UNVERIFIED rather than passing — the fee-based balance above it is sound, that one is not, and saying so beats printing a number that cannot be reproduced.

27 Aug 2026

A headline that contradicted its own paragraph — and nine more stale ratios behind it CORRECTION

Villa’s loan-quota card said “1 + 6 Left” in green, directly above a paragraph reading “0 of 2 concurrent remaining” and “ROOM: none left domestically”. Wan-Bissaka’s loan on 18 August took the second slot. The body was updated; the big number at the top was not. So the figure a reader sees first said a slot was free while the text underneath called the same thing a binding constraint. The bar sat at 50% with nothing left, and the card was still green. Crystal Palace had the same shape — “2 + 6” above “1 of 2”, left over from before the Guessand loan.

The failure runs one way every time: the prose gets edited and the summary above it does not. tools/check-quotas.js now fails when a loan-quota headline disagrees with its own body, including when the room note says “none left” and the headline disagrees. Verified by sabotage — put the wrong number back and it fails on exactly that.

Then the baseline gate was widened and found nine more. It was matching “ratio is X%” and “X% → Y%” but not the Quick Answers phrasing, “roughly 63% of football revenue” — which is the plain-English answer a reader or a search engine is most likely to lift. Brentford were claiming 75% while computing 84.9%. Manchester City 65% against 57.3%. Newcastle 74% against 70.8%. Ten pages rebased from their own inputs.

Two gates, two days, and both found more than the bug that prompted them. That is the argument for writing the check rather than the fix: the fix closes one hole, the check tells you how many others there were.

27 Aug 2026

The baseline gate had a hole in it and was passing on what it could not see CORRECTION

The gate shipped this morning excluded the changelog by truncating each page at <section id="log">. The data arrays holding every rumour card sit in a script block after that point. So it was scanning 167KB of a 422KB page, never saw a single card’s projection, and reported green.

It now removes only that section and keeps the rest. On the first honest run it immediately found eleven stale figures across three pages — every Villa projection still quoting a baseline two changes old, and two on Chelsea. All recomputed.

A gate with a hole in it is worse than no gate, because no gate makes you check and a green one stops you looking. This one was written, tested against the case that prompted it, and shipped — and the case that prompted it happened to sit in the part of the file it could still see.

One rule came out of it. A live rumour card may state a projection, because the gate now keeps it honest against the current base. A completed deal may not: “60.2% → 63.4%” was true the day it was written and decays the moment anything else moves, and the effect is already in the headline. Those now state what the deal costs instead.

27 Aug 2026

A new gate: does the prose still quote the ratio the page computes? CORRECTION

Twelve of the twenty pages were asserting a squad cost ratio their own inputs no longer produced. Manchester City claimed 63.0% while computing 57.3%. Manchester United said 53.9% against 56.9%, Sunderland 60.9% against 63.2%, Coventry 69.7% against 71.0%. Every one has been rebased from the page’s own figures.

Most of it sat in the answer paragraph and its structured-data twin — the text search engines and AI crawlers read before anything else, which makes it the worst place on the page to be stale. The headroom figures beside them were rebased too.

Nothing was catching this. The status gate reads deal status; the invariants gate reads the arrays; neither reads a percentage in a sentence. It surfaced only because a single free transfer moved one club’s baseline and the knock-on was visible. tools/check-baselines.js now recomputes every page’s ratio from its inputs and fails on prose asserting a different one, and it runs with the rest on every change.

Two things it deliberately does not flag. A sentence reading “68.6% → 62.0%” where 62.0% is the current ratio is a completed move being described, not a stale claim, so a done deal can still say what it did. And the changelog is excluded entirely: a dated entry recording August’s number is the record, and rewriting it to match today would be the opposite of what this tab is for.

26 Aug 2026

The amortisation graph now splits the squad you had from the squad you bought FEATURE

One bar was hiding the more interesting number. The run-off now stacks two series — the squad that was already here in blue, and everyone signed this window in amber — with both totals and a combined figure above it, and a per-season split beside each bar.

It changes what the chart says about a club. A settled squad shows a thin amber band on a thick blue one; a rebuild inverts it. Coventry carry £14.0m already here against £28.9m signed this window, so two-thirds of their amortisation arrived in ten weeks, and their inherited book runs out entirely by 2028/29 while the new one still has three years to run. Liverpool are the other extreme at £143.6m against £18.4m. Same chart, opposite stories, and neither was visible when it was one bar.

Who counts as “this window” is taken from the signing date, not from the flag the squad rows carry. The two disagree: the date catches six players the flag had missed — Garnacho and Cissé here at Villa, Bentley at Coventry, Charles at Fulham, Sá and Diomande at Forest — and never disagrees the other way. A derived test cannot be forgotten the way a hand-set one can, which is the same reasoning that put the sell-ons and the outgoing amortisation on derivations.

Two rows of figures now sit above the chart and they will not always agree, so the panel says which is which rather than leaving a reader to spot it. The first row and the graph are the SQUAD, split by arrival date. The second row is the DEALS, including advanced ones whose players are not in the squad table yet. Where they differ the panel names the gap and what it is — agreed business that has not completed.

26 Aug 2026

Every deal now shows what it costs per year — and the agent fee was being charged five times over FEATURE + FIX

A fee only means something against the charge it creates. £47.5m is a headline; £9.9m a year for five years is the thing that reaches the squad cost ratio. Until now this page printed the fee on every row and the amortisation on none of them. Both tables now carry an AMORT £m/yr column, and a panel underneath gives the number those rows add up into: the squad’s total annual amortisation, what this window has added and freed, and how the charge runs off over the next five seasons as existing deals finish.

None of it is newly typed data, which is the point. Incoming charges come from the player’s own squad row where one exists — real contract dates, five-year cap applied where it bites — and from fee over five years where a deal is advanced and the player is not in the squad yet, flagged est when that happens. Outgoing charges are derived rather than stored: a row’s cost-freed figure is the ungrossed wage plus the amortisation, so subtracting the wage leaves the charge that stops. They cannot drift from the totals above them because they are computed from them.

Loans show a zero, and that is the correct answer rather than a missing one. A loan moves the wage and leaves the registration here, so the amortisation stays too — the point this site has made about loans since the wage bridge, now visible as a column entry instead of a paragraph.

And a bug the new column sat straight on top of. The cost-per-year calculation behind these tables charged the agent fee in full every single year instead of capitalising it and spreading it over five — the same error corrected in the scenario modeller last week and missed here. On a £47.5m signing it overstated the annual cost by £1.9m. Every SCR-cost figure in the Ins and Outs tables, and the window’s cost-added total, move down accordingly.

One thing the new column makes visible and this page is not hiding: the SCR cost figures in these tables count wages at face value, while the rumour cards, the scenario panel and the wage bridge gross them up 1.45x for employer NI, bonuses and image rights. The same signing can therefore read £17.1m in the table and £20.2m on its card. The grossed figure is this site’s convention and the table is the odd one out. It is stated in the panel rather than quietly reconciled, because restating it moves every published window total on all twenty pages and deserves its own pass.

25 Aug 2026

Minteh added: two bids rejected, Brighton want £70m NEW

New entry 25 August. Ornstein reported an improved Liverpool bid worth around £60m turned down on Friday, with Brighton naming £70m; an earlier bid was rejected before it. Personal terms with the player are reported agreed and Liverpool are described as optimistic and weighing a third bid.

Graded at bids-rejected, not talks — two rejections is the opposite of one, and there is no club agreement. The modelled fee is Brighton’s £70m ask, not Liverpool’s £60m offer, because the ask is what a completed deal would cost; this page has been caught before modelling the number that was refused. At £70m he is ~£24.7m/yr, of which £14.6m is amortisation and £9.0m is a wage estimate that is entirely this tracker’s own.

Liverpool are reported to want two wingers before 1 September with Minteh ahead of Ibrahim Mbaye on the right. The two cards should be read together and not added together — the scenario panel will happily tick both, and that is not what the reporting describes.

25 Aug 2026

The “last updated” notice is gone — it had stopped telling the truth REMOVED

There were two of them. A line under the header reading “DEALS & FEES AS REPORTED [date] · BOOK VALUES & CALCS RECOMPUTE DAILY”, and a script that read that date and, once it was four days old, pushed an amber banner above the header warning that the page had last been checked N days ago.

The second one was firing on all twenty pages. The date it keyed off was hand-typed and ranged from 9 to 19 August across the site — while the deals underneath had in fact been swept on the 24th and 25th. So the site was leading with a warning about itself, generated from the one number on the page that nobody was maintaining. A staleness notice that is itself stale is worse than none: it tells readers to distrust figures that are current.

Both are removed, with their CSS. Nothing else changes — every ratio, book value and window total is unaffected, and the dated entries in this changelog remain the honest record of when each page was actually worked on.

23 Aug 2026

You can now change the numbers — and the card line beside them was still wrong FEATURE + FIX

Every fee on the rumour board is somebody’s estimate. Brugge “value him around €45m”. Al-Hilal’s bid reached this site in the wrong currency and had to be chased down. Marmoush’s fee is arithmetic off a reported two-player budget rather than a figure anyone published. Readers were being asked to take those guesses as given.

So the amounts are editable now. Every card carries a fee box, and incoming cards a wage box too. Type your own number and the card’s cost line and the scenario panel both follow it immediately. Reset puts the reported figure back — overrides are held separately and the underlying data is never overwritten, so there is always something true to return to. Outgoing cards expose the fee but not the wage, because an outgoing player’s relief is derived from his squad row rather than typed, and the fee is the part that actually moves the profit on the sale.

And a fix that should have landed with the modeller rebuild. The card’s own “ADDS £Xm/yr” line was still running the OLD formula — ungrossed wages, and the agent fee charged in full every year. The calculation underneath was corrected; the display beside it was not, so every card showed one number while the panel below computed another. On this site’s own worked example the card said £10.1m and the panel used £10.7m — the exact discrepancy that rebuild was written to explain, sitting in the markup the whole time. Both now call the same helper, and that is checked on all twenty pages: tick a card, and its figure and the panel’s agree.

22 Aug 2026

The 22 August sweep, and a modeller that was wrong three ways DATA + METHOD

Curtis Jones has gone to Inter for £25.6m guaranteed, rising to £30m, with a 10% sell-on retained. Academy product, so the book is £0 and the whole fee is profit. Two things follow that this page had built arguments on: the window's fee income was £0 and its net balance −£92.1m, both now wrong; and the club-trained four — Bradley, Jones, Elliott, Gomez — is a three. Gakpo's card said “no bid”; Tottenham have lodged £60m and he has agreed personal terms.

The scenario modeller was wrong in three ways at once, on every page on this site. An incoming signing's wage was charged with no gross-up, while the wage bridge, the ratio inputs and every note here gross wages by 1.45x for employer NI and image rights — so every modelled signing was 45% cheaper on the wage line than the same player would be in the ratio directly above it. The agent fee was charged in full every year instead of being capitalised with the fee and amortised, so a £60m signing carried £3m/yr of agent cost rather than £0.6m. And sale profit never reached the denominator: nineteen pages let a sale relieve the numerator and stop, when the profit also lands in the denominator through the three-year average, and the twentieth added the whole window's profit when one window belongs at roughly a third.

Why none of it showed up. The first two faults pull in opposite directions and roughly cancel at a typical fee-to-wage ratio — for a £25m signing on £70k/wk the old code gave £10.09m/yr against a true £10.73m, close enough to look right. They do not cancel at the edges: a free transfer on big wages was understated by 45%, a big fee on modest wages overstated by about 9%. Two errors that hide each other are worse than one that does not.

Outgoing relief is now derived, not typed. The hand-set relief on all eighty outgoing rumour cards carried the same ungrossed wage — checked against the squad, the stated figures reproduced the ungrossed derivation almost exactly. Relief and profit now come from the squad row, on the same gross-up and the same five-year cap as everything else, with the typed figure kept as a fallback for the handful of names with no squad row. Profit is allowed to be negative, because some of these sales are losses and the page should say so.

20 Aug 2026

Konsa card closed properly — he is an Arsenal player now DEAL COMPLETE

This card was already marked closed, but its club field still read "Aston Villa", which is the kind of stale attribute that produces the João Pedro failure mode — two pages placing one player at two clubs. The cross-page checker caught it the moment Arsenal's row went live. Now reads Arsenal, with the completed fee.

The substance is unchanged and worth restating: Liverpool never lodged a bid. The card stays as the record of an interest that never became a negotiation, and the centre-back question on this page is still unresolved.

19 Aug 2026

Araújo added — the centre-back question was answered on 9 August and this page missed it CORRECTION

What happened. Liverpool announced a season-long loan for Ronald Araújo from Barcelona on 9 August, with a £47.1m (€55m) option to buy. Two pages of this site were still describing the centre-back question as unresolved and the links as bidless. It was resolved before they said so.

Why it is an awkward deal to model. There is no loan fee in either direction and Liverpool pay 100% of the salary. So the amortisation line does not move at all — nothing was bought — and the entire cost lands on wages. That is the purest squad-cost spending available: no asset, no book value, no resale, just running cost for a season. The option is an option and not an obligation, so £47.1m enters no committed total until somebody exercises it.

The number to distrust. His wage is a tracker estimate of ~£150k/wk and a wide one. Barcelona salaries are badly disclosed and loan moves are usually renegotiated, so this single assumption moves the ratio by about two points on its own. The wage bridge on this page now carries it.

19 Aug 2026

Konsa has gone to Arsenal — a target Liverpool never bid for RUMOUR CLOSED

Ezri Konsa. Arsenal agreed £51m plus add-ons on 19 August with the medical set for the 20th. Liverpool were credited with interest for a fortnight and never lodged a bid, which was always the reason this sat in the Rumour Mill rather than the Ins table. The card is closed and kept as the record of an interest that never became a negotiation. The centre-back question on this page is unresolved.

15 Aug 2026

Barcola breakthrough — agreement in principle at ~€128m RUMOUR UPGRADED

Bradley Barcola. After two rejected bids and a €150m+ brief from Paris, the clubs are now reported to have an agreement in principle at ~€128m (~£110m). Barcola’s personal terms have been settled for weeks, Al-Khelaïfi has publicly confirmed negotiations, and PSG agreeing €55m for Ajax’s Mika Godts is the tell — you buy the replacement when you mean to sell. No signatures or medical yet, so the card stays a rumour with the modelled fee moved to £110m. At that price the deal would be Liverpool’s club record.

09 Aug 2026

Salah signs in Turkey, the Barcola stand-off hardens, and a second PSG teenager becomes the real story

Resolved: Mohamed Salah has a club. Trabzonspor announced a two-year contract on Thursday 6 August — reported €17m a year guaranteed (€10m salary plus a €7m per-year signing bonus, with a 20% merchandise-revenue clause), running to 2028 — ending the Sporting KC/MLS thread this page had carried as favoured. He left Liverpool by mutual agreement in May, so no Liverpool figure moves: £0 fee was already booked, his wage relief was already in the window totals. The Outs row, forwards chip and free-transfer FAQ now name the destination. Not a cross-club item — Trabzonspor are not a Premier League club.

Barcola: second bid in, second bid rejected. The improved offer of ~€115m (£98.5m) went in during the first week of August and PSG turned it down, with the Paris briefing hardening to €150m-plus excluding bonuses — a number Liverpool are reported unwilling to pay — and Sky calling the deal "difficult to complete" after talks. He STAYS at In talks: a rejected bid is not a collapse (terms with the player are said to be agreed and his agent is working the gap), but nothing here is advanced. The row, chip, rumour card, FAQ and headroom callout all now carry the rejected-bid wording instead of "gap unclosed".

Added to the Rumour Mill: Ibrahim Mbaye (PSG, 18). On 5 August this page recorded PSG offering him as leverage; by 6 August it had become a genuine parallel pursuit — club-to-club talks open, Liverpool's discussions reported the most advanced ahead of Leverkusen, the player keen, Iraola approving, PSG asking €40-50m (£34-43m). No fee agreed, so he is a rumour modelled at £38m (mid-ask), not a table row. No total moves.

Re-priced: Cody Gakpo, £40m → £70m, and the story inverts. Liverpool now brief no plans to sell without a "huge" offer — put at ~£70m by Football Insider — while Romano has Tottenham stepping up after contact with his representatives and the player open. The scenario model now uses the reported £70m (booking ~£56m profit against ~£14m book value) instead of the £40m floor. Still no bid from anyone. Involves Tottenham.

Centre-backs, one warmer and one colder. Konsa: Villa's dressing room reported "increasingly resigned" to his exit by 7 August, the price settling at the £60m mark, Liverpool said to be waiting on Barcola-budget clarity — but still no Liverpool bid, so he stays a rumour (modelled £70m, conservatively, against the £60m ask and Arsenal's rejected £64.1m). Involves Aston Villa and Arsenal. Tomori: cooled — 8 August reporting says he is not Anfield-bound and a different Premier League club has inquired; his card stays on the board at ~£15m only because the defensive need is real. Curtis Jones: two Inter bids now reported rejected and Jones described as reluctant about Forest; the £40m ask stands, nothing announced. Involves Nottingham Forest.

Recorded late, excluded from the window maths: Samuel Martínez. Liverpool announced an agreement on 21 July for the 17-year-old Colombian (Atlético Nacional, ~£750k, five-year deal) — missed at launch and added now to the forwards board and squad notes. Under FIFA's under-18 rules he cannot move until summer 2027, so per this page's own convention (Jacquet's January agreement sat in the 2026 window) his fee belongs to next year's window and no 2026 total moves. Also: Nyoni's loan is now ON HOLD — the standout of the US tour, with Iraola weighing keeping him; Aberdeen among the suitors if not.

Nothing completed, so every headline figure holds: committed fees £92.1m (Jacquet £55m+£5m, Muñoz £34.5m, Ndukwe £2.6m), fee income £0, net window balance −£92.1m, estimated squad cost ratio ~63% against the twin 70% lines. Amortisation continues to derive live from the squad contracts; the 3-year-average sale-profit input is untouched. Footnote from the weekend: Iraola's first Anfield match ended Liverpool 2-3 Monaco on Sunday, Isak and Wirtz scoring — pre-season noise, no compliance meaning. Carried forward unverified for lack of fresh reporting: the Gomez–Milan offer's current state, the Ndukwe loan destination, and the Mac Allister/Elliott/Endo threads, all unchanged from 5 August. External sourcing worked again today (searches only; the transfer-data domains themselves remain unfetchable from this environment), so the window list should be treated as verified at headline level and estimated in detail.

05 Aug 2026

A flat day at the top of the window — Wharton drops off the table, two centre-backs join the board

NOTHING COMPLETED, SO NOTHING WAS PROMOTED. No Liverpool deal was announced on 4 or 5 August, and no deal reached a medical or a "here we go". Every headline figure is therefore identical to yesterday's and that is the finding, not a gap in it: committed fees £92.1m (Jacquet £55m + £5m, Muñoz £34.5m, Ndukwe £2.6m), fee income £0, net window balance −£92.1m, estimated squad cost ratio ~63% against the twin 70% lines, squad table and amortisation runway untouched. A tracker earns its keep in a live window by making a flat day look flat.

Demoted off the Ins & Outs table: Adam Wharton. He has been sitting in the incoming table at in talks since launch. He should not have been: with under four weeks of the window left no bid has ever been lodged, Liverpool's interest is reported to have cooled at Palace's ~£100m valuation, Manchester United have been linked all summer without moving, and Palace are relaxed about keeping him. That is a link, not a negotiation, so he moves to the Rumour Mill — where the scenario model can still price him — and off the ledger. No total moves with him: a 'talks' row with no agreed fee was already excluded from every sum. Involves Crystal Palace, whose page carries the same story from the selling side.

Re-priced: Curtis Jones, £30m → £40m, and the suitor changes. This page had him as an Inter pursuit. Liverpool have named their price at £40m, and the club furthest along is now reported to be Nottingham Forest, who want him as the structural replacement for the £116m Elliot Anderson sale, with Inter still in it. Corriere dello Sport called a deal agreed on 11 July and Jones publicly denied it the following day; nobody has announced anything since, so he stays a rumour. Academy graduate, £0 book value, so the modelled profit rises with the fee to ~£40m — and he remains one of only four club-trained names holding up the List A quota. Involves Nottingham Forest — their page lists him as a target on the buying side, and the two pages should be reconciled centrally.

Two centre-backs added to the Rumour Mill, both at interest level only. Ezri Konsa (Aston Villa): Arsenal's reported £64.1m (€75m) bid of 2 August has not been accepted, Villa are braced for an improved offer while trying to tie him to a new contract running beyond 2028, and Liverpool are credited with interest alongside them — no Liverpool bid is reported, so he is a rumour, not a row, and the £70m modelled is an improved-offer estimate rather than a struck fee. Fikayo Tomori (AC Milan): Liverpool reported on 5 August to have made initial contact, against flatly contradictory briefing elsewhere about his situation and nothing from a reporter of record. Both are logged because Iraola's centre-back corps is genuinely thin — Van Dijk in his final year, Jacquet 20, Leoni back off an ACL, Gomez the subject of a Milan offer. Konsa involves Aston Villa and Arsenal.

New callout: the Milan exchange risk. Milan hold an official offer for Joe Gomez while Liverpool are now reported to be asking Milan about Tomori. If both concluded within 45 days on similar terms, UEFA's Annex G.3.5 would treat them as one exchange valued at the lower of fee and book value — and Gomez's book value is £0, so the ~£12m of profit the Gomez sale is modelled to book would vanish while Tomori's cost landed in full. Conditional, not a forecast, and counted in no total; flagged now because it is the kind of thing that only becomes visible after both deals are signed.

Also re-dated, unchanged in substance: Barcola stays in talks — the €120m bid lodged on 26 July is now ten days old with no reported movement on PSG's ~£145m valuation, and the row and chip now say so rather than implying momentum. Gakpo's note gains Tottenham as the named suitor (their page prices him nearer £65m than the £40m modelled here; no bid reported either way) — involves Tottenham. Gomez, Mac Allister, Elliott and Endo are unchanged.

Research limits, stated plainly. The same constraint as yesterday, and worse: this environment's search quota was exhausted before the first query and the network policy returned 403 for every transfer-data domain tried — Transfermarkt, the BBC, Sky, the Guardian and liverpoolfc.com included. So no external source could be consulted today. Everything above is cross-referenced from the site's own counterpart pages, which see deals involving other Premier League clubs and nothing else. That means the following are carried forward unverified rather than confirmed today: the Barcola negotiation with PSG, the Gomez–Milan offer, the Salah destination, the Ndukwe and Nyoni loans, and any arrival from or departure to a club outside the Premier League. None was promoted, none was removed, and no fee was invented. Treat the window list as verified for intra-Premier-League business and unverified for the rest.

04 Aug 2026

Methodology: squad-cost amortisation now derives from the squad contracts

The headroom model's amortisation input used to be a hand-maintained estimate, while the Squad tab computed the same thing bottom-up from every player's fee and contract dates. The two had drifted apart — by up to £29m across the league, which is several points of squad cost ratio on pages whose whole purpose is showing how close a club sits to a compliance line. The hero model now takes its amortisation straight from the squad contracts, so the headline ratio and the squad table can no longer disagree, and the figure updates itself whenever the squad data changes. The field is still editable: type over it and the what-if model responds as before. Wages remain a stated estimate — clubs publish total staff costs, not the players-plus-head-coach slice the rule needs, so that split is still this tracker's assumption and is labelled as one.

04 Aug 2026

Robertson marked complete · window audit

Corrected: Andy Robertson's move to Tottenham Hotspur is now recorded as done, not advanced. His Liverpool contract expired on 30 June 2026 and Spurs registered him on a free from 1 July, so the deal is complete; the Ins & Outs table, the defenders chip and the "why did they leave for free" note now all say so. No financial figure moves with it: a £0 fee changes no net-spend line, his wages and amortisation relief were already counted in the window totals, he was already out of the squad table and already marked gone on the CL A-list. Net spend stays −£92.1m (£92.1m out, £0 in), the squad cost ratio stays ~63% and PSR headroom is unchanged.

Audit scope, stated honestly: this pass was meant to rebuild the window from a full external source list (Transfermarkt or an official round-up) rather than trusting the list already on the page. That was not possible today — this environment's network policy blocked every transfer-data domain and the search quota was exhausted — so the rebuild fell back to the site's own 20-page counterpart oracle, which only sees moves between Premier League clubs. The three incomings (Jacquet £55m + £5m, Muñoz £34.5m clause, Ndukwe £2.6m) and five outgoings (Salah, Konaté, Robertson, plus the Ndukwe and Nyoni loans) are unchanged and no new deal was found; but arrivals from or departures to clubs outside the Premier League cannot be confirmed complete until an outside source is available. Treat the window list as verified for intra-PL business and unverified for the rest.

Left alone deliberately: the Barcola bid and the Wharton link stay in talks — neither has been announced. Curtis Jones remains a rumour: this page models an Inter exit while Nottingham Forest's tracker lists him as a £40m target, and a one-sided rumour is not a contradiction until somebody announces something.

27 Jul 2026

Page launched

The Bean Counter's Liverpool tracker goes live at bean-counter.co.uk/liverpool. Baseline data loaded: FY2024/25 accounts (record £703m revenue, £428m staff costs, +£15.2m pre-tax); the summer 2026 window to date — Jacquet (£55m + £5m add-ons), Muñoz (£34.5m clause) and Ndukwe (£2.6m) in, Salah, Konaté (Real Madrid) and Robertson (Spurs-bound) out on frees; squad book values and straight-line amortisation model; the Rumour Mill seeded with the live Barcola bid (€120m in, PSG holding out), Wharton's £100m price, and the Gomez–Milan, Jones–Inter, Gakpo, Mac Allister and Elliott exit threads. Also logged: Edwards' resignation as FSG's CEO of football, Hughes' expected post-window exit to Al-Hilal, Ekitiké's Boxing Day target, Leoni's return, Chiesa's stay-put u-turn, and Ndukwe's work-permit refusal forcing an immediate loan. All 12 tabs shipped.

Glossary

Every rule in this tracker, in plain English — each with a real Liverpool example. For the group chat member who just asked "what's SCR?"

PSR (Profit & Sustainability Rules)
The Premier League's rule capping losses at £105m over a rolling three-year period (£35m/yr), after 'good' spending on academy, infrastructure, community and women's football is deducted. Liverpool have never been charged in the rule's history; the final-ever assessment is January 2027, then squad-cost rules take over.
Squad Cost Ratio (UEFA SCR)
UEFA's rule limiting spending on the squad — player and head-coach wages, transfer amortisation and agent fees — to 70% of football revenue plus net transfer profit, tested on a calendar-year basis. Liverpool sit around 63% on this tracker's estimates: a £480-500m squad cost carried by the deepest revenue base in England.
PL Squad Cost Ratio (PL SCR)
The Premier League's version of the squad cost rule, tested on a season basis rather than calendar year, phasing in from 2026/27 as PSR retires. Clubs in Europe — Liverpool included — carry a 70% green line (red at 100%); clubs outside Europe get 85%/115%. First checkpoint October 2026, assessment March 2027.
Football Earnings Rule (FER)
UEFA's successor to break-even: clubs may lose no more than €60m (~£52m) over three years, counting only football earnings — player-sale profits count, intra-group asset sales don't. Liverpool comply on real trading alone: FY25's £15.2m profit plus an estimated £120m+ of FY26 sale profits from Díaz, Núñez, Quansah and co.
CFCB
UEFA's Club Financial Control Body — the panel that judges compliance, imposes fines and agrees settlements. In July 2026 it fined Villa, Chelsea, Newcastle and Forest. Liverpool have never appeared in a CFCB decision list.
Settlement Agreement
A negotiated compliance plan with UEFA in place of escalating punishment: annual targets, monitoring, suspended penalties, sometimes registration restrictions. Liverpool have never needed one — which is why this page has no "hard gate" tab where others do.
List A
A club's registered senior squad for UEFA competition, capped at 25 with homegrown quotas: at least 8 locally trained, of whom effectively 4 must be club-trained. Liverpool's club-trained four — Bradley, Jones, Elliott, Gomez — includes three players on the for-sale list, which is the quota story of this window.
List B
The unlimited under-22 list for players with two uninterrupted years at the club since their 15th birthday. Covers Ngumoha, Danns and Nyoni for 2026/27 — free registration depth that spares A-spots.
Amortisation
Spreading a transfer fee as a cost over the contract length. Wirtz's £100m guaranteed fee on a five-year deal costs ~£20m/yr in the books; Isak's £125m about £25m/yr under the five-year cap — which is why the 2025 window costs ~£75m every year until 2030, whoever manages the team.
Five-Year Amortisation Cap
UEFA and PL rule that fees must be amortised over a maximum of five years even on longer contracts — closing the eight-year-contract loophole. Muñoz's six-year Liverpool deal amortises over five in the official books.
Book Value
What's left of a player's fee still to be amortised. Sale profit = fee minus book value. Curtis Jones and Harvey Elliott carry ~£0, so any sale is essentially pure profit; Konaté's book value was £0 when his contract expired, so his free exit cost the accounts nothing — only the future.
Pure Profit
Shorthand for selling a £0-book-value player (academy graduate or free transfer): the entire fee lands as profit for PSR/FER purposes. The engine of modern compliance — and the reason every for-sale list starts with academy names.
Free-Transfer Exodus
This page's shorthand for summer 2026: Salah, Konaté and Robertson leaving on frees. Books £0 profit but removes ~£33m/yr (est) of wages from the SCR numerator — the mirror image of a fire sale: no cash in, all cost out.
45-Day Exchange Rule
UEFA Annex G.3.5: opposite-direction transfers between the same clubs within 45 days on similar payment terms are treated as a player exchange, valued at the LOWER of fee and book value — slashing bookable profit. Liverpool have no swaps on the books; the rule mainly constrains how any player-plus-cash structure (a makeweight in a Barcola deal, say) could be priced.
PL 4% Transfer Levy
A 4% surcharge on transfer fees paid by Premier League clubs, funding player pension and education schemes. It capitalises into the registration cost and amortises with the fee — Jacquet's £55m really costs £57.2m.
FIFA Solidarity Contribution
Up to 5% of an international transfer fee distributed to the clubs that trained the player between ages 12 and 23. Rennes' £55m for Jacquet sheds a slice to his formative clubs; rides inside the transfer cost for compliance purposes.
Intra-Group Asset Sale
Selling an asset (women's team, real estate) to a company under the same ownership to book profit — allowed by the PL under PSR, rejected by UEFA's FER, and explicitly closed under the new PL SCR. Liverpool's accounts have never contained one; FSG's stadium funding runs the other way, as intercompany loans into the club.
Sell-On Clause
A percentage of any future sale owed to a selling club. Osasuna owed Real Madrid 50% of Muñoz's £34.5m clause from his 2025 move — a reminder that the fee a club receives and the fee it keeps are different numbers.
Senior Loan Quotas
Limits on loan signings: domestically, max 2 concurrent (4 per season) from English clubs and never two from the same club; internationally, max 6 senior FIFA loans each way — U21 and club-trained players exempt, which is why Ndukwe's and Nyoni's loans out cost nothing against the quota.
SSR (Sustainability & Systemic Resilience)
The PL's incoming liquidity and solvency tests running alongside the squad cost rules — an £85m stress test against liquid assets (including 40% of squad market value) plus a positive-equity ratio tightening to 80% by 2028/29. For a £703m-revenue club with FSG's balance sheet, the easiest test on the page.
Headroom
The gap between current squad cost and the 70% line — the practical transfer budget. Liverpool's is ~£55m/yr of running cost on the model defaults: roughly one Barcola, and then nothing.
Calendar vs Season Test
UEFA tests the ratio over the calendar year (Liverpool's 2026 number freezes 31 December); the PL tests the season (assessment March 2027). The June frees improve both, on different clocks — half a year of saved wages for UEFA, a full season's worth for the PL.